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

Charles William Super, Ph. D., LL. D.

WISDOM AND WILL IN EDUCATION

By

CHARLES WILLIAM SUPER, PH.D., LL.D.

Ex-President of the Ohio University and Professor of Greek, Ibidem; Translator of Weil's Order of Words; Author of a History of the German Language Between Heathenism and Christianity, &c.

HARRISBURG, PA.
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"If thou wilt mighty be, flee from the rage
Of cruel will: and see that thou keep free
From the foul yoke of sensual bondage:
For though thine empire stretch to Indian sea,
And for thy fear trembleth farthest Thule,
If thy desire hath over thee the power,
Subject then art thou and no governour."

Wyat.

"For when was public virtue to be found
When private was not? Can he love the whole
Who loves no part? He be a nation's friend
Who is, in truth, the friend of no man there?"

Cowper.

"And more than common strength and skill
Must ye display;
If you would give the better will
Its lawful sway."

Wordsworth.

TO MY COLLEAGUES BOTH OF THE GENTLER AND THE STERNER SEX, WHO DURING THE PAST YEARS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH ME IN THE INTERNAL MANAGEMENT OF THE OHIO UNIVERSITY, WHO SHARED WITH ME THE PLEASURES AND THE PAINS, THE PENALTIES AND THE PLAUDITS OF COLLEGE LIFE, AND BUT FOR WHOSE KINDLY PARTICIPATION IN THE MANIFOLD DUTIES OF A LABORIOUS POSITION THERE WOULD HAVE REMAINED TO ME NO TIME FOR SYSTEMATIC LITERARY WORK, THESE STUDIES ARE GRATEFULLY DEDICATED BY THE

AUTHOR.

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INTRODUCTION.

"We can not get along with the women; but" (after a pause) "I suppose we can not get along without them." This remark was made to me many years ago by a fellow teacher after a somewhat stormy altercation with one of his female patrons who had been endeavoring to instruct him in the rights and privileges of her children. It has often seemed to me since, when I have recalled the quotation, that with a slight change it is applicable to our present social conditions. Everybody realizes that we can not get along without education; yet many intelligent persons are reiterating that education is not accomplishing what may be justly expected of it. If the putting in practice of a rational system of instruction were entirely in the hands of teachers we should doubtless see a rapid advance toward so desirable a goal. But in democratic communities where almost everybody has something to say about what is to be done and how it is to be done, especially in matters that concern or are supposed to concern every man, woman and child, progress in popular education can, in the nature of the case, move forward no faster than progress in general enlightenment.

Notwithstanding the title of the book the contents are for the most part of a sociological rather than of an educational character. They deal with man in his collective

capacity more than with him as an individual. The body politic does not consist of a sum total obtained by adding together a number of homogeneous units like a sum in arithmetic. It is well known that a howling mob is often made up of individually sane men. Man in his collective capacity is more easily moved by an appeal to his good or his evil impulses than when alone.

While it is true that we have no guide for the future but the experience of the past and that men have remained substantially unchanged within the historic period, the same conditions are never exactly duplicated and conduct must be constantly readjusted to new circumstances as they arise. If, therefore, it is wisely regulated it requires careful thought. There are, however, certain fundamental rules of action that are as invariable in their operation and effects as any law of nature, and the fundamental problem of scientific pedagogy is how to stimulate the selfhood or the self-activity of the individual so that he will always shape his course in conformity to these laws.

It is the business of the sociologist and the psychologist to investigate, to define and to formulate the forces, both external and internal, that make one people or one age different from another; that of the educationist to put into operation the agencies that will bring about the results he wishes to produce. It is to be feared that herein will be found the chief shortcoming of the great body of teachers. They regard each subject that enters into the curriculum as an end in itself, whereas it ought to be subsidiary to the remoter object of preparing the rising generation for the performance of those duties that devolve upon it in the complex relations of institutional life.

The history of education is in the main the history of civilization; or, we may transpose our terms and say that

the history of civilization is chiefly the history of education. Every nation that has had any claim to be considered enlightened has bestowed a large share of its best thought on the training of the young; and almost every philosopher, from Socrates to Herbert Spencer, has had more or less to say on the subject. Every progressive people that has appeared on the scene of history has had some sort of a system of national education, however unsystematic it may have been; and the rate of its advancement may generally be measured by the degree of intelligent attention the problem received. As long as the instruction of the young was based on nature and had due regard to institutional life each generation became wiser than its predecessor. When this ceased to be the case and mere dogma was substituted, progress ceased. For nearly a thousand years Europe was virtually at a standstill because its best intellects were more intent on finding their own views in the works of the ancient Greeks and Romans than in interrogating nature at first hand. The best thoughts which the Greek philosophers had left on record were either not understood or not heeded.

After all, progress is relative; we see in the course of events one people at one time, another at another time, taking its place at the head of the procession that marches before the mind's eye of the student of the past from the earliest times to the present.

Every system of education to be intrinsically valuable must have regard to the past and look to the future; it must take into account man both as an individual and man as a member of the community. In so far as the historic systems have failed it has been because they neglected to take into due account in practice one or both of these factors. Too much stress has always been laid on the na-

tional or local element and not enough on the cosmopolitan. Each nation, it is true, must, in virtue of its situation and to some extent by reason of its history and traditions, move toward the goal to be reached by a somewhat different route, but the goal is the same for all. Truth is unvarying in all ages and countries, and will continue so to the end of time. It is a sad fact that the governments of the world have so often repeated the same blunders, instead of profiting by the experience of others. Some, even of the States of our Union have at times tried to accomplish by legislation what the attempts of others in the same direction ought to have shown them was impossible or at least unwise.

It can not be too often or too vigorously called to the attention of our public that the school is not the only agency by which the youth are trained and their characters moulded. The bench, the bar, the press, the pulpit, the medical profession, the family and public opinion are all potent educators. Is the preponderance of their influence educating upward or downward?—this is the important question. If the latter, be it ever so little, the results will in time be serious. Are we not in danger of becoming so much occupied with the welfare of the Cubans, the Filipinos and with other more or less far-off projects that we overlook the threatened lowering of the ideals that should serve as beacon lights to those in power and authority? It is well to be generous; it is better to be judicious. If the good Samaritan had discovered that the man whom he was succoring was not without means and had subsequently succeeded in collecting a pretty large bill for services, he would probably be none the less regarded as a philanthropist, but his care of the wounded stranger would not have been transmitted to posterity as the deed of a

man who was actuated by purely altruistic motives. If the ideal of conduct as taught in our schools comes to be regarded as incompatible with what are subsequently considered as the essentials of success in civic life their influence will soon be overborne or made nugatory. Not only in our own country but in France and Germany are heard loud complaints that the educational system breaks down in a great measure when considered as an agency for building strong and upright men. It is not charged that the teachers are at fault but that society is corrupting.

Our courts can do more than any other agency to foster the love of justice and to engender popular confidence in the triumph of right. But if our lawyers are more willing to put forth their best efforts to compass the acquittal of rich criminals than to secure redress for the wronged, whether they can pay liberally for the service or not; if they attach more importance to purchased fidelity to an individual or a corporation than to their obligation to the community as a whole, we have just cause for alarm. Unless public opinion is greatly at fault, the legal profession is chiefly responsible for the spirit of lawlessness that has so sadly debauched our civic life. If law-breakers are permitted to feel that they can generally trust to money or a perverted local sentiment to secure immunity from punishment, it is of little use to teach the young so to regulate their conduct that it will always square with the right. If the rich and influential are permitted to evade the laws, the poor will in the end come to believe that they are their oppressors rather than their protectors, and that their only hope lies in their subversion by violence, if need be. Such a course will, at least, not make their condition worse. We already hear it said that the morality of the schools is irreconcilable with the imperative demands of practical

life. If this belief becomes wide-spread and deep-rooted it will ruin our schools. It will be a sheer waste of time and effort to teach and to learn what is of no use; yea, worse than useless.

What can we say of our press as an educator? That much of our periodical literature is ethically indifferent no one will deny. It is intended solely to amuse or to help its readers to pass away time for which they find no better and no worse use. Perhaps no fault ought to be found with this. That a good deal of it is elevating no one can gainsay. On the other hand, much that appears in the daily and weekly press is positively debasing. Those who are responsible would probably protest against the impeachment. Their plea is that they do not make men worse; that they only send to market wares that will sell, and if a certain portion of the public taste is corrupt it is no fault of theirs: they are merely doing business. There is probably not a large city in the United States but has one or more dailies or weeklies which always give a good deal of space to lynchings, rapes, murders, divorces, breaches of promise, etc., written up with horrible or salacious details and intended to gratify a morbid or a prurient appetite. These periodicals, which may be had for one, two, three and five cents an issue, are regularly or irregularly bought by persons who read little else. The purchasers will spend dollar after dollar in driblets who could not be induced to spend one-tenth of this sum for something that is elevating. The argument that such papers are printed for money is utterly fallacious before the forum of morals; for, by parity of reasoning, people ought to be furnished with whatever they are willing and able to pay for. A brutal murder or a spicy divorce case, the parties concerned in which had never before been heard of by any-

body but their nearest neighbors, fills column after column day after day; an educational association or some other assembly with like aims, at which men and women of wide reputation discuss questions of the deepest significance, is put off with a few inches of space.

How little can the professional teacher do toward reducing the pernicious influence of such stuff to a minimum! It is true only to a limited extent that what we put into our schools we shall afterward find in our institutional life. I once heard an old gentleman called upon to open a Sunday school with prayer. He refused with the remark that he paid his preacher to do his praying for him. With equal consistency, but with much less reason—for a man may lead an upright life who never prays in public—many parents expect teachers to lead their children to practice what they themselves do not practice. I knew a man who generally became profane when under excitement, but who never failed to punish his boys for profanity when their transgression came to his knowledge. This same man never lost an opportunity to preach the theoretical importance of fair and square dealing in all business transactions; but he could not suppress the temptation to chuckle before his family over his shrewdness when he had got the advantage in a bargain. Is it any wonder than one of this man's sons, who was more astute and more unscrupulous than his brothers, cheated his father out of his property? All the family subsequently went to the bad, this son among the rest. The case would not be worth citing were it not more or less typical. What did all the moral influence of the school accomplish in the face of home teachings? Absolutely nothing. If every man and every woman could be brought to see that they are factors in the moral life of the community, society would be regenerated in a few

decades. Unless an increasingly large number can be made to realize that upon them depends the well-being of the next generation, that generation will be the worse for their short-sightedness. In theory not many persons in any community are inherently dishonest or untruthful, but many maintain that the current ethical ideal is too high for this practical and matter-of-fact world. They regulate their dealings according to a new commandment which they, have, perhaps, never formulated into a sentence, but which they nevertheless observe sacredly, or at least as sacredly as they observe anything, "Thou shalt not get found out."

It is a healthful sign that nearly all our periodicals of the better class are now giving attention to matters that not many years ago used to be regarded as of interest and importance to teachers only. We have herein the evidence of a wide-spread conviction that education means more than mere "schooling," and that the largest possible public must be enlisted in the work of fostering and creating a wholesome public opinion.

I am neither a pessimist nor an alarmist; but I am unable, or rather I have no desire, to close my eyes to the tendencies I see about me. It is much pleasanter to commend than to criticize, but it is far less wholesome. To belittle a danger neither removes it nor makes it less. It is well to recall often the weighty words of Lincoln's second inaugural: "I see in the near future a crisis arising which unnerves me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my country. As a result of the war, corporations have been enthroned, and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all the wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic will be destroyed. I feel at this time more

anxious for my country than even in the midst of the war." The destruction of the Republic as a form of government is not necessarily the worst misfortune that could befall our posterity; for history abundantly proves that nominal republics may be the worst of tyrannies. But history also shows that a society may become so corrupt and effeminate that there is no cure for it except virtual extermination. Does such a fate await any of the great nations now existing upon the face of the earth?

Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, and unremitting industry the indispensable condition of progress. There must not only be the wisdom which is founded on a knowledge of what has been, but the will to transform it into action. While it is well to know what is, it is still better to know what ought to be and to strive for its realization. From the watch-tower of the present we may, if we will, behold by means of the powers which science puts into our hands the causes that led to the destruction of so much in the past that would seem to have been well worthy of preservation. Will the nations go on cycle after cycle trying to do that which the eternal decrees have over and over shown to be impossible? Righteousness and righteousness only exalteth a nation. It may become conspicuous by other means and for a time occupy a large place, but there will be no permanence in its prestige. If our age is on the whole better than any that has preceded it the conditions are due to the genuinely patriotic men and women who have not been wholly absorbed in the selfish quest for power and pelf, but who have devoted a part of their energies to the public good. The hope of our country lies in the persistent activity of its moral forces. It will avail us nothing to solace ourselves with the reflection that because we have done fairly well hitherto—remarkably well, com-

paratively—we shall continue to prosper. Every generation needs to realize that it is the custodian of its successor; that it is in duty bound not only to transmit to posterity all the inheritance it has come into possession of, but also to increase it and to add to its value. The nation that is always "pointing with pride" to its past achievements is in serious danger of forgetting its duty to the present. Let not this be our folly and our fate. All the world admits that the American people may have a glorious future before them. They have their own history that is on the whole an honorable one, and that of the race, for their guidance like the rest of mankind; they have also like them the priceless intellectual treasures so abundant everywhere and so easy of attainment in our day. But they have this in addition that they are not shackled by the irrational traditions that so generally warp the judgment, nor cramped in their development by financial burdens. By their position and resources they are secure against foreign wars; by the abundance and variety of their natural products they are only dependent upon the outside world so far as they care to be. If their career closes like that of so many powerful nations that have preceded them it will not be because it was their destiny but their desert. It will be because internal corruption has weakened them and made them a prey to the disintegrating agencies that are sleeplessly vigilant for harm in every body politic.

While we need not take in their bald literalness the lines of George Berkeley's poem beginning,

> "The muse, disgusted at an age and clime
> Barren of every glorious theme,"

Yet we see more than a grain of truth in the conclusion,

"Westward the course of empires takes its way;
The first four acts already past,
A fifth shall close the drama with the day:
Time's noblest offspring is the last."

Every people has its heroes. They are usually regarded with a reverence that increases with their remoteness in time. Posterity endows them with all those qualities and excellencies and disinterested motives which it admires but looks for in vain among contemporaries. It is the exclusive privilege of Americans to be permitted to look back upon their history and to contemplate in the full blaze of its clearest light one name at least in which the reality embodies the ideal. Well might Eliza Cook pen lines like these:

"Land of the West! though passing brief the record of thine age,
Thou hast a name that darkens all on history's wide page!
Let all the blasts of fame ring out—thine shall be loudest far;
Let others boast their satellites—thou hast the planet star.
Thou hast a name whose characters of light shall ne'er depart,
'Tis stamped upon the dullest brain and warms the coldest heart;
A war-cry fit for any land where Freedom's to be won;
Land of the West! it stands alone—it is thy Washington!"

Yet it would be unjust to others, notably to Abraham Lincoln, to say that he had less ability or was a less disinterested patriot than his illustrious predecessor.

It can not be too often or too insistently called to the attention of the young that patriotism does not consist wholly

or even chiefly in the display of bravery on the field of battle,—an opportunity that comes to but few—but in performing day by day those civic duties that are the privilege and ought to be the pride of every lover of his country and his race.

Few persons are interested in the virtues in the abstract: all are attracted and many inspired by them when incorporated in flesh and blood and exhibited in activity. It is a great moral and pedagogical advantage to have such characters to place before the youth of our land for their encouragement and imitation. The privilege can not be overestimated and ought to be assiduously improved. If we would maintain the prestige among the nations of the earth that has so unexpectedly fallen to us within the last few years we must see to it that our intellectual and moral progress not only keeps pace with our political power but outstrips it. Our destiny will be determined by the manner in which we perform our duty.

It has seemed to me, as a serious student of ethnological psychology and its outward expression in the development of institutions to be not altogether superfluous to collect the following papers into a book. The private soldier can justify the recital of his uneventful experiences with the plea that though unimportant they are not quite paralleled by those of the commander-in-chief. No two persons can see a thing from exactly the same point of view; but if their views be founded on truth there will be a substantial agreement, no matter how large the number of observers. No claim is made to originality. It has, however, occurred to me and to others who have seen or heard these papers and addresses that if collected into a volume they might here and there find a reader who could get from it a few ideas that he had not come upon eleswhere. Some of them have

already appeared in print, but all have been rewritten and are substantially new.

A few illustrations have been repeated and attention called more than once to the same historic period. It has seemed to me that they have been appropriately used in each case, nor is the point of view exactly the same, and I saw no reason for expunging the apparent repetition. If any person enters upon the perusal of this volume with the expectation of finding in it profound thoughts and subtle reasoning he is doomed to disappointment. Its contents are not the work of a profound thinker; nor are they intended for those who go "to the bottom of things." They are rather the studies of one who believes that men need to be reminded far more than they need to be instructed; of one who has long held the conviction that the highest attribute of mankind is the capacity to learn and that the noblest quality of the individual is the willingness to learn. Is it too much to hope that they will at least furnish a little stimulus to reflection?

Neither are the papers wholly consistent with each other. Consistency may be as foolish as inconsistency. They reflect to some extent the mood of mind in which they were prepared and the varying points of view from which the same subject, or closely allied subjects, were studied. All are intended to be suggestive rather than conclusive.

Moreover, to state plainly what has already been said by implication, they have not been prepared especially for teachers. I repeat that popular education is by no means the exclusive affair of teachers; it is rather the affair of the whole body politic, of which teachers are the most important part, indeed, but other classes have their responsibilities as well. Teachers ought to lead, and to lead so wisely that the rest of the community will be glad to follow.

When we are treating of those agencies that lead to the accumulation of wealth and the exploitation of the material resources of the earth we are justified in using strong terms. In this respect our age has far outstripped all that have preceded it. On the other hand, we can not shut our eyes and our minds to the visions of poverty and distress that meet us on every hand; while in the spiritual realm we are on the whole far poorer than were our fathers and grandfathers. To affirm that powerful disintegrating agencies are at work among us, as they are in every civilized state, is not to deny the cogency of many conserving forces. To assert that our modern educational systems still leave much to be desired is not equivalent to denying that they are wholly or even largely failures. If they were doing all that may be expected of them we should not see so many of our best minds engaged in studying and suggesting how they may be improved. It is a fatal sign when individuals and peoples are so well satisfied with themselves that they see no need of change and have no desire for it. Judicious criticism is not grumbling, and fault-mending is not fault-finding. Yet nobody is the better for being told that things are amiss if it is not also suggested to him how they may be righted, or if the critic is himself unwilling to take a hand in the work of improvement.

"The smallest effort is not lost;
Each wavelet on the ocean toss'd
Aids in the ebb tide or the flow;
Each raindrop makes some floweret blow;
Each struggle lessens human woe."

It is a sociological quite as much as it is a spiritual truth that "none of us liveth to himself and none dieth to

himself." Society is not in any of its stages a work of art that has come complete and finished from the hand of the master. Neither is it to be compared to an immature plant or animal that needs but to be placed in a favorable environment in order that it may attain its full development. It is a unique entity. While always imperfect, it may be brought continually nearer to an ideal perfection. It is an organism composed of an infinity of self-conscious but not self-constituted units. The rapidity with which it approaches perfection will be determined by the clearness with which its units apprehend the goal before them and the effort with which they strive to attain it. In other words, the progress of society will always be regulated by the wisdom with which the end to be attained is apprehended by those who constitute society and the will that is exerted toward its attainment. A strenuous life is good; a purposeful life is better. C. W. S.

ATHENS, OHIO, September the twelfth, 1902.

ASPECTS OF ANCIENT GREEK EDUCATION.

Ever since the revival of learning there has been manifest in all parts of the civilized world a great deal of interest in the educational agencies of the ancient Greeks. Not only have many scholars been led by a scientific curiosity to ascertain what could be learned about the internal affairs of so remarkable a people, but the larger public has to a greater or less degree participated in the inquiry or its results. Besides, there has also been a systematic and persistent effort to find out, so far as this was possible, to what extent the intense intellectual activity of the fifth century B. C. was due to agencies outside of Greece, and how far it was a native product of Greek genius. Historians have also sought to discover to what degree the intellectual development of this era was fostered of set purpose by the leaders of public opinion. Our own times have called into existence a large number of special works on education in ancient Greece, from the bulky volumes of Grasberger to the brief monographs whose name is legion. I am not aware, however, that Greek civilization was studied from the exclusively pedagogical point of view until the appearance of Cramer's two-volume work, entitled GESCHICHTE DER ERZIEHUNG UND DES UNTERRICHTS IM ALTERTHUM, 1832-4; though Professor Jacobs and others had written a good deal intended to throw light on certain phases of the general subject.

For the last four or five centuries the Greeks have been our schoolmasters, as they were of the Romans of the older time, and the inquiry is certainly pertinent: Who were the schoolmasters of the Greeks? The search after the mysterious influence that made them a unique people is like the quest after many of the still undiscovered secrets of nature. We can describe results and set forth proximate causes, but there always remains a residuum that eludes our closest scrutiny. National characteristics are something for which no adequate explanation has yet been found. Anthropological and ethnological psychology is a historical, not a mathematical science; its data cannot be used for predicting the future. The adept can exhibit the *How* of many phenomena, not the *Why*. A nation's history is, no doubt, in a large measure, the resultant of the physical conditions in which it lives, but not wholly. The same soil and the same atmosphere have frequently nourished, and still nourish, nations of widely different mental characteristics. So, too, national traits often change—slowly, it is true—where physical conditions vary but little, if at all. Sometimes the great thinkers of a nation are the acme and culmination of its psychic forces; they are only *primi inter pares*. This is true of the age of Pericles, of Augustus, of Elizabeth, of Louis XIV. Sometimes they stand out like intellectual and spiritual monuments amid the general abasement or indifference which serve only to show that the spirit of their countrymen is not wholly extinct. Such was the age of Milton in his almost solitary grandeur, and in a less degree of Goethe and Schiller. The coryphæi of Italian literature form, for the most part, a small and hapless procession as they pass before our mind's eye; and some of the brightest intellects of ancient Greece seemed at times to be oppressed with the

feeling of their loneliness. Whose was the fault I do not say: I only speak of the fact.

The progress of a people or a nation may be measured by its system of instruction; and as the people of the nineteenth century are taking an unprecedented interest in all that relates to popular education, there has been a growing desire to look more carefully into Greek pedagogy in order to ascertain, if possible, whether it contains anything of stimulus or warning for our times. Probably no one familiar with the facts would deny that the audiences that listened to the speeches of Pericles, or the coteries that gathered about Socrates, or took sides in the bitter forensic contests between Demosthenes and Aeschines, were the most intelligent ever assembled for a like purpose.

Nevertheless, the society they represented had in it the seeds of decay that soon developed into vigorous life and destroyed the organism in which they had planted themselves. In our day those to whom is entrusted the instruction of the rising generation are held to be largely responsible for its morals and its patriotism. Does a like responsibility rest upon the teachers of the ancient Greeks? Did these enlightened commonwealths fall into political disintegration because their schoolmasters were faithless to their trust, or fail through shortsightedness to point out to the rising generation the way of safety? Or did misfortune come upon all because no such state-constituted guardians existed whose duty and privilege it was to hold up persistently the true aim of life? The answer, at least in part, is that no state of Greece had a system of education, as the term is now understood; that the teaching of the sophists was well calculated to accentuate the inherent selfishness of the Greeks, and that the Greeks were cursed with certain fundamental vices which probably no system of

education could have wholly neutralized. At any rate, they are quite as conspicuous to-day as they were at any time in the past.

The student of the history of education, beginning with the remotest times, can hardly avoid the conviction that the men who have made the deepest impression upon the life and thought of the world are the product of times when the state did but little for the enlightenment of the masses. There may be little or no connection between the two conditions, but we constantly find them existing side by side. In Athens, the era in which lived Socrates and Plato, Aristotle and Demosthenes is a conspicuous example Few men of antiquity have so profoundly influenced the thoughts of the world, beginning almost from the day of his death, as Cicero, yet he, in no sense, owed his education to the laws under which he lived; neither did Caesar, nor Horace, nor Virgil. Many of the countries of modern Europe have had their universities for four or five centuries, but in most cases their conservatism has been so pronounced that they afforded but little stimulus or scope for independent investigation. Some of them have not yet been aroused out of their mediaeval sleep, while others were stirred from their lethargy by intellectual forces which were created outside of the sphere of their influence and against which bars and bolts were powerless. We are almost forced to the conclusion that there is no necessary connection between a nation's greatness and its educational system, nor even between the former and the great men who are born upon its soil. If, therefore, we study systems of instruction with the hope of finding therein that which will show us how a nation becomes great, we shall almost invariably be disappointed. They do not make great men. They have chiefly a historical, rarely, if ever, a

practical value. Much as there may be in the intellectual productions of great men—Socrates, for example, has furnished food for the mental digestion of millions of thinking people—there is little apparently in the age in which he lived to show that he was its natural outcome, though there is no doubt that if he had lived amidst a different environment his activity would have been directed in a different channel. Men of his type can not be called into existence at will. There is much truth in the statement that a nation's history is a biography of its great men. In the last analysis thought rules the world more than most persons are willing to believe. The truth, when steadfastly and disinterestedly proclaimed, is certain of a wider recognition than the bounds of a nation or the limits of an age. Why is the Greek education that produced the great men of the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ of more interest to us than that in which were trained Shakespeare and Milton, or Lessing and his contemporaries? Because all these fed more or less on the intellectual product of the ancient soil. In a sense, then, a study of Greek pedagogy is an examination of the sources from which the later comers drew their intellectual inspiration more or less directly. But they used these materials only as genius and talent uses such materials—as stimulus.

It is not the purpose of the present paper to furnish a history of Greek education. It is too brief for that. On the other hand, it is impossible in our day to write more than a mere sketch, for the reason that the extant materials are exceedingly scanty. There is only room here to record a few fairly well authenticated facts and to set forth certain inferences that have occurred to the writer during the quarter of a century that he has studied the subject. The scantiness of the material that has come down to us is

sufficient evidence that the Greek public did not attach the importance to national education that is attached to it by the leading nations of the day. If the large cities of Europe or America were to be swept from the face of the earth as completely as those of ancient Greece, there is hardly one among the ruins of which would not be found unmistakable evidence that it had been the seat of great educational institutions. But the ruins of Greek cities tell us little of education. There were no buildings corresponding to our colleges and universities, as no Greek state seriously concerned itself for the instruction of its youth beyond the mere rudiments of knowledge. It is greatly to be regretted that we have so little definite information about Greek elementary education. Many writers have more or less to say upon education, but they tell us rather what it ought to be than what it was. While, therefore, it is comparatively easy to write a history of Greek educational theories, it is impossible to say much about Greek educational practice without feeling that a great deal of what we say is possibly erroneous. We know almost nothing of Greek school-rooms; the preparation required of teachers, though of their fitness they were probably themselves the sole judges; of the books and other appurtenances used, such as maps, globes, slates, etc. In short, on the external appliances for teaching, that are now considered well nigh indispensable, we have only the most meager information. It is probable that these things played a very subordinate part in the work of instruction and that the stress was laid almost wholly upon purely mental labor. Need we be surprised because such great results were produced by such meager means? Or is it not rather the great vice of modern pedagogy that it helps the pupil too much?

A leading trait of the Greeks, especially of the Ionians, was the desire to know. Paul tells us that even in his time many of them were constantly on the alert to find out some new thing. This desire in its inception is mere idle curiosity, but it is the foundation of scientific inquiry. From it sprang the fruitful growth of Greek, and indeed of all philosophy. It impressed the Apostle, because to his Oriental mind it was something almost incomprehensible. In the Homeric Poems but faint traces of it are manifest, and it was never very conspicuous among the Dorians, but reached its fullest development among the Athenians. To what it led is well known. It is related of many Greeks that they visited the older countries of the East in order to observe and study their institutions and their natural productions. Surprise has often been expressed, and it is certainly a matter of regret, that these quick-witted travelers took so little note of the speech of the people they visited. But there is reason for this. Language was regarded by them as a mere external manifestation of what was in the human mind. In itself it had to the Greek no intrinsic value. His own language was manifestly superior as an organ of expression to any with which he came in contact. If he could discover the underlying thought, of which speech was only the medium of communication, he was content. He concerned himself with foreign languages only so far as they had a practical value, and regarded them of no further importance, because they revealed no radical differences in the human mind. The case was otherwise when there was a question of foreign institutions and the history of foreign countries. Here was something radically unlike anything he could find at home.

The Greeks attached a high value to training both physical and intellectual. Every Greek city had its build-

ings and grounds suitably furnished for gymnastic exercises, and to be unfamiliar with such exercises was regarded as the mark of a slave or a barbarian. In fact, the state concerned itself far more with such training than with training of the mind. But here, too, the principle was believed to be of chief importance. Greek writers have so much to say in disparagement of extensive information when acquired at the expense of thorough mental training, that this thought must have had a firm basis in public opinion. Plato regarded as the important principles of education, the correlation of all knowledge, the recognition of the unity of all sciences, the desire to pursue truth to its discovery, and the determination not to stop short of this goal. From this point of view Greek education was strictly rational and philosophical. It did not multiply issues. Indeed, it could scarcely have done so, because the intellectual product available for pedagogical purposes was limited in amount. Its aim was not to make professional men, but intelligent citizens. In this it served its purpose admirably.

How simple the most liberal course of study was to the time of Aristotle, when Greece was already in its decline! There was but little history in the modern sense of the term, and hardly any natural or physical science. The speculations of philosophers, though wonderfully shrewd in many cases, were hardly more than mere guesses. They thought deeply, and observed with some care, but their observation lacked accuracy for want of suitable instruments. There was no study of geography and no scientific study of music. It was made up chiefly of literature, practical politics, and some mathematics. We get a fairly accurate notion of what it must have been by subtracting what we know that it could not have included.

What we see taking place in the case of individuals in our own day has taken place from time immemorial in the history of nations, and the Greeks were no exception. The parent who, by natural ability, has succeeded in acquiring a larger amount of knowledge than his fellows, soon recognizes the superiority that his attainments give him, and desires the same advantages for his children. He then endeavors by artificial helps, applied in the form of more or less systematic instruction, to transmit to them the benefit of his acquired knowledge and experience. When a considerable number of persons have reached the recognition of this advantage they strive to establish national systems of instruction. The Greeks, owing to their pre-eminent natural genius, fostered by advantages of soil and climate, unconsciously produced the Homeric Poems. Later generations recognized their value as a means of culture, and made them the basis of a national system of instruction. This literature was, however, spontaneous and unconscious, as indeed is all the earliest literature of every nation. But the product of the Greek muse was far superior to everything else of the kind. That it came into existence by a sort of inspiration was a fact well recognized by the Greeks themselves when they began to reflect upon it and study it. They saw that it could not be called forth at will, though many of them tried to do this by a scrupulous observance of a set of rules instinctively followel by the creators of Greek literature.

Sometimes a nation recognizes the superior value of a foreign literary product to anything of its own creation and makes an imported article the basis of its national instruction. The Romans followed this course and their earliest text-books were translations of the Homeric Poems. Somewhat similarly the school-books used in this country

until a comparatively recent period were more or less close imitations of those in use in the mother country. In time, however, the Romans gradually laid aside their translations from the Greek and brought into general use the writings of native authors. And it may be added, we are having a like experience with the literature of Great Britain.

It has been stated above that Greek writers often speak of the evil effects producel upon the mind by the effort to know many things. This judgment is not only endorsed by the universal testimony of mankind, but by the experience of the Greeks themselves. When we come to the Alexandrian period, pre-eminently an encyclopedic age, we find how greatly the Greek intellect has deteriorated. There are few great thinkers, and no great men except autocratic political leaders. The Greek literature of this period is vastly inferior to that which preceded it. We have entered upon an era of great scholars who are often mere pedants—men sadly lacking in the power of original thought. Yet it was this highly artificial product that was chiefly admired by the Romans. We know more of it from its image reflected through Roman minds than we do directly.

Passing thence to Rome we are confronted with what may well be regarded as a peculiar condition of things. The Roman people manifested almost no interest in intellectual pursuits. The meager education they imparted to their youth was based on a foreign product. The lack of imagination is strikingly manifested in Roman mythology. Yet they exhibited a genius for government that is without a parallel in the history of the world, and created, without a model, a body of laws that subsequently became the basis of all European legal systems. In like manner the English people, at least before the present century, con-

tributed but little to the original thought of the world, yet they have known how to extend their empire around the globe. Their educational system, until recently, took but little account of the common people, while that intended for the higher classes was founded on the intellectual creations of Greece, more or less modified by Roman ideas. Their legal system is likewise more original than any other now obtaining in Europe. It should be observed, however, that the comparative isolation of England was in some measure due to her insular position. Her history presents some striking points of comparison with that of Rome, so far as her experience with tributary nations is concerned, but England has rarely been guilty of exploiting her colonies for the benefit of the mother country. Rome did this almost systematically.

If the aim and purpose of popular education is to train the young for intelligent action in institutional life, that of the Greeks was in a large measure a failure. As a political factor in the history of the world they accomplished little during their independence, after the repulse of the Persians. They had no comprehension of the importance of a regular and orderly development in the growth and permanence of a state. Almost every man of large views among them felt constrained for reasons of personal safety to keep aloof from the political turmoil that was constantly seething about him. Narrow selfishness usually took the place of broad patriotism. No services, however brilliant, no sacrifices, however great, could protect a citizen from the vindictive whims of the populace. Too many men were ever ready to sacrifice the commonweal for personal aggrandizement. The gold of the despised barbarian was always welcome to those who sought for the nonce to get the better of a rival. In no country has political animosity

cost so many lives compared with the whole number of citizens; no where did this vindictiveness profit any man or any party so little. When the conflict with Philip, and afterwards with Rome, threatened the independence of the different States and the liberties of Greece; when only a united effort could repel the invader, such a unity of effort could not be brought about. Two millenniums later, when the Greeks sought to shake off the Turkish yoke the event proved that they had learned nothing in the long interim. Had it not been for the intervention of foreign powers Greece would to-day be a province of the Turkish Empire.

A most important influence was exerted in Greek education by the Sophists or "Masters," as Bergh calls them. Though only a passing phenomenon, they fill a large place in the intellectual history of Athens during the fifth pre-Christian century after the repulse of the Persians, for the accomplishment of which Athens had made the largest sacrifices. A new and wider horizon opened up before her young men. The traditional education was found to be too circumscribed to meet the new conditions. At the same time the pre-eminence of Athens attracted men from various parts of the Grecian world who came hither to "make their fortune," as we say. The impressibility of the Ionic temperament, the eagerness with which all proposed innovations were listened to, and the readiness with which new enterprises were entered upon, especially by the Athenians exposed them to all sorts of influences, both good and bad. Besides, the democratic form of government which opened all public offices to shrewdness and a glib tongue, served as an attraction to ambitious spirits who were for any reason discontented with the conditions at home. Here there was a fertile field for the teachers of a new kind of eloquence; for men who professed to be able to qualify their

pupils to talk equally well on opposite sides of the same question; for instructors who made little of facts but attached the greatest importance to words. Such professors were not only welcome to the champions of a democracy like the Athenian, but to a people like the Greeks, in whom the moral forces were always somewhat weak. The inherent centrifugal tendencies of the Greek political ideals was accentuated by the doctrine that made man the measure of all things, while conversely the doctrine found the more ready lodgment in minds naturally predisposed to receive it. Aristophanes, the arch-conservative, thus contrasts the old education with the new. The voice of the past, that of the "good old times," speaking to the youth, says, "Choose, with confidence, me, the better course, and you will learn to hate the Agora, and to refrain from baths, and to be ashamed of what is disgraceful, and to be enraged if any one jeer at you, and to rise up from your seats before your seniors when they approach, and not to behave ill toward your parents, and to do nothing else that is base, because you are to form your mind in an image of modesty. You shall spend your time in the gymnastic schools, sleek and blooming; not chattering in the market-place rude jests, like the young of the present day; nor dragged into court for a petty suit, greedy, pettifogging, knavish; but you shall descend to the Academy and run races beneath the sacred olives along with some modest compeer. If you do these things which I say, and apply your mind to these, you will ever have a stout chest, a clear complexion, broad shoulders, a little tongue, large hips, little lewdness. But if you practice what the youths of the present day do, you will have in the first place a pallid complexion, small shoulders, a narrow chest, a large tongue, little hips, great lewdness, a long psephism; and *this innovator* will persuade you

to consider everything that is base to be honorable, and what is honorable to be base." After making all allowance for the license of the poet and the enthusiasm of a *laudator temporis acti* this quotation from the Clouds probably presents a view of the case as it appeared to many Athenians toward the close of the fifth century B. C.

While the activity of the Sophists was confined to a single century, the influence they exerted upon Greek education was ineffaceable. Moreover, we meet with teachers of this type at two or three periods during the first Christian centuries. While they differ from the older Sophists in minor points, they are their true spiritual descendants in the stress they lay on the ability to speak interestingly and persuasively on any topic, no matter how void of content.

The study of the poets in the schools of ancient Greece seems to have been about as follows: Boys are first taught their letters at school,—for be it remembered that girls do not go to school—and as soon as they can read a little, the teacher places in their hands as they sit on benches, the works of good poets, which they are required to learn thoroughly. How much of the teaching was oral we do not know, but some of it must have been from manuscript copies. "The purpose was not only to form the boy's literary taste, or to give him the traditional lore; it was especially a moral purpose, having regard to the precepts in the poets, and to the praises of great men of old,—'in order that the boy may emulate their examples and may strive to become such as they.' "—Jebb.

So late as the close of the first century B. C. Homer still holds his place in the schools as a text-book for children. It should, however, be remarked that some of the ancient philosophers objected to this universal use of Homer on moral grounds, and with good reason; but, so far as we

know, their protests produced no effect. As usual, it was the *status quo* that so long held its ground against the initiative.

Here again our thoughts almost involuntarily turn to Italy and Germany, the home of music, poetry, painting and philosophy—countries until recently as badly governed as the states of ancient Greece. Only after centuries of internecine strife, disintegration, and the most wretched administration have these countries achieved a national unity, the permanence of which is by no means assured. Will their efficient educational system effect what the genius of the people aimed at in vain? It is not much wonder that practical people do not greatly concern themselves about national education. The Greeks were not lacking in patriotism. Their orators are never weary of calling up the memory of the heroes of Marathon and Thermopylae, and their hearers never failed to manifest a justifiable pride in the glorious deeds of their ancestors. But they could not be aroused to emulation and to a willingness to make similar sacrifices when occasion called.

Greek writers on education generally lay much strees on the importance of making the systems of instruction conform to the existing constitution. Speaking broadly, this means that where the established form of government is aristocratic, the young should be taught to respect it, and where democratic it should be looked upon with the same feeling. Socrates, as is well known, went to the farthest extreme in his reverence for the laws of his country, and voluntarily sacrificed his life to an edict that he held to be clearly unjust. He felt, as few men have felt since his time, that for no possible excuse should a law be evaded. Though a great admirer of the institutions of his native city, he was keenly alive to the pernicious influence of

demagogues, a class of men who were ever ready to advocate any measure that promised to subserve their immediate ends. During his trial he tells his judges that he is divinely commissioned to act as a monitor to his countrymen, and that he dared not abridge his life by exposing it to the animosity of an opposing political party.

Convinced as he was that virtue and knowledge were reciprocally interchangeable terms, he believed that all that was needed to make a man virtuous was to make him intelligent. The corollary to this belief was that the form of government under which men live was unimportant. On the other hand, the chief thinkers of the Socratic school were not fully in accord with their master on this point, and nearly all exhibit a preference for the aristocratic constitution of the Dorians. The fickle democracies of their times wrought a feeling of disgust in the minds of most thinking men who were not practical politicians, and they looked to a government in the hands of a small number of persons to guarantee the State against ever recurring innovations. We have in these opinions some pretty clear anticipations of compulsory education as advocated in recent years by the majority of educators. It was held that a strong government should early take the prospective citizen in hand and instruct him in the political duties that pertained to the sphere he was intended to fill.

The ruinous effects of democratic government in Greece became, in the course of time painfully evident, yet it is not easy to see that, in the main, the aristocrats governed any better. Greece, indeed, found peace under the protection of a strong power exerted from without, but it was at the expense of all that had made her a conspicuous place in the history of the world. Plainly, the price paid was much too high for the value of the commodity.

Many intelligent Greeks seem to have reached the same conclusion now held by not a few of our thinkers. An enormous mass of matter issues from the press in our day designed to warn the public against the dangers to be apprehended from an unenlightened democracy. The only remedy proposed is more intelligence for the masses. Our panacea is likewise a thorough system of instruction vigorously administered. In fact, the same view is generally held in Europe, and current history is a repetition on a large scale of the history of ancient Greece. The Germans expect to strengthen and perpetuate monarchy by a thorough and efficient system of public instruction; the English and French look for the same results from the same cause under a regime in which democracy is constantly growing in power and influence.

An important fact that should always be kept in mind in the study of Greek education is that even where it was not aristocratic it was always exclusive. It kept in view but a small portion of the actual population. The inhabitants of Attica, during the period here under discussion probably varied in number from 400,000 to 600,000. Of these from 20,000 to 30,000 were citizens. The remainder were slaves, with a small number of resident aliens. Women were entirely excluded from the benefit of systematic intellectual training. All they learned related exclusively to domestic affairs. The few women who figure in Greek history were, at least so far as Athens is concerned, of the class whose reputation was questionable. There were not lacking evidences of dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, but it produced no tangible results.

Slavery was an institution so firmly established in the social fabric of antiquity that we rarely meet with any who questioned its justice. Greek writers, almost without ex-

ception, looked upon it as founded in the nature of man. They held that many men are servile by nature and only fitted to be in subjection to others. Admitting this reasoning to be correct, we are at a loss to see how they overlooked the fact that men often fell into slavery through no fault of their own. The almost inevitable fate of the vanquished in war was to be sold into servitude, a fate that bore heaviest on women and children. These rarely had the opportunity of choosing between death and bondage. The intense love of liberty that has always been a conspicuous trait of the Greek character makes it all the more remarkable that slavery should be regarded by them as the proper condition of many people, not excepting some that belonged to their own race.

NOTE.—It ought, perhaps, to be said that the Stoics taught, at least indirectly, if not directly, the natural equality of all and the universal right to freedom. Paul doubtless had this doctrine in mind in his speech on Mars Hill when he said that God had "made of one every nation of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth." But neither Christianity nor Stoicism exerted any marked influence on the status of the members of the body politic for many centuries, and therefore not on that of the slave. The early converts who were slaves, did not claim that their conversion gave them any title to freedom, and Christian masters did not feel called upon to manumit those in bondage to them. That in Christ "there is neither bond nor free" must not be understood as interfering with the social condition of those professing it any more than the same admission would have required the Southern white man to treat his blacks as his equals. The theory represented an aspiration that had hardly a perceptible influence on the fact. In like manner the dictum that "God is no respecter of persons" was equally held by the later Stoics and the Christians; but its practical effect hardly meant more than that the Christian master will treat his slave in a brotherly manner and the Christian slave will serve his master faithfully. The early Christian

Freedom to do, at least within certain limits, whatever one liked, was a right that was always ardently maintained by the Athenians. Thucydides lays great stress upon this trait of his countrymen in the well-known oration that he puts in the mouth of Pericles. The Spartans who gave up their lives at Thermopylae desired posterity to know that this deed of patriotism was done in obedience to the laws of their country. On the other hand, the Athenians exhibited equal bravery at Marathon and elsewhere because they recognized that the liberty of all Greece was at stake. Theirs was a voluntary sacrifice for the good of their country, not mere obedience to law. It was a notable exhibition of individual prowess rather than obedience to tradition.

Nowhere was this love of liberty and the lack of it more strikingly shown than in the educational system of the two states. In Sparta the child became at birth, or even before, the ward of the state. It was trained by the state and for the state exclusively. We are astonished at the overwhelming power of tradition. But as this training was almost entirely of a military character, it was of little value except in times of war. The arts of peace received no attention, and the consequences could not be otherwise than disastrous. Sparta, like Athens, fell a prey to the foreign conqueror, and left behind no memorials of her former greatness. But Athens, even in her ruins, is glorious.

It is probable, however, that even in Athens the state, or a strong public sentiment, required the citizen to give his

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teachers were even more careful than the Stoics not to countenance anything that might cause them to fall under the suspicion of stirring up sedition. Their disciples seem to have been equally on their guard. It is worth noting, too, that under some of the Roman emperors the Stoics, no less than the Christians, were persecuted.

boys at least the rudiments of an education; but no more seems to have been required, and there is ample evidence on record that not all Athenians were intelligent. If a citizen neglected the education of his sons it was a matter that concerned only the parties in interest and nobody else. There were laws to regulate the management of schools, but apparently none compelling their establishment.

The Greeks considered plenty of leisure as an indispensable prerequisite to liberal culture. They could not conceive that a person who was compelled to labor with his hands might also be an earnest searcher after truth. The importance of liberal culture being conceded, it was argued that plenty of spare time was necessary for its acquisition, and that it could only be had by relegating to slaves those callings that were necessary to provide the means of livelihood for all. The question does not seem ever to have been seriously considered by any one whether it was possible so to educate those who have to toil with their hands that they might find in their hours of relaxation the solace and enjoyment of a trained intellect.

The treatment of slaves in Attica was exceptionally mild. All the Greeks were simple in their manner of life and their wants were easily supplied. Nevertheless, the free citizen was expected to devote himself to philosophy and to politics, but not to a handicraft of any kind. The poorest were not without their slaves, whose duty it was to provide for their physical wants. It must not be inferred that because leisure and literature were here found together, the one was the necessary corollary of the other. The people of our Southern States before the War of the Rebellion were not lacking in leisure. A social system existed not unlike that which prevailed in ancient Greece, yet the South produced neither artists, nor literary men, nor philosophers.

Even its politicians were as much of a failure as those of ancient Greece. The literary product of England did not come from the leisure class. The English nobility were often the patrons of literary men, but not themselves creators of literature. From these facts it is again evident that when we study the ancient Greeks we are dealing, not with a peculiar condition, but with a unique people.

When we are examining Greek education it is well to keep in mind the important part played in it by the social habits of the people. In time of peace it was customary for many of the citizens to meet together almost daily for purposes of literary and philosophical discussion. That questions of this kind were not of interest to all is sufficiently evident; but that many took part in them is well attested, in spite of the fact that the political clubs of Athens and other Greek cities were the foci of all manner of schemes. No better school for young men can be imagined than these coteries, in which older men were the chief speakers, and where all questions of human interest were discussed over and over. It would not be difficult to name a score of men who might be found together in Athens at almost any time during the period here under consideration, whose conversation, if well profited by for a year or two, would of itself constitute a liberal education. How valuable such a privilege was no one in our day can so well appreciate as the solitary student. The Greeks had a strong aversion to the written character. On this point I can not do better than to quote the words of Butcher. Says he: "The severance between writing and the fine arts—beneficent as it was from the artistic point of view, and no less so from the point of view of convenience—was unhappy for the *prestige* of writing, which was long regarded by the Greeks as mechanical, symbolic—almost cabalistic. They

dissociated from it the notion of organic beauty and artistic form. Now, as artists, they disliked all mere routine—all work that was merely mechanical. The free inspiration of the poet was checked by the use of conventional symbols; the epic and the drama depended, if not for their very existence, at least for their vitality, on the living voice and on listening crowds. Add to this fact that poetry, with its musical accompaniments, could be carried in the memory without external aid and appliances. * * * * Socrates says writing is the mere image or phantom of the living and animated word. It does not teach what was not known before; it only serves to remind the reader of something that he already knew. It enfeebles the power of thought. It is delusive even as an aid to memory, for it weakens and supersedes this faculty by providing an artificial substitute. Moreover, it has no power of adaptation; it speaks in one voice to all; it cannot answer questions, meet objections, correct misunderstandings, or supplement its own omissions."

The student of Greek pedagogy can hardly fail to be impressed with its weakness in what we call its moral elements. Socrates, indeed, taught that it was just as far from right to injure an enemy as to injure a friend, and his countrymen seem to have had a sort of vague notion that justice prevails in the end. On the other hand, the Greek orators in their harangues seldom appeal to any other motive than a rather narrow and short-sighted expediency. Whatever they may have thought, they seem to have felt that it was only by such appeals that they could produce the impression they desired upon their auditors. A kind of fatalism, either latent or expressed, runs through the entire body of Greek literature. It seems to have been admitted that men might do what they would, the event lay

in the hands of the gods, who were often whimsical, and who often interfered in the best laid schemes of mortals without regard to their moral qualities. The religious belief of the Greeks, so largely formed and moulded by the Homeric Poems, had a deleterious effect upon their conduct. This was so keenly felt by men like Plato that they wished to exclude them from the list of educational books. But this was only a theory, and no one seems to have ever thought seriously of putting it into practice. These poems exhibit, along with much that is surpassingly beautiful, the most revolting scenes of inhumanity, unchastity, lying and deception. There could hardly be a greater contrast between the books now put into the hands of the young and those that were in the hands of Greek boys from their earliest childhood. The effect of this teaching, both direct and indirect, was of the most pernicious character. The qualities most conspicuous in Greek heroes of both history and fiction were rarely such as would now commend them for imitation.

There is nothing more prominent in the instruction of the young Greek than the extraordinary stress laid upon the cultivation of the memory. It is the key-note of the entire system. From the beginning to the end of his school days he was constantly employed in learning by heart the literature of his country. The case of a young man is recorded by Xenophon who was required by his father to commit to memory the entire poems of Homer; and there is nothing in the anecdote to show that the feat was regarded as exceptional. In this connection we may also remind our readers of the story told regarding the humane treatment accorded by the Sicilians to those Athenian captives who could repeat considerable portions of the dramas of Euripides. In this respect the later Greeks were doubt-

less influenced by the earlier rhapsodists who were in the habit of reciting long extracts from the Homeric Poems at the various entertainments and assemblies so common among their countrymen.

Yet this method, now regarded as so objectionable, and which is so rapidly going out of use, not only produced great literary characters, but great thinkers, great historians, great physicians, great mathematicians, great scientists, great artists, and great orators. With these facts and results before us, is it not safe to conclude that but one thing is indispensable for the most efficient intellectual training of the young, and that is a thorough acquaintance with the highest literary achievements of the race? The example and experience of the ancient Greeks furnishes useful lessons for our time, both positively and negatively; positively, as showing that a small amount of knowledge may be so used as to produce intellectual excellence of the highest order; negatively as making plain the fact that something more than this is needed to make good citizens and guarantee the perpetuity of the state.

It is a remarkable fact, to which there is room here for only a passing reference, that our own day is the witness of a return to the fundamental principles of Greek pedagogy in the prominent place advocated for the study of literature. What the Greeks actually did we are strongly urged to do, namely, to begin the study of the best authors in the lowest grades and continue it through the highest. It goes without saying that the modern movement has no connection with antiquity, but is the outgrowth of a careful study of our social condition and needs. Nevertheless, something more than literature is necessary. Mere literature is a product that is too spontaneous in its origin to be a safe guide to conduct. We need to know history; we need to

have placed before our young people the results of conduct, the political and social experience of the race, if we would have them learn the effect of human conduct on the happiness or misery of mankind. If the habitual practice of honesty, chastity, sobriety, truthfulness, self-denial for the good of others, do not in the long run bring the greatest good to the greatest number, and if the disregard of these virtues does not produce the opposite results, as shown by the experience of the older governments, where shall we find our sanctions for moral conduct?

The extraordinary amount of attention bestowed upon athletic training by the Greeks has been referred to above, and is, moreover, a fact so well known that not much need be said about it here. Strength, agility, swiftness, and endurance were qualities of supreme importance to the citizens of states that were more at war than at peace. The Athenians strove to make sound bodies as well as sound minds; or, rather, they regarded both as of equal importance. The Spartans, on the other hand, almost wholly neglected the mind, but trained the body to the highest degree of efficiency. The practice of athletic games was more nearly universal among the Greeks than attention to moral culture. The various governments provided the necessary buildings and appurtenances with far greater liberality than they provided for schools. A collection of houses among which there was no gymnasium was not regarded as entitled to the name of city. It was especially in athletic contests that emulation and rivalry were stimulated to the highest degree. The Athenians, however, went farther and instituted literary contests, and their intellectual superiority is in no small degree due to this fact.

Sparta and Athens are usually spoken of as the leading states of Greece, but we do not always keep in mind that

what we know of the achievements of Spartans comes to us through the records of their hereditary enemies, the Athenians. To the latter we may fitly apply the words of Longfellow and say that most of them are both "writers and fighters;" to the former the line of Dr. Johnson is more suitable, for they live to us only "To point a moral or adorn a tale."

As the moon and the stars would be invisible except for the illuminating rays of the sun, so Sparta and the lesser states of Greece would emit but a few faint glimmerings in the dark vista of history were it not for the light shed upon them by Athens. If we would form a just estimate of this remarkable people we need to keep in mind the small number of Athenian citizens at any time, and then consider that among this number were more men in a single century who profoundly influenced the progress of thought than ever appeared in the same length of time subsequently in the whole world.

While its true that the conditions under which they lived cannot again be restored, the study of this age, so prolific in great men, must ever continue to be one of profound interest. No wonder that Schiller, looking back from the troublous times in which he lived, should give vent to the feelings that burdened his sad heart in the beautiful language of his poem, "The Gods of Greece," the closing stanza of which reads:

"Home! and with them are gone
The hues they gazed on and the tones they heard;
Life's beauty and life's Melody:—alone
Broods o'er the desolate void, the lifeless Word;
Yet, rescued from Time's deluge, still they throng
Unseen the Pindus they were wont to cherish:

Ah, that which gains immortal life in song,
To mortal life must perish!"

The genius of the Greek people, as expressed in literature and art, remained but a short time at the zenith of its glory. Greek history is not without interest, even to the fall of the Eastern Empire; but more than a thousand years before this event took place those elements of Greek social life that are the most important to posterity had virtually disappeared from the earth. The Alexandrian period was one of intense intellectual activity, but this activity was concerned almost wholly with the past. After Greece had become a Roman province, schools of rhetoric were established and maintained in nearly all the cities and towns of the East as well as in Greece proper. A knowledge of the Greek language was a common accomplishment in almost the whole Roman Empire, and there seem to have been few illiterates. It is a noteworthy fact that Paul wrote his Epistle to the Romans in Greek. Long after the separation of the Eastern from the Western Empire the great mass of the classical writings, as well as most of what had been produced in the interim, was still in existence, and much of it read in the schools. It is to the Saracens and, perhaps, in an equal degree to the inroads of the Crusaders that is due the immense loss of manuscripts that modern students so greatly deplore.

It is hardly possible to contemplate the history of Greece without a feeling of profound sorrow for her manifold misfortunes and a feeling of contempt for her wretched statecraft. All accessible evidence goes to prove that the lessons of the past have been almost wholly lost on the present generation, no less than upon their immediate predecessors for two or three generations. Nations have

no guide for the future but the experience of the past, and if they refuse or neglect to profit thereby they are certain to reap the bitter fruits of their folly and shortsightedness.

It is a sad fact that though the people of Europe have been studying Greek life for at least five hundred years they have profited little by the lesson left upon record—as little as the Greeks themselves. The moderns appropriated from the ancients what gratified the taste, but gave hardly any practical attention to the things that would have made life a thousandfold more worth living. What would we say of the wisdom of that man who should give much attention to the art of dressing well and tastefully but should concern himself little about the laws of health? In theory no one maintains that it is better to look well than to be well; in practice this is the unconscious maxim the vast majority have followed. Of no people can it be said with more truth than of the Greeks: if the will of the majority had supported the wisdom of the intelligent—not the intellectual—minority, the history of the world would have been many times brighter.

NOTE.—Francis Galton, a severely scientific investigator thus expresses himself in regard to the Greeks, in his Hereditary Genius. "The ablest race of whom history bears record is unquestionably the ancient Greek, partly because their masterpieces in the principal departments of intellectual activity are still unsurpassed and in many respects unequalled, and partly because the population that gave birth to the creators of these masterpieces was very small." He then gives a list of the distinguished men produced between 530 and 430 B. C. numbering fourteen. After citing a quantity of facts, he says further: "It follows from all this that the average ability of the Athenian race is, on the lowest possible estimate, very nearly two grades higher than our own—that is, about as much as our race is above the negro. This estimate, which may seem prodigious to some,

is confirmed by the quick intelligence and high culture of the Athenian community before whom literary works were recited and works of art exhibited, of a far more severe character than could possibly be appreciated by the average of our race, the caliber of whose intellect is easily gauged by the contents of a railway book-stall."

His reasons, actual and inferential, for the rapid decline of the "marvelously-gifted race" are thus stated. "Social morality grew exceedingly lax; marriage became unfashionable and was avoided; many of the more accomplished and ambitious women were avowed courtesans, and consequently infertile, and the mothers of the incoming population were of a heterogenous class. In a small sea-bordered country where emigration and immigration are constantly going on, and where the manners are as dissolute as were those of Greece in the period of which I speak, the purity of a race would necessarily fail. It can be, therefore, no surprise to us, though it has been a severe misfortune to humanity, that the high Athenian breed decayed and disappeared; for if it had maintained its excellence, and had multiplied and spread over large countries, displacing inferior populations (which it might well have done, for it was naturally very prolific), it would assuredly have accomplished results advantageous to human civilization, to a degree that transcends our powers of imagination."

ASPECTS OF ANCIENT GREEK ETHICS.

There is perhaps no social question on which it is more difficult to form a correct opinion than upon the ethical standard of a people. It is not easy when we take into account our contemporaries, or even our neighbors; but it is tenfold more difficult when we study nations that are widely separated from us in time and space, or both. An additional element of complexity is introduced into the problem by the fact that ethical standards are not uniform, nor are all the parts that enter into it regarded as of equal importance. They exhibit a kind of moral stratification, some of the layers of which are thick and easily observed, while others are thin, or do not exist at all. It is true, the moral characteristics of a nation have more or less relation to each other, but they are not all, nor necessarily, connected. For instance, commercial integrity is not always found associated with continence, or with that virtue that is known in modern times as temperance. It is safe to say, that, on the whole, the commercial integrity of the French is as high as that of the English; but there is every reason to believe that social purity is regarded as of less importance by the former than the latter. Again, in a study of

the virtues and vices of a people, we are generally compelled to get our data at second hand, to use testimony that is always liable to be more or less distorted; in short, to depend largely on inferences, in the drawing of which men are apt to differ widely. But if the evidence is furnished by our contemporaries, and especially by men and concerning men occupying about the plane of civilization with ourselves, we are in the least possible danger of drawing erroneous conclusions.

But there are other facts that may lead to error. It is well known that two spoken or written words, while apparently meaning the same thing, may, in fact, differ widely in signification. Persons using the same expressions do not necessarily mean the same thing. Without knowing somewhat intimately a speaker or writer, we can never be sure that we know just what meaning his words are intended to convey. Some men, like some nations, habitually use great plainness and bluntness of speech; they do not hesitate to talk of matters that are elsewhere never mentioned in cultivated society. Yet it would often be wrong to draw inferences as to morality from these facts. Plainness of speech on all subjects does not necessarily argue in favor of laxness of morals. The English-speaking people are much more conventional in speech and manners than those of Continental Europe. Is it safe to say, that, on the whole, their public morality is higher? If we compare the Turk with the Englishman as regards the use of intoxicants, the comparison will result much more favorably for the former than the latter; but if we compare them on the ground of sexual morality, the decision will be very different. If, then, we wish to make a comparative study of the ethical standards of two or more nations,—or of two individuals, for that matter,—we need to

define carefully the various elements that make up the standard. Speaking figuratively, we may say that it is a compound into which a number of ingredients of necessity enter, and in varying quantity. We shall be more likely to attain definite results if we make the comparison along certain lines, or follow certain strata, so far as this can be done with the available material. It is a matter of common experience, that foreigners differ widely in their estimate of the general character of a people among whom they have dwelt for a time. We sometimes find their reports diverging so widely that we are at a loss to understand how they can refer to the same community. The same thing often occurs in the case of individuals; and we are driven, for an explanation, to the extreme fallibility of human judgment.

As it is proposed in the present article to make a brief study of Greek ethical standards, we need here only to refer to a fact well known to scholars, that modern writers upon this question have reached widely different results. I believe that, generally speaking, the conclusions of the moderns have been too favorable. I believe, further, that this is largely owing to undue stress laid upon certain noble traits exhibited by the Greeks and an excessive admiration for their æsthetic qualities, to the neglect of other equally important characteristics in the make-up of national character. Strange as it may seem, the Germans appear to have come widest of the mark, while the French and English have exhibited the Greeks more nearly in their true light. Friedrich Jacobs, for instance, in his enthusiastic admiration of the æsthetic taste of this people, frequently draws inferences favorable to their ethic qualities to which they are hardly entitled. Schiller's well-known "Goetter Greichenlands" has contributed not a little to shed a halo over the

mythology of the ancient Greeks. No doubt there are points of view from which the free-and-easy life of antiquity becomes attractive to us, hemmed in as we are by the conventionalities among which we live and move from day to day. But if their condition is studied from all sides, and from the standpoint of every member of the body politic, the verdict can scarcely fail to be less favorable. The history of Greece, no less than the writings of her philosophers, is adequate evidence that the citizens of the Greek republics very often suffered quite as much from too little government, at least of a wholesome sort, as the contemporaries of Jacobs and Schiller suffered from too much. It is a well-marked tendency of our times to idealize a social condition so much nearer to nature, in a certain sense, than our own, that makes so many writers glorify, and at times sigh for, the life of our Germanic ancestors, or even the nomadic life to the undivided Aryan race. By directing our attention too much to those features of social life that contrast favorably with our own, and leaving out of account the many disagreeable features that are an essential part of the picture, it is easy to make the mistake to which I have just referred.

It is unwise to lose sight of the fact that restraint and civilization move forward hand in hand. In the evolution of social life, there is a constant tendency to abridge the liberty of the individual, for the good of the community, and in order to secure greater freedom for him as a member of the body politic. It can be clearly shown that what is so often called the natural state of man is a misnomer, and that one state is no more natural than another. Our modern *Weltschmerz,* the desire to be something else than what we are and where we are, has led many a man to construct out of a figment of his imagination, a state of existence that

could never be found anywhere on the face of the globe. If, like the usurer of Horace, of whom he sings in his second Epode, they were brought face to face with this imaginary state, they would probably decide, as he did, that, after all, they are better off than they would be if transplanted into their imaginary paradise.

Let us consider for a moment what we are to understand by ethical conduct. Perhaps we cannot better define it than to say, that it is conduct regulated according to a law not made by ourselves that makes for righteousness. But a great deal depends on what we understand by righteousness, and there is not room here to discuss the point. As soon, however, as an individual recognizes such a law and voluntarily obeys it, in contravention of a narrowly selfish impulse, he begins to be an ethical being. It is evident that, until he admits the binding force upon him of such a law, he is unfit to be a member of a political or social body. It is asserted by some writers.—Muensterberg in his "Ursprung der Sittlichkeit" expresses himself very positively on this point,—that the people which the Germans call *Naturvoelker* act wholly without any ethical elements in the motives that influence their conduct. But it is not easy to see how even the most primitive people can exist in a state deserving the appellation of "social," with feelings towards each other so nearly on a par with brutes. On the contrary, it seems to be nearer the truth, that all human beings, even the lowest, perform some acts and refrain from others from ethical motives. It is probably more correct to find the germs of ethical conduct in certain brutes. To assert anything positively on either question is hazardous, and to draw inferences from our meager knowledge accessible in both cases is scarcely less so. If the lowest savages are governed wholly by impulse

and the desire to gratify their passions immediately and without regard to the remoter results of conduct, it is hard to see at what stage the germs of altruism are discoverable.

Certain it is that the Greeks of the earliest ages had already long passed the primitive state, and even that occupied by all the Eastern nations, except the Hebrews. They were intensely patriotic, in the sense of being ardently attached to their fellow-citizens, their ancestral customs, and their native land. For these they were generally willing to sacrifice everything they possessed, not excepting life itself. They recognized national, and to some extent international, obligations. They had some conception of the importance of family life in the perpetuity of the state. They had a strong sense of the dignity of manhood and a deep-seated aversion to monarchy in all its forms. The ethical systems of some of the Greek philosophers were far in advance of the popular standard, and approximated more or less closely to that of the New Testament. On the other hand, it is extremely doubtful whether any believed in their system so thoroughly as to make its precepts the norm for the regulation of their own lives. Besides, the popular notions as to the character of the gods had a most deleterious influence on private morality,—an influence from which even the noblest philosophers were not wholly exempt.

The Greeks when they first come under our observation, had already passed, by a long interval, beyond a primitive stage of religious belief. Nevertheless, to them the universe was literally filled with divinities, benevolent or malevolent, as circumstances might dispose them. The most serious hindrance to any consistent line of conduct, in the popular mind, was the caprice of the divinities. Their good-will was sometimes gained, and their enmity

often incurred by the most trivial acts,—acts which in their nature had no ethical value, but frequently the contrary. Unlike the Romans, the Greeks knew of no way to compel the favor of the gods. But even the most august and powerful of the dwellers on Olympus was not wholly supreme in the affairs of men or of the gods. A mightier than he was blind fate, inscrutable destiny, that was the final arbiter in everything.

The Greeks when they first come before us in the Homeric Poems are already organized into civic communities. They recognize a body of unwritten laws which the Romans designated by *mos majorum, mos patruus* and other like terms. The validity of these customs has its sanction in the experience of men everywhere, but they are most scrupulously obeyed where the talent for political organization is most marked. Neither in politics nor in ethics were the Greeks very firmly attached to tradition, though this attachment was stronger among the Spartans than elsewhere. The willingness to accept foreign arts and customs had a deleterious effect upon their morals; and it is well established that some of their worst vices were introduced from the East. They never exhibited the moral earnestness manifested by the Hebrews at a much earlier period. They were too fond of having a "good time"; too ready to give the loose rein to their passions; too willing to gratify sensual desires. In consequence, they could not be induced for any length of time to follow the counsels of those who had more wisdom and political insight than has the average man. If we turn aside for a moment to compare the moral character and earnestness of the ancient Hebrews with the Greeks, the result of the comparison will be very greatly to the advantage of the former. From the very nature of the case, a code of laws formed by a single

mind, able to discern intuitively the remote effects of conduct, will always be superior to one that is the product of evolution by an entire people. It is doubtful whether any one man in the history of the world has so deeply and lastingly influenced its thought as the patriarch Abraham. Coming forth as he did from among an idolatrous people to proclaim the unity and spirituality of God, his was a step forward and upward the far-reaching consequences of which cannot be over-estimated. Judaism, Mohammedanism and Christianity are based upon this thought. The more the career of this man is studied, the more remarkable it is; inexplicable, we may well call it, from the mere human standpoint. From the central idea around which his whole life revolved, his people, in spite of their frequent moral lapses, never entirely departed. When we consider the abominations that idolatry has always and everywhere countenanced, the ethical import of Abraham's life is brought into still greater prominence. Greatly as we must admire Socrates for his wisdom, his keen insight, and his moral earnestness along certain lines, we can but feel that his friendliness toward the mythology of his country was detrimental to his influence as a teacher of morals. It was such a tissue of ridiculous absurdities, that it is hard to see how so intelligent a man as he could have had any patience with it. Or, if he regarded the popular mythology in its true light, his best friends have strangely misinterpreted his attitude. The history of the world shows with painful distinctness, that, until men had emancipated themselves from a belief in the plurality of gods, there was no ethical basis possible for the regulation of human conduct.

The Greeks of Homer's age have often been compared to children; and not unaptly. But it should not be forgotten,

that, while they exhibited some traits that we expect to find in children, they often gave way to the basest passions of full-grown men. The range of their ethical ideas was more circumscribed than that of the moderately well-trained child of our day. The ferocity they sometimes manifested is appalling. A typical example is the treatment of the dead Hector by his slayer Achilles. There is no shadow of excuse or justification for his conduct toward a chivalrous foe. He had engaged in a deadly duel with the odds against him, and under circumstances that would naturally have aroused compassion in any breast but that of the lowest savage. Yet even the poet who relates the story of this harrowing deed has no word of condemnation for the victor or of compassion for the vanquished. In subsequent times this same bloodthirsty and vindictive Achilles was regarded by all the Greeks as the embodiment of youthful beauty and heroic bravery. Similar ferocity is sometimes exhibited under other circumstances, as in the case of Medea, but there is usually more or less justification for it. But the influence of the Homeric Poems upon the popular mind was far greater than that of any other literary production.

It was an unfortunate circumstance for the ethical development of the Greeks, that their literature for the most part commended itself, in spite of its low moral tone, by reason of its æsthetic excellence. That some of their best thinkers clearly recognized and deplored this fact is well known. It is hardly to be doubted that the Homeric Poems retarded the moral growth of the Greek nation quite as much as they refined and elevated and promoted their literary taste. While there is no question, that, from the dawn of philosophic inquiry, many persons began to outgrow the anthropomorphic ideas they embody, this intel-

lectual emancipation brought with it little or no profit to the cause of morality. The Greek rationalists, like the French freethinkers of the eighteenth century, not only lost faith in a religion that was largely supported by hypocrisy, but they also surrendered that part of it which furnished a support and sanction for moral conduct. In the time of Aristophanes even the Greek populace had seemingly given up all respect for their gods, or faith in their traditional mythology; yet, with a strange inconsistency, they feared the very beings whose existence they doubted. Temple robbery and sacrilege were at all times regarded as heinous crimes, and severely punished. Long after the period here under consideration, Paul found the Athenians scrupulous observers of the external forms of religion, and indifferent to its spirit. While it is probably true that the conduct of Socrates at his trial was the chief cause of his death, it must be said, to the eternal disgrace of his countrymen, that they were willing deliberately to entertain charges of the most ridiculous character against him; and they condemned him to death for crimes that nine-tenths of the jury must have known that he had not committed.

This brings us to another reprehensible trait of the Greeks—their slight regard for human life. Men were put to death upon the flimsiest pretexts,—sometimes singly, sometimes in large numbers. Socrates tells his fellow-citizens, that he would probably not have survived many years if he had engaged in politics, for in the nature of the case, he must ere long have fallen a victim to party rancor. The ferocity with which their feuds were often carried on almost exceeds belief. In every city, and at all times, there seems to have been a large number of "outs," who neglected no opportunity to get possession of the gov-

ernment. Their object was always purely selfish, except in some rare instances where self-preservation was the motive. In these internecine struggles, men were as recklessly deprived of life as if it were a thing of little value. Judicial proceedings in capital cases were characterized by the same precipitancy. One would suppose that the plainest dictates of prudence would plead for leniency toward a defeated party. A turn of the political wheel might easily bring those who were below to the top, and mercy shown could be used as a valid ground for asking mercy in return. But, as would be expected of short-sighted children, the only question with the dominant party was always, how to root out every particle of unfriendliness, as if this could be done so effectually that it could never raise its head again.

The Greeks never grasped the importance of law in the development of civic institutions. What the Germans call *Rechtssinn* was almost entirely lacking in their character. As if afraid to trust themselves, they frequently passed decrees fixing severe penalties on any one who should propose the repeal of a law. The persistence of this racial type is plainly seen in Greek politics in our own day. Every citizen is or wants to be a politician or a statesman, and there is little doubt that if modern Greece were a pure republic, the people would want to elect a President at least as often as once a month, and turn out all the office-holders in order to make room for a new set. The injustice this mode of procedure has worked from time immemorial need not here be dwelt upon. Greek political writers, beginning with the earliest, often deplore this fickleness of their countrymen. Again and again they said: If you will cease to quarrel among yourselves, compose your internal feuds, and unite in a common enterprise, you can

easily make yourselves masters of the entire world. But such admonitions almost always fell upon deaf ears It is not remarkable, then, that a strong foreign power which promised to put an end to internal strife should be welcomed by many thinking men in Greece. It was the best thing attainable under the circumstances. The Greeks never grasped the importance of personal responsibility. The citizen was merged in the city. In many cases a body of men that might fitly be characterized as a mob, decided what was right and what was wrong according to the passions then prevalent What a travesty upon justice their collective action when laboring under excitement often was, is well known.

A cardinal moral weakness of the Greeks was their readiness to accept bribes. Not only were many of them always willing to receive money from the Persians, but offers from their own countrymen rarely came amiss. It is true that public sentiment was strongly against such conduct, but it was not strong enough to make the business thoroughly odious. It seems to have been felt that the loudest outcry was often made against it by those who were so unfortunate as not to have been subjected to temptation. This penchant is, in part at least, explicable by two characteristics that were prominent in the Greeks: one of these was the keen enjoyment of sensuous pleasures; the other, a decided aversion to labor. As public opinion was strongly against the citizen who engaged in money-making enterprises, other avenues for getting rich were readily entered. The citizen must not labor; if he does, he forfeits the respect of his fellow-men, no matter how much his character may be deserving of it. Personal worth is not the decisive factor in such a case. The state is the arbiter in the

matter; and the state has decided that labor is for the slave, state-craft and philosophy for the free man.

Nothing strikes us as more remarkable in the most advanced Greek thought than its attitude toward human slavery. That the popular mind accepted the *status quo* without a question is not strange, but that the philosophers, almost without exception, were unable to see that the "sum of villanies" must eventually be abolished, is inexplicable. They anticipated modern thought in many directions. In some things they seem even to have divined the goal it would ultimately reach. But slavery was to them so essential a part of civic and social life, that no thought of its ultimate abolition dawned upon the mind of any one. The justification of slavery by Aristotle and others reminds one of the puerile arguments sometimes heard, in *ante bellum* days, in favor of letting slavery in the South alone, on the ground that the owners of slaves had lawfully paid for them. When the Stagirite tells us that some persons are by nature of a servile disposition, and fitted only for a station in which they will be wholly under the tutelage of a superior, we readily assent; but, when he proceeds to justify slavery on this account, we involuntarily ask ourselves, whether he is in earnest, and expects to be taken seriously. It was sometimes the misfortune of the wisest and noblest to fall into slavery. As wars were anciently carried on, it could not be predicated with certainty of any one that he would never be sold as a slave. The weakest and least deserving from any point of view,—the women and the children—were most in danger. Their birth did not decide their destiny, though it might in some cases mitigate the treatment they received. Where slavery exists, human life is cheap. It brutalizes men, not only toward the unfortunate beings who are in their power, soul and body, but also toward equals. It has been an unmiti-

gated curse wherever it has existed; yet governments have clung to it, and encouraged it, with a persistence worthy of a better cause. Perhaps, after all, we need not be surprised that no ancient philosopher looked forward to the time when slavery should be abolished in every civilized country. *Compare note on page 42.*

It is well known that in all the Grecian and Roman cities there was a considerable population debarred from the rights and privileges of citizenship, though to some extent under the protection of law. There is no doubt that the existence of numerous slaves, together with the class just referred to, had a most deleterious effect upon the public morals. Abundant experience has proved that the surest way to bring the state to its highest efficiency and its greatest security, as well as to elevate the tone of its morals, is to grant to as large a number as possible of those enjoying the protection of its laws a direct share in the government. This gives to all a personal interest in the internal affairs of the state, and makes every one more or less responsible for its perpetuity. There is no way to ruin a young man more completely than to make him feel that, do what he will, he can never become of any importance to any one, not even to himself. As he cannot elevate himself, he has no interest in assisting others to rise. But he may, and generally does, revenge himself and gratify his social instinct by dragging others down to his own moral level. Wherever slavery has existed, human life has been cheap, and public morality low. That the latter was exceptionally so in ancient Greece becomes more and more evident as one's knowledge of the subject deepens.

There is abundant testimony to show that chastity and conjugal fidelity on the part of men were neither commended nor practiced. Prostitution was frightfully com-

mon. Married women were held to strict account, lest they might debauch the state by illegitimate offspring, but there was no restraint upon husbands, either in the laws or in public opinion. A few passages bearing upon this point may properly be cited here. In the second book of his *Memorabilia,* Xenophon reports the following remark as made by Socrates to his son: "And, in truth, you are not to assume that men beget children for the sake of mere sensual pleasure, since the streets as well as the brothels are full of the means of gratifying desire." This statement bears strong testimony to the prevalence of the social evil in Athens in the fourth century B. C., but it is also evidence of the matter-of-fact way in which it was regarded by men like Socrates. Testimony to the same effect is furnished by Demosthenes in his harangue against Neaera We quote a single passage: "We have mistresses for the sake of pleasure; concubines for the daily attendance upon our persons; wives for the sake of legitimate children and of having faithful guardians of our households." Here the orator's "we have" shows that he is speaking of what is universally admitted, and not of himself alone. He is but identifying himself, in the matter of sexual morality, with the mass of the citizens. A wife is not regarded as a companion or an equal, but as a creature that exists solely in order that legitimate offspring may be brought into the world. If one would realize what such a confession implies, let him remember the public occasion on which it was uttered; then let him picture to himself what the effect of such an avowal would be if made in the presence of hundreds, perhaps thousands of men in our day. Let him remember, too, that we are not dealing with the mere offscourings of a great city; but that the orator is standing in the presence of the most respectable citizens, who had

met together for the purpose of hearing what a great orator would say on an important case. I am aware that this oration is now generally regarded as wrongly attributed to Demosthenes. This, however, detracts little from its value as testimony to the moral status of the Athenians in the time of the great orator. Its importance in the history of Greek morals remains unimpeached; besides it only corroborates testimony of the same character found in other writings. When one reads some of the Plays of Aristophanes for the first time he involuntarily asks himself whether a condition of things such as he in part describes, and in part assumes to be well known, can have existed in any community having any claim to be called civilized; yet a more thorough knowledge of the then current sexual morality of the Greek cities soon convinces the student that the witty poet has not painted his picture in too deep colors. The Epistles of Paul, written several centuries later, make it painfully evident that Greeks and Romans, even after their conversion to Christianity, were slow to yield the lax moral notions they had held while heathen.

Social purity was a vice so deeply ingrained in the habits of the people that it was almost impossible to eradicate it. To this day the effort has been successful only in a very moderate degree. Nothing is more clear than that the Greeks made light of such a command as, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; much less did they realize the high moral standard of Christ set forth in the words, "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." It is doubtful whether this phase of conduct was ever seriously considered by any of their philosophers.

In all Greek literature there is no more typical character than Ulysses. His prominent traits are fertility of re-

source, superior skill in gymnastic exercises and in the use of arms, tenacity of purpose, unscrupulousness in the attainment of ends, fidelity to friends, implacable hostility to enemies, familiarity with the sea and all that pertains to it, and ardent love of country. But chastity and conjugal fidelity are not in the list of his virtues. His lapses in this regard are mentioned by the poets with as much naivete as if nothing else was to be expected. In striking contrast to the way in which they speak of her husband, is the praise, expressed or implied, bestowed on Penelope. She is represented as faithful to her lord, modest in her demeanor under all circumstances,—in short, she is made a model of purity. Like traits under different circumstances are exhibited by Arete and Nausicaa. Though the position of women in the Homeric Poems is higher and more influential than it was in most of the Greek states in historical times, the ethical standard by which she was judged had changed but little.

There is room here to touch briefly upon a single additional trait of the Greeks: their extreme vindictiveness. To surpass friends in conferring favors, and enemies in doing injuries, was a fundamental article of the national creed. This condition of things is so nearly universal among savages that it would call for no comment, were it not for the marked superiority of the Greeks in many of the elements of the most advanced civilization. Here again it is plain that no necessary connection exists between the highest intellectual gifts and a high moral standard. It is true that Socrates taught a doctrine diametrically opposite to the universal practice of his countrymen; and he deserves all the greater credit for his courage and far-sightedness. But moral earnestness and intellectual acuteness had elevated him to an ethical plane

to which few of his countrymen ever attained even in their philosophical systems, much less in their conduct. It must, however, be admitted that in spite of the short-comings of the Greek people in both their public and private life most of the Greek thinkers had a profound conviction of the moral order of the world. Their *Weltanschauung* is largely tinged with pessimism because their countrymen so often chose and persisted in courses that could lead nowhere but into disaster. Herodotus somewhere says that the most unfortunate situation in which a man can find himself is when he sees calamity approaching and is unable to avert it. Aeschylus inquires, "What defence are riches to a man who insolently spurneth out of sight the mighty altar-throne of Justice?" After enlarging upon this theme he cites the case of Paris as a warning example of a man who by frivolous and unrighteous conduct brought innumerable woes upon his family and his country. He contends that "Justice shines in houses dark with smoke and honors virtuous life; while gold-bespangled seats, where hands are filthy, she leaveth with averted eyes, and unto pious homes repairs, revering not the power of wealth with spurious commendation stamp'd." "The swift stroke of Justice comes down upon some in the noonday light; pain waits on others in the midst of darkness, and the gloom of night overshadows them." At another place he says: "There is a voiceless law which is not seen by thee while thou sleepest, walkest and sittest; which accompanies thee, now at thy side, now behind. For the darkness of night does not conceal thy evil deeds, but whatsoever crime thou hast committed, doubt not some one has seen it."

The historians are equally certain that wrong-doers can not escape the penalty of their misdeeds. There is room

here for but a single citation. Herodotus puts into the mouth of a Spartan the following anecdote:

Three generations ago a certain Milesian came to Sparta to a citizen of that place renowned far and wide for his probity, and left with him a valuable deposit of money. He also gave to the citizen, whose name was Glaucus, certain tallies with the directions that the money was to be returned to the person who produced the tallies. Many years after, the sons of the depositor appeared before Glaucus and, producing the tallies, asked to have the deposit returned. The Spartan now professed to have forgotten the matter, but promised to do what was just in case he really had received the money, as the strangers asserted. He wanted four months for reflection. Meanwhile he went to Delphi to consult the oracle as to whether he might be permitted to swear that he had not received the money and so make a prize of it. The Pythoness replied that he might do as he wished since death is equally the lot of those who keep oaths and of those who do not; but the Oath-god overwhelms with destruction the perjurers and preserves those who keep their promises. Glaucus, now thoroughly frightened, besought pardon of the Pythoness for his question, but she answered that it was as bad to tempt the god as to have done the deed. "At the present time," adds the narrator, "the family of Glaucus is extinct in Sparta." Whether we read the poets, the philosophers, the historians or the orators we find the same clear views of the penalties involved in the infringement of the moral law.

The Athenian people may be compared to a woman who is endowed with all the possible charms of mind and person,—fair in face, stately in form, majestic in carriage, graceful in movement, bewitching in manner, with a genius, it may be, for poetry or painting or sculpture; but

who is capricious, often utterly unreasonable, untrustworthy, given to moods, now an angel, now a demon, yet always exhibiting the same unerring taste and displaying the same passionate love of what is beautiful.

Many modern writers have interested themselves in showing how the ethical elements of Christianity were gradually evolved from the tenets of the Greek philosophers. One of the most instructive recent contributions to this question is the "Logos Spermaticos" of Dr. Edward Spiess, a volume of more than five hundred pages of parallel passages to the New Testament from the writings of ancient Greeks. The inquiry is not without profit, as showing that, in the fullness of time, the world was ready for the teachings of Christ, and that his appearance was not out of harmony with social evolution. But the ethical philosophy of the Greeks lacked some important principles that were essential to the healthy and uninterrupted progress of the world. A gradual evolution will not account for the appearance of the first man, nor of such characters as Abraham and Moses; least of all will it explain the coming of Christ, unless we mentally supply some essential factors for which we have as yet no data. The weakest part of Greek philosophy was its morality, because it was tinged with ethnic characteristics; the power of Christ's teachings lies in their ethical elements of universal validity.

KNOWLEDGE AND MORALITY.

There is, perhaps, no thought that occupies men's minds more frequently at the prensent time than admiration for the wonderful age in which we live. Nor is this surprising. When one compares the closing years of the nineteenth century with the end of the sixties, and examines somewhat in detail the inventions and discoveries of the intervening period, he finds himself indeed in a new world. In nothing has public opinion undergone a more marked change than in the estimate placed upon the value of knowledge, *per se*. So many secrets have been wrung from the keeping of material nature, and the information thus gained has been turned, in so many ways, to the effective service of man, that the world seems to be looking for its temporal salvation in this direction. That the increase of the public welfare is commensurate with the advance of knowledge is an axiom that has influenced public opinion within the last few decades to a remarkable degree.

The most tangible expression of this belief is the liberality shown, both by states and individuals, in the establishment and support of institutions for the highest education. It is entirely safe to say that more money has been donated and voted for this purpose during the last ten or

fifteen years, perhaps even during the last three or four, than during the entire preceding history of our country.* Most of it has come from men, and by the votes of men, whose scholastic attainments are not above the average. They have been influenced in their action by the tide of popular opinion, perhaps far more than by their own inclination, at least in a majority of instances. But this estimate of the value of knowledge is not confined to the United States. France has been extraordinarily liberal in its provision for both elementary and higher education. The Republic has literally covered the country with normal schools and faculties corresponding to some extent to German universities. Germany has for a long time been conspicuous for its liberality in educational matters. Strangely, too, the Germans, under a government verging on a despotism, promote education in order to maintain their political institutions; while France and the United States are pursuing the same course, in order to strengthen their free institutions. We have been persistently reminded that we must educate, or we must perish by our own prosperity; and that, unless we do so, we shall inevitably lose the liberties that have been handed down to us from our fathers. It is hard to see how anything can produce two diametrically opposite effects, and it may be profitable to examine the foundation upon which the popular belief rests.

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*According to the latest obtainable statistics the sums given for educational and charitable purposes in the United States in 1899 amounted, in round numbers, to eighty million dollars. In 1900 the sum was sixty-two and a half millions, while in 1901 it reached a total of one hundred and twenty-four millions. Of this amount nearly sixty-nine millions went to educational institutions, not including libraries, museums and galleries.

If the effect of the general diffusion of knowledge is to promote the highest welfare of the largest number, it is probable that the form of government has little to do with the problem. But it will be profitable to consider, whether those periods of the world that are most conspicuous for intelligence were, on the whole, the happiest; whether there are not other factors of the social organism, such as national traits, individual characteristics, and creeds, that are more potent for good than mere knowledge; and whether, conversely, we are not mistaken in assuming that all we need to do to make men better is to make them more intelligent. It is taken for granted that to make men more intelligent, or at least better informed, is to make them more reasonable. Is the assumption correct? Is it true that, as the majority becomes enlightened, as the world judges enlightenment, they will be more ready to help those, always a large proportion, of the population who need help and guidance and encouragement?

One cannot read attentively the history of the ancient Greeks without feeling all the time that many of them clearly recognized the horrors of war, and the futility of engaging in it with a view to gaining any permanent good. This is plainly indicated in their historians, their philosophers, and their dramatic moralists. They recognize, clearly, too, the existence of a rule of right that was not dependent upon the changing beliefs and impulses of men. They nevertheless were compelled to yield to public opinion in the midst of which they lived, and Greek civilization decayed under their eyes and through forces against which they continually protested. A modern historian even goes so far as to say that the Greeks were not naturally a warlike people, in spite of the fact that they were almost constantly engaged in war. Even in the Homeric Poems the

transcendent value of obedience to law and the rule of right are clearly recognized. Yet how little influence did this recognition have on the progress of events. It is almost literally true that the most civilized and intelligent people of antiquity went to their destruction with their eyes open. Though wanting to do good, evil was ever present with them. It was impossible to make head against an all-powerful pernicious public opinion that received its inspiration not from reason, but from sentiment.

On the other hand, the Roman state was built up and maintained by the intense feeling of patriotism which made its citizens always act in the spirit of the maxim, "My country, right or wrong." The Romans possessed a genius for government which was not founded on intelligence, but on a national trait. Passing over a large interval of time, we find this genius the most marked in the English. Yet, taken on a whole, it will hardly be claimed that they have been the most intelligent people of Europe for the last three or four hundred years. On the other hand, it seems clear that the moral forces have, during most of this time, been more active and more influential in England than in any country on the Continent.

Though there is some apparent injustice in comparing the two periods, owing to the difference in time, we are safe in saying that the Reformation in Germany had much less influence on the morals of the people than the movement inaugurated in England by the Wesleys and Whitefield. In mere scholastic learning Germany was unquestionably far ahead of England in the middle of the eighteenth century, and probably for a long time before. The same is true in a more marked degree of France. Yet, while France and Germany were filled with scholars and men of genius, the country was going from bad to worse,

and, so far as a regeneration came, it was not inspired or carried out by them. In England, moral and religious forces have always been active and vigorous, as they still are; on the Continent, except at rare intervals, weak. No matter how large a stock of facts we accumulate, if one has no inclination to use them, of what advantage are they? And, while England is doing less to-day than either France or Germany to promote intelligence, and put the highest learning within reach of all, we do not hear of much that is done to promote practical morality in the latter countries. If we are to judge the situation from the testimony of Germans and Frenchmen, the moral condition of their countrymen is becoming worse as they are becoming more intelligent or at least more intellectual. Plainly the salvation of the world does not come through worldly wisdom. This is a truth confirmed by past experience and present observation.

In view of the testimony just cited, the man who believes that "righteousness exalteth a nation" may well ask, What, then, shall we do? Evidently to fill the land with scholars is not to fill it with men of character, with men who believe in doing right because it is right. If the more intelligent members of a community are truthful and commercially honest because the practice of truth and honesty are the characteristics of a gentleman, but take no interest in the weak and degraded, it is not hard to see where and to what such indifference will lead.

If there is any good reason for the somewhat widely diffused faith in the efficacy of mere education to promote the happiness of mankind, it ought to become strikingly manifest in the growing aversion to war. Is this so? A recent writer truthfully says: "If men forsake the use of swords and spears, it assuredly is not to convert them into plough-

shares and pruning hooks, but to substitute rifled cannon for these antique instruments of slaughter, now found ineffectively murderous. Surely never was the aspect of Europe so threatening as it is at the present hour. Standing armies of a vastness hitherto undreamed of confront one another. The frontiers of every country are embattled. Railways are converted into military roads. The physical sciences are ransacked for engines of carnage. The whole continent is an immense parade-ground, destined,—who can say how soon?—to become a vast battlefield." "'Tis pity, and pity 'tis, 'tis true." In this willingness of the nations of the earth to engage in deadly conflict with each other, upon a trifling pretext, we see the power of irrational motives operating destructively. It is the spirit of a pack of mastiffs ready to fly at each other's throat as soon as an opportunity is offered. One does not need to have been a very profound student of history to know that when two governments wanted to go to war with each other they easily found a reason for so doing. Most of these professed reasons were flimsy enough, but they served their purpose. The world is still ready, as it always has been, to applaud a weak nation for taking up arms against a strong one, though the outcome is plain beforehand. It at least shows pluck,— a praiseworthy trait, certainly, but it needs proper direction.

We all know the story of the German professor, who, when told that his house was on fire, said to his informant, "Go tell my wife; I never meddle with domestic affairs." He was a typical student; absorbed in some insignificant matter, he took no account of what was going on around him. In truth, the people have never perished for lack of knowledge, but for lack of the will to use it. When we see on what utterly useless trifles many men have spent

the marvelous insight into the needs of their time exhibited by the writers. They developed and applied the simple teachings of the Founder of Christianity in a manner that cannot fail to command our admiration. Every Epistle is different from every other, according as the circumstances of those addressed were unlike; yet the fundamental theme is everywhere the same; the motives to which appeal is made, are the same. The various schools of Greek philosophy had each essayed in vain to provide a regenerative force. They were all originally too intellectual, and had in time degenerated into mere idle speculation, or into quiescent introspection. So far as they had any definite aim, it was to know, not what and how to do. The author of the "Education of the Greek People" well says, "Until the supernatural sense can recognize as its object a living God, or Being with perfect intelligence, love, will, supernaturally correlated, but in no sense identical with the spirit of men, so that his perfections are their goal and not his being, their grave, it will never be able to maintain itself against abstracting reason or supply the basis of moral life." And again, "The lesson of history is, that of all the faculties of the human soul, that which demands the most careful training is the supernatural sense. While it remains undeveloped all other education leads ultimately to nothing. It was the failure to recognize this that made Greek education impotent to save the world, and forced it to crown itself with Christianity, whose function is to train the supernatural sense to a recognition of the living God as the Father of Spirits, the guardian of the moral law, and the bond of institutional life."

Passing again to modern times, for we are not here concerned with chronological sequence but with parity of con-

ditions, we find many points of resemblance between western Europe in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century and the Roman Empire in the time of Christ. What is called the literature of these periods takes singularly little account of the common people. They are not the submerged tenth, but the neglected two-thirds or more. The classical writers of these periods rarely mention them, except to stigmatize their brutality, rail at their ignorance, or sneer at their stupidity. It is true there exists a considerable body of devotional literature called into existence by the spiritual wants of those who aspired to a better life, but these books rarely found their way into the hands of the educated, and certainly did not exercise any influence on them. As in England, so in Germany and France, there was always a considerable portion of the population that were genuinely pious and sincerely desirous to lead pure and holy lives. But the masses were little, if at all, influenced by their example. Not until our own day did it occur to any one to write a History of the English People,—apparently because hitherto readers were only interested to know what the upper class, those who were more or less concerned in shaping the political destinies of the country, did.

In another paper I have given a quotation from Kidd's Social Evolution, which puts in a striking light the attitude of the educated classes in England toward most of the reforms that have been brought about in that country during the present century. The extract occurs on p. 105, but deserves to be read in this connection.

I am aware that he who undertakes to show the influence of motives generally classed as irrational in the development of society and to set forth their potency for good lays himself open to the charge of returning to the

text on which the school of Rousseau preached so many powerful sermons in the last century. The influence and vitality of the doctrines so forcibly proclaimed by a man who was almost without education is a strong tribute to their truthfulness. In Germany a man of different mould, but aroused by the same conditions, was spurred to action while his French prototype was content to talk and write. The new doctrines were promulgated at a time when Europe was at least to some extent prepared for them, though this preparedness consisted rather in dissatisfaction with the old than a clear recognition of the needed remedy. The conservatism of the upper classes had become well-nigh unendurable. Their rule of life was regulated by the thought that for them the state existed; for them government performed its functions; it was right for them to exploit the resources of the country to the fullest extent it would bear. Almost all who had the courage to cry out against the existing conditions were proscribed; were often in danger of incarceration and even of their lives. That one man is as good as another; that all men are brothers and bound together by obligations to mutual helpfulness; that it is the duty of the weak to protect the strong, are not articles that are found in the creed of those who stand foremost in the ranks of the intelligent. It is Christianity, and Christianity alone, that has always insisted on the supreme importance of such teachings to the welfare of mankind in the widest sense. And it was just because the intelligent classes, not excepting those whose calling made them the exponents of Christianity, had long ignored these teachings, that a protest arose against the wretched condition in which the poor were perforce kept, from so many of those who had no sympathy with the prevailing religious creeds. It was al-

truistic feeling breaking through the crust of custom that had been hardened by the conservatism of centuries.

This brief sketch of facts and inferences is not intended as a protest against the growing intelligence of our time. It is written for the purpose of calling attention to a serious danger into which we seem to be rapidly drifting. Some of the European nations are already on the verge of a precipice over which they may topple at any moment. There are few things for which it is impossible to find a reason. The most atrocious crimes have had their defenders; the most unjust institutions their apologists. Sentiments and ideas, too, are often misleading; yet it is in obedience to these mainsprings of action that the world has grown better. They are the prime motors in human progress. They furnish motives to which all men in every progressive country naturally respond. It is with them that reformers have primarily to reckon; it is to them they must chiefly look for support; against them it is impossible to go forward. We may enlighten the head as much as we please, if we do not succeed in filling the heart with proper sentiments we shall not inspire any one to activity or to self-sacrifice for the good of others. It will hardly be denied that a large proportion of those who are engaged in research have no interest whatever in the welfare of mankind. Unquestionably the wisest activity is conditioned by the largest knowledge; but he who never acts until he is sure of being familiar with the entire situation will usually never act at all. I know of no caution that the enlightened nations of the world need more at this time than that against implicit faith in the doctrine that a training of the senses, pure and simple, will bring about that condition of society for which all good men labor and devoutly pray.

REASON AND SENTIMENT AS FACTORS IN SOCIAL PROGRESS.

It is generally held by philologists that the word which in the Teutonic tongues designates the head of the animal kingdom is closely allied to a verbal root whose signification is "to think." Man is, therefore, the thinking being *par excellence* in the realm of animated nature. Whether this derivation be correct or not, and necessarily without reference to it, man is wont to assert for himself the proud pre-eminence of occupying the highest place among the creatures that inhabit the earth, and to claim that this position has been accorded to him, or that he has won it for himself, because he is alone the possessor of reason. It may be interesting, and it is certainly not without profit, from the practical point of view, to examine to what extent the history of the race, so far as it is fairly well authenticated, bears out the common belief that reason has been the prime factor, the chief motive power, in human progress. Such an examination will prove almost beyond a doubt that ideas, impulses generally irrational, tradition, interests real or imaginary, and national traits have played a far larger part in shaping the destiny of the world, and are doing so still, than is generally believed. A saying at-

tributed to Franklin, that there would be no advantage in being a reasonable creature if one could not find a reason for doing what he wants to, pointedly expresses the subordination of reason to other motives that impel men to action.

When a man makes up his mind to do a thing he can generally prove by a mental process to his own satisfaction that he ought to do it. Let us take the burning social problem of the day and see how far the influence of reason has been effective in dealing with it. We mean the drink problem. The advocates of temperance have nearly all the reason on their side; their opponents have everything else, including the appetites of those who drink and the avarice of those who sell. The intelligent class among all European peoples are on the side of temperance. Writers and speakers are incessantly warning their countrymen against the dangers of alcoholism. They are demonstrating from day to day that more than one half the evils that afflict the body politic are due to drink. They point to the uncontradicted testimony furnished by the records of poverty, crime and wretchedness as evidence of the reasonableness of their teaching. Yet how little has been accomplished, how few drunkards have been reclaimed, by argument! Often the very men who are firmly convinced of the danger of meddling with strong drink—and who is not?—are unable to resist an appetite when once strengthened by indulgence. The inefficacy of reason to stand against desire for drink has been so fully demonstrated that it has largely changed the methods by which the demon of alcoholism is to be combated. Instead of arguments addressed to reason, training is applied for the formation of right habits. Prophylactic agencies are brought to bear upon the child while in the plastic state; and, though the reasoning powers are

yet weak, this has been found to be the most effective, and indeed the only generally effective, preventive of drunkenness. We have no desire here to enter into a discussion of the temperance question, and have only touched upon it because it illustrates in a striking way, and by examples familiar to all, the subordinate position of reason in directing human affairs.

Although the philosopher Schopenhauer was a cynical critic of his fellow-men, he often told the truth plainly and pointedly. Who will say that he exaggerated when he wrote the following?

"Brainless pates are the rule, fairly furnished ones the exception, the brilliantly endowed very rare, genius a *portentum*. How otherwise could we account for the fact that out of upwards of eight hundred millions of existing human beings, and after the chronicled experience of six thousand years, so much should still remain to discover, to think out, and to be said? By far the greater part of humanity are wholly inaccessible to purely intellectual enjoyments. They are quite incapable of the delight that exists in ideas as such, everything standing in a certain relation to their own individual will, in other words, to themselves and their own affairs. In order to interest them it is necessary that their wills should be acted upon, no matter in how remote a degree."

The material of which reformers is made is furnished by nature in such small quantities that none of it gets into the great mass of mankind. They are pretty well content with the world as it is, and expend far more thought in making themselves as comfortable in it as may be than in making it better. "We must take the world as it is," or "Why should we concern ourselves with the doings of our neighbors so long as they do not interfere with our own?" has

always been the conscious or unconscious creed of a large majority of the human race. The researches of anthropologists and historians have thus far failed to discover any evidence of the existence of human beings upon earth who were intellectually inferior to those now living. In so far as there has been or is any inferiority it is quantitative rather than qualitative. The most abject race can be civilized in a generation or two when placed under proper conditions. No new faculties need to be created; it is only necessary to develop those already existing. Yet human progress is a comparatively recent thing. But faint traces of it are discoverable until the advent of the Greeks. Egypt and Babylon appear to us, at the other end of the vista of historical perspective, about as we find them two or three thousand years later. This could hardly have been possible if reason had been a force in ancient society. In so far as it was, it can only have been the reason of the modern Turk, who finds the idea of progress utterly repugnant to him and who is content to be what his father was before him. If progress is founded upon reason, and not rather upon race characteristics, it is impossible to explain the wide differences that exist among the inhabitants of the globe.

There is no question affecting the relation of man to man upon which the civilized world is at present more nearly agreed than that slavery is wrong. So deep-seated has this feeling become that the foremost nations of our time have not only ceased to tolerate it among themselves, but have undertaken to extirpate it from the face of the earth. While we may question to some extent the disinterestedness of the motives of some of those who engage in its suppression, there is no doubt that they have a strong public sentiment back of them. How glaring is the con-

trast of public opinion to-day upon this question with that of antiquity! No intelligent man will assert that in the power of thought, in the ability to reason, the world has advanced one iota in two thousand years. It is universally conceded that no greater men ever lived than Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. These men, to say nothing of many others, seemed to have divined by a sort of superhuman prescience almost all the lines of human progress for all time to come. Yet how little they have to say upon slavery, except to recognize it as an existing institution! Aristotle even enters into an elaborate discussion to show that servitude is the natural state of a part of the human race. Might has always made slaves. Even slaves found nothing reprehensible in the practice and submitted calmly to their condition, though they now and then rebelled against oppression. Those who had themselves been slaves never hesitated to enthral others when by a turn of fortune they found the power in their hands. Not many years have passed since it was a common thing to defend slavery, and even the pulpit took a share in this defense. We were frequently told that it was ordained by God himself; that its abuse was no reason for its abolition; that it would be just as reasonable to turn all children over to the care of the state because some parents maltreated or neglected their offspring. Dean Alford, writing in 1864, expressed his contempt for the American people for several reasons, and among others for their "reckless and fruitless maintenance of the most cruel and unprincipled war in the history of the world." This dignitary of the Church uttered not only his own sentiments, but those of almost the entire aristocratic class in England, to which the Anglican Church professes to belong. How delusive the progress of the last score of years has proved the learned dean's

reasoning to have been! How few persons can be found to-day who defend slavery! England itself abolished slavery, not because it was more unreasonable in the nineteenth century than in the eighteenth, but because the growth of the altruistic sentiment among the English people would no longer tolerate it.

It is doubtful whether in the last analysis war is ever a reasonable procedure. Under certain conditions a people may be justified in taking up arms. When a government becomes so tyrannical that its subjects can endure its domination no longer there is sometimes no recourse but rebellion. But not many of the wars that have drenched the earth with blood have been of this sort. Generally they are born of the lust of conquest or of the desire to uphold that peculiar sentiment, national honor. Many wars have been undertaken from a religious motive, and these have usually been the most relentless; yet the superiority of one religion over another is the last question that can reasonably be settled with the sword. Hardly different is the case when national honor is involved. Take, for instance, the Franco-Prussian War. The French people held that their nation was insulted in the person of their ambassador. Every intelligent man knew that this was a mere pretext for engaging in a conflict that had already been determined upon. Two individuals who happen to have a dispute can usually settle their differences by referring them to a third party, especially if force in the guise of law is behind the arbitrator. It is generally found that one or the other party is in the wrong, or it may be both. In the nature of the case a national dispute might be decided in the same way. But it is rarely done. It must be decided in a way that always proves costly to both parties and terribly costly to one of them.

Reason and experience have proclaimed their lessons, for the most part in vain. In spite of our boasted progress there is a painful amount of truth in the recent words of a Congressman: "Nineteen hundred years have passed since the advent of the Man of Nazareth, and instead of growing nearer and more near to the universal era of peace, all the energies, all the inventive talent, all the genius of the human mind are now devoted to the manufacture and construction and suggestion of implements of war more horrible, more fatal in the power of execution, than any which the world has heretofore seen." The intellectual pre-eminence of the Athenian people is well known. But how did they use their intelligence? Was it employed to promote the welfare of one another? It was rather used to defend the institutions to which they had fallen heir by no effort of their own. Far more thought and labor were expended in trying to injure one another than in the work of promoting their own welfare or that of their neighbors. Most people are theoretically in favor of the principle of arbitration and practically in favor of it when it concerns any nation but their own. It is easy to point out the right course when our interests, our possessions, or our putative honor are not involved. That the American people are passionately devoted to enforced arbitration for the settlement of international disputes was clearly proved by their attitude toward the recent controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela; that they were little disposed to accept it for themselves was shown with equal clearness by the spirit with which they received the suggestion for a similar mode of adjusting their differences with Spain.

There is probably no sentiment that dwells permanently in the human breast, and is hardly ever absent from any member of the race, for which so little can be said on the

ground of reason as the love of early scenes. Tacitus failed to see how anyone could endure to live in such a country as Germany, unless it were his native land. But affection for home and familiar surroundings is hardly ever effaced, no matter how unpleasant they may have been, and how far subsequent prosperity has removed one from them. Early habits leave such an abiding impress on us that we review the familiar scenes with a certain degree of pleasure, even when this is not untinged with sadness. The Irish peasant never forgets the land of his birth, though his recollections are wholly of abject poverty, or squalor, and half-satisfied hunger; and he is ready at all times to take up arms against the government that he holds responsible for his woes. The German seeks to transplant his native customs to every land that hospitably receives him, and to make his new home in many respects as much like the land of his birth as he can. The Scandinavian from the Far North, a land almost unendurable to those accustomed to warmer regions, is never so happy as when he is permitted to return to his early haunts and to live over again the familiar scenes of his youth. There is no explanation of this curious psychological fact except that we feel a certain pleasure in doing over again that to which we have been accustomed, though at first it may have been unpleasant and even painful. Men are prone to run in grooves. It is hard to get those who have not been trained for it to do some new thing, to entertain new thoughts, to strike out new paths. Much easier is it to accept a tradition than to examine its trustworthiness. There is no harder work than thinking; and it is a kind of labor to which the common man is much averse. No wonder that he finds pleasure in doing and believing what has become familiar and easy. No wonder that early habits and beliefs

have such powerful hold on most of mankind that they are ready to fight and even lay down their lives to preserve them. And what shall we say of the influence of chivalry upon the history of the world, using the term in an ethical rather than an historical sense? It is almost the sole secular motive that lights up the dark wilderness of mediaeval history. "Order, veracity, loyalty, self-sacrifice. and mildness of manners, the protection of the weak and the innocent, and the punishment of wrong" were the motives that gave it birth and nourished it into full-grown maturity.

From the mythical age of Haemon and Antigone to the day of the contemporary novelist and poet, affection between persons of the opposite sex has been a powerful incentive to human action. The fact that it plays so large a part in the literature of fiction is but the proof that the shadow furnishes of a substance not far away. What deeds of prowess and daring has it not inspired and carried to successful issue! It is true that its reign has not been one of unmixed good. From the courts of emperors and kings to the home of the peasant it has exerted its baleful or benevolent influence. We are not here concerned with the purity of the motive, but with its strength. No one who takes time to reflect can doubt that the devotion of the lover to his lady, or of the lady to her lord, has been one of the most powerful factors in the development of the race. Whether it has been the ephemeral passion whose fierce flames burned out the fuel upon which it fed in the brief space of a day or the conjugal fidelity as abiding as life itself, its potency none will dispute. Often the source of its inspiration, as in the case of Lady Macbeth, was demoniacal rather than divine; its potency was none the less the arbiter of the destinies of nations and individuals.

And what shall we say of a mother's love? By the almost unanimous consensus of enlightened mankind there is no emotion of the human breast that partakes more largely of the divine than the love of a mother for her child. Irving well portrays it in the following language: "There is an enduring tenderness in the love of a mother to a son that transcends all the other affections of the heart. It is neither to be chilled by selfishness, nor daunted by danger, nor weakened by worthlessness, nor stifled by ingratitude. She will sacrifice every comfort to his convenience; she will surrender every pleasure to his enjoyment; she will glory in his fame and exult in his prosperity; and if adversity overtake him, he will be the dearer to her by misfortune; and if disgrace settle upon his name, she will still love and cherish him; and if all the world beside cast him off, she will be all the world to him. It is never exhausted; it never changes, it never tires." Can any one say that this undiscriminating affection has done more good than harm? How few mothers there are who will recognize the stern demands of justice when their children are concerned? Who is there that has had to do with the instruction of the young that has not been reminded over and over again how hard it is to convince a mother that her child is in the wrong even when the denial puts everybody else in the wrong? If mothers had their way few malefactors would be punished and none executed. It is true, not all mothers are blind to the faults of their own children and lynx-eyed to the short-comings of others; but those whose judgment in such matters is not overborne by their emotions are greatly in the minority. While it is true that fathers are not impeccable there is a considerable measure of truth in the words of Seneca:

"Do you not see how differently fathers and mothers show their love for their children? The former want their sons to be roused early in order that they may betake themselves to their studies; their vacations even they would not have them pass in idleness, and they even draw sweat and sometimes tears from the youths; but mothers want to fondle them on their bosom, keep them in the shade; they would never have them weep, never be sad, never undergo toil."

Perhaps no fact in what we may call ethnological psychology is more potent than the constitutional inability of any nation to form a just estimate of itself. And it sometimes seems as if this weakness increased, if such an expression be admissible, with the rank and intelligence of those who exhibit it. No reader, except a native, will rely upon the history of any country written by a native historian. In nine cases out of ten, wherever there is in the narrative an opportunity for the display of national bias we are sure to find it.* That France marches at the

*It is refreshing to find occasionally a writer who openly admits the truth even at the risk of being charged with the lack of patriotism. From a book published in Madrid in 1900, entitled "Education in the Twentieth Century," I take the following confession of the author: "In foreign countries no one takes any account of us; we exist as if we did not exist. No important publication pays any attention to education in Spain. No statistician takes note of us or mentions our name. Now and then a French publicist devotes to us a brief article in which he either treats us with a certain consideration, whereupon we reproduce it and think over it; or he treats us with a contempt which we do not resent." Is this backwardness of Spain due to national traits or to her comparative isolation? That the latter factor is important is proven by the relative prosperity of those portions nearest to France.

head of civilization is an assertion one would endeavor in vain to refute in debate with a Frenchman. In their opinion they have never had occasion to go abroad for anything that was desirable. Yet it is an accepted fact that the French people know less of other countries than almost any others of Europe. Another typical case is afforded by recent histories of Germany. The success of the Germans in the Franco-Prussian war has turned the heads of almost the entire people; and the German historians frequently talk of their fellow-countrymen as if they belonged to some higher order of beings and had always so belonged. This, too, in spite of the fact that German literature, from the close of the Reformation almost to the time of the French Revolution, is hardly more than a blank; while for a still longer period the German people, oppressed at home and despised abroad, were of no political consequence whatever. Difficult is it to get material for self-glorification out of German history. But national prejudice has abundantly demonstrated its power to accomplish this feat. As few persons have access to original records, the great majority see facts only at long range and through the distorted medium of national vanity or prejudice, or both, with results that may be and often have been painful enough. It is sad indeed that so few persons can be led to see that truth alone makes free. Zeus is represented in a passage of the "Odyssey" as saying: "Lo, how men blame the gods! From us, they say, spring troubles. Yet of their own perversity, beyond what is their due, they meet with sorrow." It is evident that Homer's chief god was a careful observer. His sagacious remarks were not only history, but prophecy also.

In one of his lectures Professor Giesebrecht used the following language: "The sovereignty belongs to Germany

because the Germans are an elite nation, a noble race; and for the same reason it ought to exercise such an influence on its neighbors as it is the right and duty of every man endowed with superior intelligence and force to exert upon those individuals less highly endowed about him." How an honest man who knows the history of Germany can give utterance to such sentiments is incredible. Sometimes poor mortals who have lost their reason imagine themselves to be God. Such persons are usually confined in asylums, where they can harm neither themselves nor others. But in Germany we find men in professors' chairs and even wearing titles of nobility, telling their countrymen that they belong to a race of demigods, the speakers included, and are charged with the mission of enlightening their neighbors. This would be amusing if there were not always danger that it would lead to grave consequences. Yet it would be well for the world if this species of mental aberration were confined to one country. Let us at least give the German professor credit for sanity in the moral he draws.

In France the case is not greatly otherwise. Gallic pride has been terribly humiliated. Yet in reason what ought it to matter to the French or to the people of Alsace-Lorraine who governs them, provided they are well governed and permitted to possess their property in peace? The attachment of the latter to France is all the more ridiculous for the reason that they are radically German. Here, again, we see the inability of reason to make progress against a mere sentiment. Many a brave Frenchman has laid down his life for the delusive phantom *la gloire;* and to what purpose? Taine, speaking only of the Napoleonic era, says:

"According to him (Napoleon) man is held through his egotistic passions, fear, cupidity, sensuality, self-esteem, and emulation; these are the mainsprings when he is not under excitement, when he reasons. Moreover, it is not difficult to turn the brain of man, for he is imaginative, credulous, and subject to being carried away; stimulate his pride or vanity, provide him with an extreme and false opinion of himself and his fellow-men, and you can start him off head downward whenever you please." The results of proceeding upon this policy are thus summed up by the learned writer:

"Between 1804 and 1815 he has slaughtered more than 1,700,000 men born within the ancient boundaries of France, to which must be added probably 2,000,000 of men born out of these limits, and all for him, under the titles of allies, or slain on his account, under the title of enemies. All that the poor, enthusiastic, and credulous Gauls have gained by confiding their public welfare to him is two invasions; all that he bequeaths to them as a reward for their devotion, after this prodigious waste of their blood and the blood of others, is a France shorn of fifteen departments acquired by the republic, deprived of Savoy, the left bank of the Rhine, and of Belgium—losing 4,000,000 of new Frenchmen which it had assimilated after many years of life in common, and, worse still, thrown back within the frontiers of 1789, alone diminished in the midst of its aggrandized neighbors, suspected by all Europe, and lastingly surrounded by a threatening circle of distrust and rancor."

A few years before, the French people, for an idea which they expressed in the trinitarian formula, "Liberty, equality, fraternity," destroyed every man and every institution that seemed to stand in the way of a practical realization of the creed it embodied. Yet hardly a decade had passed

before they were ready to follow implicitly the most uncompromising tyrant that ever deluded a people. The desire to be free from oppression is eminently reasonable; but what can we say of a people who had just broken the yoke of bondage that had so long and heavily lain upon their own necks trying to fasten a new one upon their neighbors as well as upon themselves? No wonder Napoleon had a poor opinion of men when he saw how easily they could be led *en masse* into crime and misery.

During the past few years we have heard much about the so-called Monroe Doctrine. In definition it apparently amounts to about this: when any government administered in Europe interferes in the affairs of any country on the Western hemisphere, except in case of its own possessions, the people of the United States are to regard such interference as a direct menace against them. Yet the territory virtually owned by Great Britain on the Western continent, to say nothing of other European governments, is probably equal in extent to the Union, and England may therefore reasonably be supposed to have an equal interest here with ourselves. Nor is there any doubt that most of the Spanish-American States, if they were administered by an enlightened people like the English, in spite of their shortcomings, would enjoy peace and prosperity such as they have never known. We have assumed that the attitude of a monarchy towards a republic is always that of an oppressor, without inquiring into the facts of the case. Again, there has for a long time been a feeling of sympathy for the Cubans in their desire to free themselves from the heavy yoke of Spain. There is not much doubt that this feeling was strongest in those States that fifty years ago led the Union into an unjust war with Mexico for the purpose of acquiring territory with a view to the

extension of slavery, and a few years later plunged the whole country into a civil war, largely for the purpose of keeping the shackles of bondage on several millions of human beings—a far worse condition than that of the Cubans under the government of Spain, except possibly when in a state of actual insurrection. A story is told of a Russian countess who wept over the misfortunes of an imaginary hero as she beheld them portrayed on the stage while her coachman was freezing to death at his post on her carriage outside. How many of us can say that we have never been guilty of a similar if less shocking inconsistency? Sometimes that which transpires immediately under our eyes moves us most strongly; at others that which is more or less remote appeals most vividly to our imagination. He who gives a dole or a dinner to a beggar or a tramp often does him and the community more harm than good; but it is so much easier to yield to the paroxysm of sympathy aroused by a personal appeal than to try to intelligently to remove the conditions that make tramps and beggars.

The fundamental activity of the soldier is expressed by the lines,

> "Theirs not to make reply,
> Theirs not to reason why,
> Theirs but to do and die."

The soldier is not to inquire for a reason; he has but to do what he is ordered to do. He is usually a young man; not so young that his reasoning powers are undeveloped, but yet so young that his energy is prone to find expression in action rather than in deliberation. War needs not only men who are physically strong, but men who can be depended upon to subordinate their reasoning powers to the

word of command. Whether the command be a reasonable one does not enter into the problem. The best soldier is not he who looks at war in a large way, and who is capable of understanding the cause for which he is to lay down his life; but it is he who is best able to use the means within his reach to accomplish the ends placed before him by those in authority over him. It is a question whether intelligence is so important a factor as is generally believed. No country has been so uniformly successful in war as Russia, because no armies fight more bravely than the Russian. The Russian peasant, grossly ignorant as he has always been and is, never hesitates to lay down his life for his emperor, if the latter wills it. Apparently he has never concerned himself about the reason why. Yet what astonishing results have rewarded his prowess! While he cannot frame into words the Horatian *dictum,* "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori," he does more—he is the living exponent of it. Public sentiment finds ten heroes on the battlefield to one in civil life. That foolhardy bravery is often displayed and life lost in unwise and foolish conflict makes little difference. The world is interested directly in the act, and looks no farther. Physical courage is still rated far higher than moral courage; if it were not so the world would to-day present a very different aspect from that which we see.

From the consideration of mere personal bravery the transition is easy to the contemplation of patriotism. Here is a sentiment that is as 'versal as man himself. Every man, no matter how low in the scale of civilization, feels a certain degree of affection for the land of his birth; it is an affection akin to that which he feels for himself. But patriotism is an idea that, *per se,* will not for a moment stand the test of reason. The patriot is not necessarily wiser

than the man whose motto is, "Ubi bene, ibi patria." The Fuegian loves his country just as fervently as the most enlightened European. If the former were compelled to change place with the latter both would be equally unhappy. The one would protest as loudly against the efforts to elevate him as the latter to degrade him.

Patriotism is not necessarily unreasonable, but it is always unreasoning. A man may be able to give a good account for the faith that is in him, and he may not. Lessing wrote, "Of love of country I have no conception; it appears to me but a heroic weakness which I am glad to be without." Goethe was frequently blamed for his lack of patriotism. And, in truth, there is little in his writings that exhibits a distinctive German feeling, and there was equally little in his life. Plato, a coryphaeus among philosophers, is singularly free from national bias. When the historian Polybius made a study of the history of Rome, he found that its steady growth was not an accident. Though a foreigner he could see that its government was stable from the absence of the forces that made the government of his own people unstable. The Romans had instinctively put into effect those principles which the Greek philosophers had for centuries preached in vain to their own countrymen. The Romans were no philosophers, and despised philosophy. But they had the instinct of government, and rarely followed this instinct to their own detriment. Practical wisdom does not come through knowledge, often not even through experience. It may serve men who think, but this class is generally too small to make its impress permanently felt in the growth of states. Frederic the Great is reported to have said that if he wanted to ruin one of his fairest provinces he need only to place it under the government of the philosophers. Akin to this is his remark that "one pinch

of common sense is worth a university full of learning." Though a man of exceptionally keen penetration he did not always see to the bottom of things. And so here. He mistook the appearance for the reality. He mistook for philosophers the pedants of whom his country was full, men who spent their lives in delving among musty tomes filled with the lore of the past or in disputing about philological, metaphysical and theological subtilties without once looking up to take note of what was going on in the world around them. Who was it if not the real philosophers that formulated the admirable system of instruction that has been to a greater or less extent the model for every progressive nation? While Germany's thinkers have borne a leading part even her dreamers have done something. The investigator may by accident discover some important law in the physical universe, but it is the philosopher only who can interpret its bearings and potency.

Plato thought that unless philosophers became kings or kings philosophers there would be no cessation of evils among men. This is doubtless true, but true only on the assumption that philosophers are genuine lovers of wisdom and not mere devotees of their own theories and prejudices. Of the latter there are a score for every one of the former.

It seems almost like a law of nature that the different peoples of the earth should have an antipathy toward each other. This is particularly true where and when national prejudices are strengthened by real or supposed national interests. But even among men of the same nationality who are reputed equally wise there are often the bitterest animosities. Truth, for most persons, is not an abstraction. Those who are engaged in the search for what they believe to be the truth are men with passions like ordinary mortals

and often as likely to be blinded by them or at least to allow their intellectual vision to be obscured by them. Here then we find the same difference of opinion as to what is reasonable, sentiment again overmastering reason. Reason is artificial, deliberate, skeptical. Its function in human affairs is to regulate and control, not to supply "idea-forces." It decides how to do rather than what to do. Only in a restricted sense can it be said that intelligence rules the world. We believe the author of Social Evolution has stated a truth of far wider application than he makes of it when he says:

"It has to be confessed that in England during the nineteenth century the educated classes, in almost all the great political changes that have been effected, have taken the side of the party afterward admitted to have been in the wrong, they have almost invariably opposed at the time the measures they have subsequently come to defend and justify. This is to be noticed alike of measures which have extended education, which have emancipated trade, which have extended the franchise. The educated classes have even, it must be confessed, opposed measures which have tended to secure religious freedom and to abolish slavery. The motive force behind the long list of progressive measures carried during this period has in scarcely any appreciable measure come from the educated classes; it has come almost exclusively from the middle and lower classes, who have in turn acted, not under the stimulus of intellectual motives, but under the influence of altruistic feelings." Let us at least credit them with seeing and admitting their errors.

Progress needs a motive force, and this reason does not provide. The most powerful emotion that moves men partakes more or less of a religious character. It is everywhere in the foreground in the Babylonian and Assyrian

wars. It played an important part in the struggle of Greek with Greek, or of Greek with barbarian. A Roman army was invincible only when it was confident that it went into battle with the favor of the gods. The religious idea carried the victorious armies of the Saracens over a large portion of the known earth in an incredibly short time. It is not necessary to enumerate any further; everyone can recall the course of events for himself. Christianity does not appeal primarily to the reason. Its Founder taught "as one having authority, and not as the scribes." His precepts are not usually supported by what men call reasons, nor are they arrived at by processes of ratiocination. Their truth is intended to be spiritually apprehended, not to be worked out by the rules of logic. They are intended for those who can feel, as well as for those who can reason. And how large the preponderance of the former over the latter!

If I have read the history of philosophy aright it takes singularly little interest in the emotional nature of man. The ancients, indeed, make a great account of the passions, but they generally regard them as a sort of disturbing element in the economy of society. Modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes and ending with Kant, seems to regard man's emotional nature as a matter of little consequence; as a sort of penumbra of the reasoning powers. With the advent of Rousseau a different state of affairs began to prevail. Rousseau himself was not much of a philosopher, because he lacked system in everything he did. But he was full of fruitful ideas, and he came at a time when the world was ready to listen to what he had to say. In his mental make up the emotional element largely predominated; he was so much a creature of impulse that there is nothing surprising in the extent to

which he moved the world. The world had come to recognize that, while reason must not be ignored in the instruction of youth, it cannot be wholly depended on as a guide. Modern pedagogy lays large stress on training, on giving direction to the young citizen or the young Christian before he is old enough to reason much about it. It seeks to cultivate his sympathies for the needs of society before the selfishness that he is destined to find all around him in later life gains the mastery over him. He is taught that the poor and degraded have a claim upon his charity, although this charity is to be kept under the control of reason. He may not let the slave or beggar perish from neglect, even though both are largely responsible for their condition. It is sympathy, not reason, that is the moving force in the philanthropic spirit that we see manifesting itself so powerfully wherever man has any claim to be called civilized. Examples are numerous and ready to hand everywhere. Surely nothing can be more reasonable than the doctrine that every man is inherently as good as another; yet how slow the world has been in recognizing this self-evident truth, even in theory! Christianity first enunciated it, but even Christianity was not able to bear up permanently against the tide of sentiment and tradition that bore down upon it. The early Christians themselves were slow to accept the doctrine, with all the consequences that seemed likely to flow from it. Even to-day it is far more a matter of theory than of actual practice, so slowly does the world outgrow its prejudices.

The spiritual nature of man, that prescience of God's plan in the government of the world, that sublime faith in the ultimate triumph of right which we often see manifested in highly endowed natures, is in no wise amenable to the laws of reason. We see this exhibited in the most

marked degree in the Hebrew prophets. Their lofty faith in the coming of a Messiah who should rule the world in righteousness was a trait of a highly endowed spiritual nature. The intellect colored its outward expression, and to some extent modified its form, but was not its source. Many of the world's greatest benefactors—in truth, the large majority of them—have not been men of pre-eminent intellectual endowment. They were men whose will was aroused to activity by a contemplation of the situation in which they found themselves. Kant said there is but one good thing in the world, and that is a good will. But the emotional nature seems to be more clearly related to the will than to the intellect, and to be more readily influenced by it. The result is that progress, in the best sense of the word, is not primarily intellectual. Its various phases do not, in the main, originate with the intellectual class, though men of large intellectual endowments often identify themselves with it. It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that by stimulating and cultivating the intellect alone we can make the world better. Knowledge is not even power, as we are so often told. It is, indeed, an indispensable prerequisite to power; but power is latent unless stimulated into activity by the will. They are sadly mistaken who imagine that nothing is necessary to insure the continuous amelioration of the condition of mankind but a continuous increase of the world's stock of available knowledge.

After this brief review of the psychic forces that have been chiefly instrumental in shaping the destinies of men and nations we need not wonder that human progress has been slow, painfully slow. Irrational motives have been predominant everywhere. Yet morality is a child of the intellect. Even the most disinterested altruism may do more harm than good if it is not intelligently directed. If

man were not an intelligent being he would make no more progress than the lower animals. In the future as in the past we must look to the regulative faculty to point out the course of safety. It is like the compass upon which the mariner depends to guide him across the watery waste. For while it has no power to move his ship an inch the stronger the propelling forces that urge him forward the greater the danger he incurs without its guidance. While this general truth has been patent to a few far-sighted men almost from time immemorial,—Socrates especially pointed it out with great clearness and his disciples after him—it has never been so widely comprehended as now. The theory of modern education proceeds on the assumption of the paramount importance of the human intellect. This is not saying that education should be exclusively intellectual. On the contrary, moral should precede intellectual education in time and be its constant companion. But even moral education can accomplish little unless wisely directed. If we are inclined to look with distrust on the large claims made for national education in our day by its most enthusiastic champions, because even the best education the world has had in the past seems to have counted for so little, let us remember that education in a large way is hardly older than the present generation. It has never had a trial. It has always been confined to a class or to a few classes. When attempts have been made to put an education, even the most elementary, within the reach of all its quality has been very inferior. Yet few competent judges will deny that much more might be done by teachers under present conditions and with the present financial resources at their disposal than is at present being done. While there is little difference of opinion among educationists as to the *ends* of education, there is considerable difference as to the means and methods by

which these ends may be most surely attained. Nor is it probable that entire agreement will ever be reached, but a substantial agreement is palpably not far in the future. It is not here contended that the most nearly perfect system of general education the human mind can desire will ever totally eliminate from society the pauper and the criminal. The poor and the vicious we shall always have with us. On the other hand when we consider how much is being done under intelligent direction and how much has already been accomplished to enable all the members of the body politic to help themselves to make life more worth living for all who constitute civilized communities and that the good work had only begun on a large scale we may well be hopeful of the future.

NOTE.—Charbonnel, in his "Victory of the Will," tells us how this victory is to be gained. "The philosophers have established laws for the discipline of the emotions and the control of our whole being,—namely, when an emotion or a sentiment favorable to our ideal arises in our consciousness, we are to fix our attention on this passion or sentiment, so as clearly to recognize its purity and grandeur, and to arouse in ourselves an effort of the will which shall be conformable to it; when an emotion or a sentiment arises which is antagonistic to our ideal, we must refuse it any attention, not even think of it, and thus let it pass into oblivion. If we have already allowed an evil passion or an emotion to grow and exercise an invincible power over us, we must examine seriously the ideas connected with it and the object it proposes to our will. Finally in the case where a desirable passion or sentiment is lacking in us, we must search out the ideas with which this passion or sentiment may have some affiliation, and turn our mind toward these ideas, keep them constantly present to our consciousness, and arouse the natural law of association which connect such emotions, such ideas, together."

Again: "A noble life, it has been said, is the grandest masterpiece which any man can achieve. It is an harmonious and beautiful achievement. It is our privilege to subordinate and co-

ordinate in ourselves, by the exercise of our will, our varied and contradictory emotions. The ancients compared the soul to an harmonious lyre, which gives forth sweet sounds under the fingers of the wind. This, which is true of the poetic soul, is equally true of the moral soul. It should be a well-tuned and well-strung lyre, responding to all the impressions of life. And the best law for the development of the higher life is not the stern repression of our emotional nature, or the violent destruction of this part of our being, but the wise and firm direction of it by the will. No repression, no suppression, no mutilation, but a peaceful and serene domination of the will in our harmonious soul."

Metaphysicians and psychologists may dispute as much as they please about the freedom of the will; in the last analysis everybody acts as if his own will were free and that of all other persons likewise. The entire theory and practice of rewards and punishments is based on this postulate. As Froude says, "To deny the freedom of the will is to make morality impossible." Nevertheless action is always directed by the strongest motive and motive is wholly subjective. What a man's motives are in general depends almost entirely upon his education, directly and indirectly. Two men have the same opportunity for making a great deal of money. One of them says, "The morality of the proposed transaction is questionable; I can not be a party to it." The other has no such scruples,—is not "squeamish," as the worldling puts it,—and becomes rich. Here the external conditions for both men are precisely the same and the motive the same; but the will leads to diametrically opposite action. If education can not keep the young free from temptation it can do much toward enabling them to meet it as becomes beings who are normally responsible. With a quotation from Epictetus I may fitly conclude this paper:

"There is nothing good or evil save in the will."

RESPONSIBILITY.

When the Lord said unto Cain, "Where is thy brother?" the latter took the question as an impertinence, and rejoined, "Am I my brother's keeper?" No wonder the miscreant was offended. He was not in position to give an account of his treatment of his brother. He would no doubt have been ready and willing to answer much harder questions than this one, but when he was asked about a matter of which he was fully cognizant he preferred to feign ignorance. It seemed the shortest and most direct way out of a difficulty.

I do not here use the term *brother* in the sense in which it was understood by the first murderer who has the misfortune to have his name handed down to posterity, but in the sense generally attached to it in the New Testament. The progress of civilization or at least of national and international intercourse has made closer and closer the bonds that bind together the remotest dwellers upon the face of the earth. But in every community every man is more or less responsible for his fellow-citizens, usually quite as much as if he were the son of the same father and mother. The question, Am I my brother's keeper? has made a good many people uncomfortable since the son of

Noah first asked it. Some answer it in the affirmative, some in the negative; but society will not accept the latter answer. Glance over the list of objects for which taxes are collected and you will see that to a very large extent every man is his brother's keeper. Even if the responsibility does not go so far as to require a direct contribution, it requires something. Yet the tax-list represents but a small part of the claims our fellow-men have upon each other. When a demand comes to them in the garb of law most people will recognize it more or less willingly: it is the claims that carry with them no legal obligation; that grow only out of the recognition of a mutual responsibility which give the genuinely good man the most concern. A man may strictly observe the statute law yet be neither a good man nor a good citizen. We can not say of a man who does no more than the law prescribes that he does his duty even to this extent; he merely performs reluctantly a disagreeable task. We repeat then that every man is to a greater or less extent his brother's keeper whether he wishes to be or not. The question is not whether he will assume the responsibility that circumstances place upon him, but how he will discharge that responsibility. Will he lift up his brother or will he drag him down? If he is weak, will he aid and strengthen him or will he allow him to succumb to his weakness? When we study a human being from the intellectual side only we must admit that Hamlet was right when he exclaimed, "What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving, how express and admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god! The beauty of the world! The paragon of animals!" On the other hand it is equally true that "man is but a reed, weakest in nature, but a reed

that thinks. It needs not that the whole universe should arm to crush him, a drop of water is enough to kill him. But were the universe to kill him he would still be more noble than his slayer because he knows that he dies and that the universe has the better of him. The universe knows nothing of this." On the other hand we may well ask: "How was it possible that it should ever enter into the thoughts of vain man to believe himself the principal part of God's creation, or that all the rest was ordained for him, for his service or pleasure? Man, whose follies we laugh at every day, or else complain of them, whose pleasures are vanity, and his passions stronger than his reason: who sees himself every way weak and impotent; hath no power over external nature, little over himself; can not execute so much as his own good resolution; mutable, irregular, prone to evil. Surely, if we made the least reflection upon ourselves with impartiality we should be ashamed of such an arrogant thought. How few of the sons of men for whom they say all things are made are the sons of wisdom! How few find the path of life! They spend a few days in folly and in sin, and then go down to the regions of death and misery. And is it possible to believe that all nature and all providence are only, or principally for their sake? Is it not a more reasonable conclusion which the prophet hath made, Surely all things are vanity?" In reality both views are true and not inconsistent with each other. "Man's two-fold nature is reflected in history. He is of earth, but his thoughts are with the stars. Mean and petty his wants and desires; yet they serve a soul exalted with grand, glorious aims, with immortal longings, with thoughts which sweep the heavens and wander through eternity! A pigmy standing on the outer crust of this planet, his far-reaching spirit stretches

outward to the infinite, and there alone finds rest. History is a reflex of this double life. Every life has two aspects—one calm, broad and solemn—looking towards eternity; the other agitated, petty, vehement and confused—looking towards time." It is true that the fountain of human effort sends forth bitter waters and sweet,—a mixture of that which is pure and refreshing and healthful with what is noxious and debilitating and deadly. There is abundant evidence of the worth of a man, but the evidence of his vileness is almost equally abundant. Yet it is doubtful if a human being exists that is wholly depraved. No doubt every man is more or less selfish. We are all willing to let our fellow-men have some of the good things of this life, but we are not all of one mind how the division shall be made of what is really valuable. Even the wise virgins said, "Not so, lest there be not enough for us and you; but go ye and buy for yourselves," when they must have known that if their foolish sisters followed their advice they could not return in time for the wedding, even if they had the wherewithal to purchase. It is hard and often impossible to draw the line between selfishness and enlightened self-interest. We too often find that the man who has no money is dissatisfied because the man who has a dime will not divide with him. He does not stop to consider whether it is not his own fault that he is penniless. Without a certain measure of regard for one's self on the part of the great majority of mankind there can be no enlightenment. If the experience of the race has proved anything it has proved this. No matter how tenaciously the miser holds on to what he has acquired during life the world at large generally gets the benefit of his accumulations in the end. He can not take his treasures with him when he leaves this world, and if he has not learned how

to keep wisely and spend judiciously while he lives his possessions do him little good unless it be in the reflection that his heirs will be more far-sighted than he. Whatever we may say against avarice, it is after all nothing more than a legitimate and healthful passion grown to excess. We do not give it a harsh name in its inception any more than we designate the wholesome desire for food, gluttony. So far as we are able to judge such things the richest nations are those among which individual happiness is the greatest, and *vice versa*. The talk of the socialist about the equality of opportunity and the right of all to an equal share of the good things of this life can not be regarded as anything more than idle rant in the mouths of those who most use the phrase, especially if these things are sought under present conditions. But we can hardly refuse to acknowledge that it is a noble aspiration toward the realization of which men may approach nearer and nearer as the days and the years go by. The rapidity of this approach is dependent solely upon the effort, the self-denial and the clearly divined purpose of the successive generations of men as they come upon the stage of action.

In spite of the misery in the world; in spite of the absolute want; in spite of the unequal division of what are called the good things of this life—all of which are painfully evident almost every day, I am persuaded that the world is not only not growing worse, but is improving. The poorest man has within his reach many things that go to make life agreeable that cost him nothing and which his ancestors did not have. No one will deny that we might be better off in many things than we are and that in not a few regards the times are out of joint; but this is something quite different from the charge often made that we are going from bad to worse.

"I doubt not thro' the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns."

This purpose is not in the material forces that hold us in their pitiless grasp and have not changed since the world was created, nor in the intellect of man which has not gained in acuteness since the appearance of our first ancestor upon the face of the earth; it is in the moral forces that are visibly gaining in power and prestige day by day. These forces are generated in the mind of the individual, but their growth is stimulated by emulation and co-operation. There is most progress where there is most liberty, properly regulated by law. Communism has been tried many times and in a number of different places, but it has never prospered. The development of human institutions has been steadily away from such a condition of things. Only here and there do we find a man who is as willing to labor for others as for himself. You can never get many of them together; if you could, there would be no sphere of activity in which their self-denial could become effective. The selfishness of most men only makes the absence of it the more conspicuous in a few. It is the light shining into darkness, and it is this light that draws the attention and compels the admiration of men. While in one sense the tendency of the world for more than a thousand years has been to circumscribe the sphere of the individual, in another and wider sense it has been in the direction of enlarging it. There never was so much individual liberty in the world as there is now. With the growth of individual liberty has also grown the spirit of self-activity for the betterment of society as a whole. While modern states have never done so much as they are now doing for the educa-

tion of the young to enable them to take care of themselves they doing an equal or even greater amount for the care of those who are imbecile in mind or body or both. Yet in spite of this growth of the spirit of socialism, individual initiative and personal exertion have not been in abeyance. Take the case of a single uplifting force, the church. Only a short time ago Sir Walter Besant publicly stated that fortunately the church was no longer the dead thing it was fifty years ago. Speaking particularly of London, he continued: "The church is doing an enormous amount of good. It has taken a new lease of life. One can not overrate its services. A year or two ago I investigated the matter fully, taking as my field of study a river-side parish in the East End. I found there a hundred laymen and women working for nothing under the guidance of the clergyman and his curate, visiting the poor, organizing services, forming clubs for the boys and girls, mothers' meetings and meetings for the sale of clothing at very cheap rates to the poor who would otherwise never have been able to buy any clothes at all. There were also a creche for the babies and a house where children were kept from after school to bedtime. Then there were Sunday schools, excellent for keeping children out of mischief. In fact the lives of the clergy in the East End are one long round of ceaseless activity. This activity of the church has been growing for the last twenty years. Formerly the church was indifferent to the poor. I can not give a reason for this change for the better, I can only testify to its existence." The same activity is displayed in other parts of the Kingdom and the same or similar agencies are at work in every city of the United States. The church has not transformed itself by an unconscious sort of biological process; we may be sure that the change was brought about

by a recognition on the part of its leading spirits that a transformation was necessary.

As to the body politic, we need to remember that it is not an association from which we can withdraw at pleasure as if it were a business concern of which we did not like the management or a profession that has become distasteful to us. As we are in it to stay, we shall do well to make the best of it, or rather, do what we can to make it as good as possible. No greater misfortune can befall a young man than to get "soured on the world," as the expression goes. We often hear it said that there are tricks in every trade and if you would succeed you must learn and practice them. I very much doubt this unless you give the term "tricks" a very much milder meaning than is usually attached to it. I can, of course, not deny that men often succeed by the methods of the heathen Chinee, at least they achieve what some persons are wont to call success; but if their example were followed by men in general all confidence between man and man would be destroyed and civilized society made impossible. The solid men of the business world are they whose word is as good as their bond.

We have among us a large amount of literature that it is the custom with some to disparage on the ground that it smacks of the Sunday school. It is the sort in which vice is invariably punished and virtue rewarded. There is a deep meaning in this popularity. It is the concrete picture of human life as the human heart desires it to be. It represents the ideal state toward which the world is striving, however slow its approach may be. It is the silent but powerful voice of mankind in its best estate pleading through the pen of the literary artist for the reward of Virtue and the punishment of Vice. When the

conditions are reversed violence is done to man's better nature, to the universal conscience. Consider the case for a moment and you will see that almost the entire body of modern fiction does homage to this longing of our nature. In real life the result is often different, but in imaginative literature rarely. No English writer has enjoyed such long-continued and unbounded popularity as Scott. The thought that runs like a thread of gold through all his writings may be fitly expressed in the words, Virtue and Vice always get their deserts. The same statement is true in almost equal measure of Dickens and Thackeray and George Eliot and a host of others, all of whom seek to enlist our sympathies for the good and arouse our detestation of the bad. Even when strength triumphs over weakness; vice over virtue; wrong over right, the reader almost always feels that he would rather be the vanquished than the victor. It is the voluntary choice of the human heart when unbiased and unpolluted by the selfishness that so often makes its power felt in the actual world. We take much greater pleasure in the study of life as we wish it to be than as it is. We involuntarily recognize the goal toward which the actions of men ought to be directed.

Yet something more is necessary to success than mere honesty, in fact a great deal more. Honesty is indeed fundamental, but to these must be joined tact, common sense, a willingness to deny one's self a good many things which it would be pleasant to possess, and industry. It is not hard for a judicious observer to see why some very good people do not get along. In spite of their virtues those who know them have no confidence in them. While always moved with the best intentions, they lack some important qualifications and others who are morally less worthy outstrip them in the race of life. It would clearly

be a perversion of the truth to say that inefficiency in such cases is synonymous with uprightness, or that such persons were failures because they were too honest. Besides, it is natural for men to feel a certain degree of satisfaction in the manifestation of power. We involuntarily admire the man who does things, who accomplishes his purposes, even when the means he employs do not meet our approval nor the ends aimed at commend themselves to our moral sense. A negative man, one who always stands on the defensive, who is never aggressive, may be a good man, but he is rarely of much use in the community. But the number of persons who are so constructed that they may flagrantly disregard the rules of right and yet achieve success in any calling is very small.

A lucid writer in a very recent work gives expression to his conviction in the following language. "Morality"—meaning by this term moral conduct in its widest sense—"is a necessity of social life. The relations of human beings to each other are organic, and conduct must be regulated to some degree by every one with reference to others. Under the pressure of the social situation of mankind, ideals of duty grow and a moral sensibility is developed. As this sense increases in power, it tends more and more to dominate the whole mental nature and to control conduct; that which is right is approved and that which is wrong is repugnant. The moral consequences of actions are regarded closely and educational influences become of importance. Moral men and women please and the immoral are displeasing. Our sympathies are with the righteous and our aspirations are toward moral ideals."

It needs to be constantly kept in mind that the world's estimate of what constitutes success is often a wrong one. It looks for visible, tangible and immediate results, when

in fact the most abiding results are the slowest to make themselves felt. How many thousands of men have lived who were regarded as great in their day who were soon utterly forgotten by almost everybody! It does not after all matter very much, if we are conscious of doing our best, whether we are appreciated or not. Men of large views and keen penetration are always ahead of their time. It is an unfortunate weakness to be always on the lookout for praise. If men never took a step in advance of public opinion for fear of arousing some one's displeasure there would be no progress. Some of the most important public measures and not a few of the world's greatest benefactors have encountered the most violent opposition. On the other hand few persons, especially among the young, can resist the seductions of praise. In truth, however, censure is far less dangerous, and he is a wise man who heeds even if he can not allow himself to be influenced by it. Popularity is mere surface valuation. The great mass of mankind do not care to go deeper. It is only the thinking man, the careful student in a large way that can distinguish between what is really good and what seems so.

It is a common mistake to underestimate the important part the individual, even the one who seems the most insignificant, may contribute to the general welfare and progress of the community. Suppose it were possible to make every member of ever so small a social organism feel that the reputation of the whole for honesty and fair-dealing depended on him alone, what a step forward that would be! Suppose that every scholar in any particular school could be made to realize that its good name depended on his conduct and studiousness, how quickly it would become a light that would shine near and far! There are not many men who are endowed or entrusted with ten

talents; there are more who have in their keeping five talents, and many more who have one. How important then that all the men of one talent should consider earnestly how to make the best of it! There are so many ways in which the good of the little community of which most of us are a part, may be promoted. This is not done by waiting for great opportunities that rarely present themselves, but by improving the small ones that so often come in our way. Maydole, the celebrated hammer-maker, once said to James Parton, "I have made hammers here for twenty-eight years." "Well," said Parton, "you ought to make a pretty good hammer." "No, sir," was the reply, "I never make a pretty good hammer. I make the best hammer in the United States." And buyers had long before endorsed his statement. The president of the Cambria rail works, one of the largest concerns of the kind in the world, being asked the secret of the enormous development of their business, replied, "We have no secret. We always try to beat our last batch of rails."

But there are so few people who are really anxious to do their best. The great majority want to be taken at their own estimate of themselves, and when they find that this is not done they are dissatisfied and are ready to declare that success in this world is all a matter of chance. I do not wish to deny that there is such a thing as luck, but it finds very few people, and rarely, if ever, those who are waiting to be found.

While it is true that there is most progress where there is most liberty, and therefore the trend of events is favorable to democracy, we need to beware of trusting too much to government or indeed to institutions of any sort that exist only on paper. What is theoretically the best government in the world may in practice be the worst. Every

organization is what its members make it. It depends upon the temper of the individual. It is important, therefore that the individual be enlightened in order that the entire community be enlightened. This necessity is being more and more felt everywhere; hence the abundant means in our day for promoting general intelligence. But what use shall be made of these means again depends upon the individual. We often hear it said that the progress of a country depends very largely upon its colleges and universities. To what extent this is true rests wholly upon the spirit with which they are managed. Russia and Spain and even Turkey and China have their universities, as well as Germany and England and the United States. Yet I am not aware that they contribute anything worth mentioning to the progress of these countries. They are rather the strongholds of the conservatism that is so fatal to progress and of those nations that look to the past rather than to the future. The spirit of the higher education is the spirit of the nations that foster it. If you want a tree or a shrub to grow luxuriantly and healthfully you must plant it in a fertile soil and allow the rain and the light to fall upon it. Sometimes it may be advisable to protect it against adverse atmospheric conditions; but too much protection will defeat the very ends you aim at. The same is true of education. It needs to be wisely directed from above, but not cramped by too much regulation. It needs to be fostered by governments, but not hampered by them with too many and too minute regulations. The same is true of the church. It can do nothing or next to nothing by the mere fact of its organized existence. It needs life, it needs direction and above all things its members need to be permeated by a wholesome and progressive impulse that is always looking for something that

will make the world better. The most intelligent educators of our time, and indeed of all time, insist on the superlative importance of developing and strengthening the self-activity of every child in order that conduct in after life may be wisely directed toward useful ends. We do not surrender our individuality when we make up our minds to submit to wise leadership; but we ought to understand clearly whither we are led and by what means.

They only are free whom the truth makes free. What precious word liberty is! How men have fought for it and suffered for it and died for it! How they have endured chains and darkness and misery for themselves in the hope that those who came after them might enjoy its blessings! There is probably no ideal good for which men have so valiantly striven as for liberty.

No one will deny that we have this blessing in abundance. We have all the liberty we can use, all the liberty we can ever hope for, but few know how to make the most of it. Here is a lesson we have yet to learn. It seems that the great majority of mankind is so constructed that it must have masters. If they are not born under one they soon make one for themselves; and so it comes that many barter away by their own choice or in ignorance the birthright which is the open sesame to all that makes human life worth living. If the diffusion of knowledge can teach men anything it must teach them the right use of liberty. It must teach every man to think for himself, to act for himself—in short to make the best possible use of his manhood, not merely for himself but for others.

Probably every thoughtful person is at times attacked with a feeling of despondency. There is a good deal of a certain kind of pessimism in the social atmosphere. It is not necessarily an unwholesome feeling, nor do I believe

that characters of coarse fiber are subject to it. It usually arises in minds constituted like that of Hamlet, of whom a recent critic says, "Intellectually and morally he is much in advance of his age his mind casting far onward to an era of purer, richer, brighter civilization. He conceives a mold of statesmanship, a style of public order, and a tone of social converse, such as the times afford no example of. The coarse and brutal manners of his nation, infecting even the court, he both scorns and deplores, and this on grounds of taste, of policy, of honor and of right. And the effects which such things have on national character and well being are discoursed by him with rare discernment and reach of thought. His mind is indeed penetrated with the best efficacies of Christian morality and refinement." When we find ourselves in the clutches of a feeling of discouragement we will do well to remember several things. We are not responsible for the affairs of this world or for any considerable portion of them, but only in some measure for that small part that comes within the circle of our influence. Perhaps our aspirations are not as unselfish as we would like to make ourselves believe. Those who oppose us or are indifferent or disagree with us are sometimes at least just as unselfish as we are. I am persuaded, too, that the larger our knowledge the more thorough our acquaintance with the past, the less reason we have for discouragement. I have great faith in honest and fearless self-examination. St. Paul enunciated a great truth when he wrote to the Corinthians: "Examine yourselves, prove yourselves," and, "Let a man examine himself." The greatest of all moral philosophers used to say to his friends that an unexamined life was not worth living; and he always strove to regulate his conduct by the best light he had. In fact he made his whole life a study

of this, to him, all-absorbing question. Whenever a life is not guided by reason and controlled by the will it sinks to the level of that of the brute.

While almost every adult, especially in a democracy, is in some respects responsible for the conduct of his fellow-men, he is in a much larger degree responsible for his own. Neither God nor man expects anybody to do what is beyond his power, but both have a right to expect us to do our best and not only to live up to the measure of the light we have, but always to seek for more. Goethe's last words, "More light," make an excellent motto to put before ourselves at the beginning of our lives to be kept before ourselves always. We ought to be unsparing critics of ourselves,—more unsparing than of anybody else. Only by being such can we continue to grow in knowledge and wisdom to the end of our earthly existence. Wisdom is the principal thing and wisdom is acquired only by that careful observation and experience that we ought to incorporate into our earthly existence. I once heard a man say: "Don't tell me what I was; tell me what I am." The justness of his remark has impressed me more and more the longer I have meditated upon it. But it has no meaning for those who in early life become confirmed and fixed in their modes of thought, whether they be good or evil. He is a rare man who can listen dispassionately to a disagreeable truth when it affects himself, his friends or his country. How often has it happened that men have vigorously and even passionately defended measures which they had denounced with equal heat when advocated by their opponents. See how King David's anger flared up against the man who had been guilty of the abominable deed which Nathan reported to him, little thinking that he was uttering his own death-warrant when he said: "As the Lord liveth, the man

that hath done this thing shall surely die." "The grandeur of man's nature turns to insignificance all outward distinction. His power of intellect, of love, of knowing God, of perceiving the beautiful, of acting on his own mind, on outward nature and on his fellow-creatures,—these are his glorious prerogatives. Through the vulgar error of undervaluing what is common, we are apt, indeed, to pass them by as of little worth. But as in the outward creation, so in the soul, the common is the most precious. Science and art may invent splendid modes of illuminating the apartments of the opulent; but these are all poor and worthless compared with the light which the sun sends into our windows which he pours impartially over hill and valley, which kindles daily the eastern and western sky; and so the common light of reason, and conscience, and love, are of more worth and dignity than the rare endowments which give celebrity to a few."

In most of the more ancient cities of the Old World stand churches and cathedrals that were erected many centuries ago. Of but a few the architects who planned and builded them are known by name, while the thousands who carried out their grand conceptions are long since buried in oblivion. But their works are the beautiful and abiding symbol of the faith of those who conceived and erected them. They are the visible and tangible expression of that belief in a higher power that is common to all mankind; and of the faith that mortal men are the chosen instruments through which its designs are executed. They are mute but eloquent witnesses to the universal conviction that our life and our labor should at least in part be devoted to the spiritual good of the generations yet unborn. The lowliest and weakest mortal who did no more than contribute a single stone to their solid walls contributed

somewhat to their strength and symmetry—something without which they would have lacked entire completeness. So it is the high privilege of every one of us to exert some influence without which the world would not be quite what it is. Happy, thrice happy are they of whom it can be truthfully said what was said of the woman of Bethany: "She hath wrought a good work; she hath done what she could."

PATRIOTISM AND PARTISANSHIP.

"History must not keep silent because history is the conscience of humanity; and let those understand who do not fear it that its justice can not be appeased and that its castigations are without end." These words were used by the late eminent publicist Castelar in a comment upon one of the worst kings that ever sat upon the Spanish throne, but they are of universal validity. No one who has carefully studied the past will deny their truthfulness. History is nothing more than amplified biography and those who made it were men of like passions with ourselves. It is more truly the conscience of the world than the conscience which every man is supposed to carry in his bosom. I may intentionally wrong my neighbor and succeed in justifying my conduct. At any rate it is but an incident between two individuals and is soon forgotten. When my father of my grandfather has, by any act, left a stain upon his memory, though I can not blot it out, I may excuse it as well as I can. But that does not alter the case; the deed is done, the final record made up, the books are sealed. Still, this is not a matter about which the larger public is concerned. But when I move into a wider sphere and see weighed before the tribunal of morals the acts for which my country is responsible I can neither conceal nor

successfully justify what is wrong. The evil deeds in which I am, at least by implication, a participant, can not be concealed from the curious eye of the future investigator. My ancestors, my government, my country were guilty of wrongs that I may condone but the disinterested reader will not. There exist archives centuries old to which even at this late day no one is allowed access. Their custodians seem to feel that they are involved in the guilt of the evil-doers, though they are connected with them by the slenderest ties, perhaps only by the bond of a common creed or a common country. It is like the mature man trying to cover up the sins and follies of his youth, though it is much more unavailing.

Nearly two thousand years ago Plutarch justified the calamities that sometimes befell states for the wicked deeds of previous generations. Said he, "The public calamities of states have obviously their reason in justice. For a state has unity and continuity like a living creature, not divesting itself of indentity by the changes that occur at successive periods of its life, nor becoming a different being from its former self by the lapse of time, but always retaining a conscious selfhood with the peculiarities that belong to it, and receiving the entire blame or praise of whatever it does or has done in its collective capacity, so long as the community which constitutes it and binds it together remains a unit. But dividing it by successive periods of time so as to make of a single state many states, or rather an infinite number of states, is like making one man many men, because he is now elderly, yet was once younger and still earlier was a stripling. The state remaining the same we regard it as involved in the disgrace of its ancestry by the very right by which it shares their glory and their power."

Every man instinctively feels that he is more or less closely bound up in moral sense with his family, with the community of which he forms a part, with the government of which he is a citizen. When I hold up to an intelligent Englishman, the shortsightedness of his government at certain periods of the past, or to a wide-awake Frenchman the follies that have characterized his ancestors in their mad quest for what they called *gloire,* or to a well-read Teuton the pusillanimity of the German people for centuries, they usually admit the truth of the indictment, but they have a ready answer by pointing to the political corruption that has hung over our land like a pall for nobody knows how long; to our frequent lynchings; to our repudiation of state and municipal debts; to our toleration of human slavery for a century; to our unjust war with Mexico, and more of the same sort. Then I have little to say, but I can heartily join with my interlocutors in the wish that these things were none of them so. Or we may all join in the pharisaical congratulation that we are not so bad as the Spaniards, or the Turks, or as a last resort, the Malays. Under such circumstances one is often inclined to take refuge in the philosophy of the Arab, who, when charged with being a notorious thief and unmitigated liar, retorted that if a man had only two or three faults he was not very bad. Let us not forget that national glory will not take the place of national character. The former may and is pretty sure to be transient if not founded on the latter. The true glory of a nation is not something that needs to be boasted of. For centuries Frenchmen have been asserting that France marches at the head of civilization. They were so conscious of their superiority that they did not think it worth while to examine what their neighbors were doing and refused to

learn anything from them. But the time came when they were disillusioned, and in their blind rage they blamed everybody but themselves for their discomfiture.

In this discussion it is permissible to draw a parallel between a nation and an individual. What do his neighbors think of a man who prates much about his integrity? The simplest characters are the least boastful. The man who is conscious of his probity neither parades the fact in public nor feels the need of asserting it in private.

Just now the leading nations of the earth have much to say about new duties and new responsibilities. It is at least a suspicious coincidence that their duties and responsibilities are so closely connected with commercialism. The man who really wants to do good is never particularly careful whether he gets paid for it in dollars and cents. Let us not forget that the ethical code rests on a few very simple and easily understood principles, whether we apply it to individuals or nations. Men may flatter themselves that they live under a new dispensation and that old-fashioned morality is obsolete. All history demonstrates the falsity of this position. The whole duty of man to man may be found in pre-Christian literature. In the Prophet Micah I find, "What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God." So, too, we often read that "Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." Isaiah says the same thing; and never tires of warning those who neglect these principles. Socrates follows in the same strain, as do many others, each in ignorance of the existence of the other, because they need only to observe the course of human events to deduce the moral order of the world. Justice, humanity, humility—here we have the whole duty of man. In fact we may say that all civilization rests in

the persistent effort of man to secure justice. It is at least avowedly for the purpose of securing justice to every member of the body politic that all enlightened governments are organized—justice in taxation, justice in meting out rewards and punishments, justice in representation, justice in the care of those who are not able to take care of themselves, justice in the privilege to worship the Supreme Being. No sane man asks more than equality of opportunity, a fair field and no favor. Governments have followed each other like the divisions of an almost endless procession of mourners across the stage of time because they have failed in this regard. What has happened so many times will continue to happen as long as man remains the same and like causes produce like effects. Only that nation may safely claim to be built on an enduring foundation whose civil machinery is so constructed to bring it constantly nearer and nearer to that ideal condition that is realized only in the vision of the prophet and the dream of the sage. So profound is the universal conviction of the essential uprightness of public opinion that no man in his public capacity has the courage to defy it. The most pronounced despots have justified their tyranny by a liberal patronage of the arts and sciences, by the plea that the masses are not fit to govern themselves. Sienkiewicz in Quo Vadis thus pays tribute to the natural goodness of man: "Bronzebeard is a faint-hearted cur. Although there is no limit to his power, he makes all his acts appear plausible. I have often asked myself why is it that every crime, be it as great as Ceasar's and as certain of impunity, seeks the cover of the law, of justice or of virtue? Why should it trouble itself? Nero seeks to justify himself because he is a coward. But let us take a Tiberius. He was no coward, yet he sought to justify his every act. Why, then? What

is this involuntary tribute which evil places at the feet of virtue? Knowest thou what I think? It is done because vice is disgusting and virtue divine." We used to hear slavery defended because it was good for the slave. Now we are told that immense armaments are conducive to peace. I venture to assert that no law was ever enacted for which its promoters did not claim that if it worked injury to some it benefited a greater number. It is no longer contended by anybody, so far as I know, that a state of belligerency is natural to men, or that it represents a condition upon which all first-class nations are not making continual inroads. This is unconsciously admitted by the assertion which we meet so often that the best way to secure permanent peace is to be always prepared for war. Apparently hardly anybody wants to fight though almost everybody is in favor of preparing for it. The tendency toward a more peaceful civilization is marked. Rome was almost continuously at war during the thousand years of her existence. Insignificant as many of these wars were they always meant a great deal of misery for at least one of the belligerents. The eighteenth century was ushered in by war, passed out in war, and the middle period was filled with "the din of arms." How different the nineteenth! When we remember that the Napoleonic struggle was an inheritance of the preceding century we must admit that the one just closed was much less bloody than any that preceded it, far as we still are from a reign of peace and righteousness.

Why should men be more unreasonable collectively than individually? Yet they are. In any civilized country when two men undertake to settle their differences with weapons or fists they are promptly arrested and fined. Usually it is the soggy undercrust that has recourse to vio-

lence. With what contempt we view even the *elite* in some of our States who are ever ready to adjust their differences by physical force or it may be with revolvers. It is a pity we can not all read as often as once a year Bacon's essay on the idols of pre-conceived opinion. Such a perusal would do much to enable our mental vision to penetrate the mists of error that constantly surround us. Or we may change the figure and say that if these idols were taken away we should have a clearer vision to worship the true God. About us and in us are the idols of the tribe, the fallacies that are incident to humanity in general; idols of the den, the misconceptions that grow out of our individual mental constitution; idols of the market place, errors due to the power of words and phrases; idols of the theater, errors due to false systems and illogical methods of reasoning. When we remember that some men are so constituted that, with the best intention, thy can not see the truth,—to ask them to do so is like asking a five-foot man to look over a six-foot wall—and that others do not want to see it because of the labor involved, or because they believe it more to their advantage to cling to error and that these classes embrace the immense majority of mankind, we can not wonder that the world is still largely dominated by error and false reasoning.

But, leaving aside all considerations of the quest for truth, how many people are there even in the most enlightened countries who devote any considerable portion of their time to reflection upon what will make them wiser, better nobler? Surely these are matters that would seem to attract and occupy the attention of all more or less. That it does not is because it is easier to persist in the old, much as we may complain about it, than to keep readjusting ourselves to new conditions. We thoughtlessly do what we

have always done; and what we have always done is what our elders did before us. If we are a little better in some things than other people we lay the flattering unction to our souls that we are in all respects their superiors.

Some of the very persons who have only scorn and contempt for the people of those countries or States of the Union who readily resort to arms when they have a dispute with another man will almost in the same breath hurrah over the prospect of war between the United States and some foreign country, especially Great Britain. When we ask them for the cause of their hilarity they can give no reason except that we can "lick" England and all creation and we want a chance to prove it. We can settle our private difficulties before courts of law and we scoff at those of our neighbors who can not settle theirs in the same way; yet many of us do not want to adjust our disagreements in this manner when we have a quarrel with another nation, though it may speak the same language, be proud of the same political traditions, and lay claim to the same literature.

It is true a court of law is not exactly a peaceful tribunal like a court of arbitration. Behind it is in most cases physical force as a last resort, but this is always in the background. Moral force has in most instances taken its place. And what an advance is a court of law upon conditions that prevailed very widely at one time. Gentlemen settled their disputes by strength and skill. Perish the thought that they could be settled in any other way. Yet these honorable men have almost disappeared from the earth and will soon be little more than a curiosity or an object of ridicule.

All history is but the history of civilization. This is a hard term to define, yet everybody knows what it signi-

fies. Not only is it a struggle of the more advanced people against the less advanced, but of the conservative individual against progress. We see it in our cities and our towns no less than among the nations of the earth. The tenement house problem is but one of its phases. The legal principle of eminent domain is another, and there are many more. The lust of conquest that led the Romans to add province to province is as active now as it ever was. If they provided a better government than they destroyed their course was in a measure at least justifiable. But it is doubtful if the lust of conquest is ever a moral motive, though it almost always parades under a masque of morality. The Romans did not conquer provinces, they only gave them peace. The Spaniards and the French, their descendants, coveted new lands in order that they might convert the heathen to Christianity. The Anglo-Saxon and the Teuton are a little more matter of fact, but they rarely admit that conquest is for the good of the conquerors mainly. All this proves the innate faith the world has always had in moral ideas. Even in private transactions between man and man the party of the first part never admits that he seeks his own advantage only. He would have it appear that he gives more than he takes.

It is by political methods that moral ideas are propagated. They can not move forward alone. Security to life and property is a political guarantee whether at home or abroad. This guaranty is often unjust but it is sound. How can we justify the protection afforded to a merchant or a missionary by the home government in a foreign land where he is not wanted? Why do we blame the Chinese for keeping their ports closed to Europeans and why do we regard it as creditable to them that after centuries of effort they opened a few? You find the sentiment in every

country of the world only not quite so pronounced. This is the practical side of politics, but the converse and sentimental sides demand for every man equal treatment with every other. Our Federal and State courts forbid the passage of laws that are not of general application, but in practice we have many such laws. Here sentiment and practice are again in conflict and here, too, there is a steady effort to reconcile them. It is a common saying that facts and events are more powerful than theories. Those who reason thus have a short vision. If this were true we might well exclaim, "Right forever on the scaffold, Wrong forever on the throne." See how this dictum has been proven false! Might has indeed often prevailed over right, but it has not continued unless it justified itself. Slavery and serfdom have not been abolished wholly or even chiefly by might, but by the sentiment of mankind The theory of equal rights before the law was for centuries the main support of the Roman Empire. Governments are at last beginning to put in practice the theories of education advocated by Greek thinkers and demonstrated by a few individuals. For centuries the civilized world, the most civilized nations have been trying to make real the ethical theories preached by the Hebrew prophets and the Christian Apostles. How little the Jews have figured in the politics of the world, how large in its morals, what an epic is their annals! What a mark they have made in history and are still making, but it is through the arts of peace. No people have so profoundly influenced the thought of the world as they, none can boast of such enduring achievements, yet these achievements have almost all been peaceful. "In order to get rid of war we must make peace heroic." The chief glory of Washington was not so much that he was first in war but first in peace. The

"strenuous life" of which we have been hearing so much may be spent in activities less dashing but not less useful than in fighting. Nations willingly pay enormous sums for war—why should they not be even more willing to pay as much to maintain peace? It is not idle to speculate on what might have been the course of history if the alternatives of past events are used as lessons for the future. What might we not do, what might not any people have done, if their youth could have been made to believe in the strenuous self-denial, the splendid patience, the mutual reliance, the daring, the endurance, the honor that go to make a nation great in its internal resources. If the man who makes two blades of grass grow where one grew before is a public benefactor, surely he is equally so who makes one blade go twice as far as it went before in all that pertains to the welfare of a nation. In our impulsiveness the spectacular appeals to us too strongly. "Heroic activity makes instant appeal. To do away with war we have got to make the sacrifice of peace equally noble. Mothers, teachers, preachers, poets have got to strengthen the new ideals that some men have always cherished and most men cherish even now in their calmer moments. Common life must be shown to be just as heroic and just as arduous as war, calling for just as great physical endurance, just as powerful mental and moral qualities." "If the past is not to bind us, where can duty lie? We should have no law but the inclination of the moment."

It has been said over and over again that the reason why China makes no progress is because her people have no sentiment, no ideals, nothing before them or behind them except the plain dead prose of practical every day life. The Chinaman of one province does not care what his fellow in the next province is doing or suffering, so he him-

self has enough to eat. A most competent authority says: "The only Chinese in the Empire who are alert, inquiring, eager to know what the world is doing, and especially what China and the rulers of Peking are thinking of, are the converts,—that is, the pupils of the missionaries or of those intelligent foreigners who have some other care concerning the Chinese servants than mere exaction of labor and payment of wages. Out of Chinese official life or from the *literati* it seems impossible to get honesty or virtue in any vital sense. The earnest, the thinking men of China know that her vital lack is neither capital nor machinery, but men. They realize that the Chinese system does not produce men of conscience or of sterling character. They know that it has hitherto been impossible to secure any such persons, except by importation. How can it be otherwise in the future?" In the same connection another writer, speaking of Morocco, says: "It is a popular custom of travelers to disparage missionaries. Let their work be difficult, their faith a mockery to those who share it not, their object hopeless, their achievement insignificant, or, it may be, illusory, their faults apparent, their methods absurd; the missionaries, of whatever creed, are the noble few who live for the future, and no seed that they sow is lost. Every pure and earnest life, whether by a missionary or by any other, will tell on the nation."

It is an established fact that the lower forms of animal life which first appeared on our globe have all disappeared or have been greatly modified in their structure to suit the changing physical conditions. Even those that belonged to a somewhat higher order have for the most part become extinct. The huge beasts, strong of limb and irresistible in physical force that are the wonder of our museums, destroyed or devoured the weaker ones until they them-

selves were cleared from the face of the earth by forces too strong for them. With all their strength they could not arrest the physical changes that were inevitable. Unable to suit themselves to circumstances they paid the debt of nature. With men the course of events has been similar. They followed into the dark recesses of oblivion the beasts with which successive generations contended. The mighty empires of the earth that were in the course of time established form no exception. Force was swept from the earth by greater force, for especially in the psychic world it is not force unaided by intelligence that wins in the end. The great states of antiquity were strong so long as they represented power that could be hurled against weaker rivals, who were in turn either crushed or absorbed. We are scarcely in position to say why those mighty empires that once existed in Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley have so completely disappeared. And while we may regret the destruction of so many valuable works of art it is doubtful if anything of real use to the human race has perished. They represent the degradation of man rather than his elevation. Greece stood for a higher type of civilization, but a lower type of patriotism and her statement looked so closely to the immediate future that they failed to recognize the claims of a remoter future. The Romans were wiser, and yet not much wiser. As long as they considered the state more important than the individual they kept growing stronger and stronger. There was an idealism in their politics that we of to-day can not help but admire. Yet this condition of things likewise passed away. Factions were generated in the state that were more bent upon the destruction of their opponents than upon the good of the citizens as a whole.

If there is one thing that modern research has estab-

lished beyond a doubt it is the solidarity of history. We may for convenience speak of Ancient History and Mediaeval History and Modern History, but the making of history is a continuous process. No new forces have been introduced in the world; the relations of the various forces have to some extent been changed, but no new ones have been added. Just as the adult is not something radically different from the child, though he bears to it only the slightest resemblance in feature, form and figure, so the race is to-day what it always has been. Sometimes when a man is dead an autopsy reveals that fact that his disease was incurable. There was no human help for the victim. As an individual, with his separate physical existence he could draw no support from his fellow-beings. But how often has it happened that physicians in learning the cause of one man's death discovered how to save those similarly afflicted! Not so with states. They have never died of physical but of moral diseases, and the fact that we know the causes ought to admonish us to look to ourselves. The Hebrew prophets foretold the woes that were sure to come upon their nation unless they changed their ways. But the men who for the most part managed affairs ignored these solitary theorists. They probably said, if they thought them worthy of consideration at all, "You are idealists; this is a practical world. You must take men as they are." Woe to the world if this be so! If all the efforts to make men better by instructing the rising generation ends in the maxim, "You must take men as they are," our doom is sealed.

Everybody that can read knows something about Demosthenes and Cicero. Both these men were victims of a lost cause. But in one respect they were superior, and in one only, to the great orators among their countrymen; in the

moral earnestness that pervades their political orations. Edmund Burke was likewise the champion of a lost cause when he espoused the side of the American colonies. His plea for right, for justice, for fair treatment, passed almost unheeded, but time has vindicated the wisdom of his course. I imagine there are few Englishmen to-day who would not rather have stood with Burke and Chatham, and lost, than with George III. and Lord North, though they won for the time being. In speaking of these events a recent English historian says: "The shame of the darkest hour of English history lies wholly at the door" of the king. There are two senses in which we may use the maxim, You must take world as it is. In the one we simply accept the situation and regard existing conditions with indifference. Like the servile herd that flattered the basest of the Roman emperors, and their numerous representatives in later times, we may do the best we can to live at ease from day to day, taking no thought for the future. In the other, we recognize surrounding conditions, but keep bestirring ourselves to make them better. This is the purpose of every moral agency that has for its object the betterment of men. It is the soul and essence of pedagogy. Amplified, it applies to the body politic the same principles that right instruction applies to the child. Every intelligently constructed educational system means, Take the child and make of him the best of which he is capable. So instruct him that each generation shall be better, wiser, nobler, than its predecessor. Teach him to obey existing laws and to labor for the enactment of better ones. Let him strive to defend his own rights and to accord the same rights to others.

We often hear a defense of the maxim, "My country right or wrong." What are we to understand by my coun-

try in this sense? Is it her institutions, her policy, her standard of morals, her laws? If so, who is responsible for them? Is not every thinking man dissatisfied more or less with his country? Is any one so well satisfied that he does not criticize and seek to make improvements? If improvements are not held to be necessary the country has come to a standstill like China. True patriotism consists not so much in maintaining that we have the best and are the best as in an open mind for what is good and a determination to have it. There is a kind of patriotism that is a sign of decay; it is evidence that the career of a nation is drawing to a close. The golden age of Greek oratory was an era of decline. When there was little to commend in the present men looked to the past for examples of heroism and self-sacrifice. We often see the same sort of pride in families. When the generation that is on the scene of action is doing little to commend it, its representatives are apt to boast about the abilities and achievements of their ancestors. Yet what is this worth if there is no disposition to do likewise? It seems strange, inexplicably strange, that it is so hard to look facts squarely in the face. During our late war with Spain, Continental Europe was against us almost to a man. It was a case of "Kick my dog, kick me." The merits of the case scarcely entered into the discussion at all. Spain was near by and a monarchy, the United States far away and a Republic; of course the latter was in the wrong and it was not worth while to look into the merits of the controversy. In four cases out of five you can predict with certainty on which side the recent South African war a man's sympathies were if you know his ancestry.

We need not go very far into the past to see the melancholy effect of political short-sightedness. Less than four

hundred years ago Poland occupied a large place on the map of Europe. With its thirty-five million inhabitants it was one of the most powerful states of the world. A hundred years later, though much diminished, it was still strong. No longer ago than the time of our Revolution it yet numbered twelve million people. Since then it has ceased to be a nation. There is a Polish people, but there is no citizen of Poland. Every Pole, whether at home or abroad is in a sense an exile. Campbell said, "Freedom shrieked when Kosciusko fell," but whatever we may think of Kosciusko and a few genuine patriots, their cause was doomed from the start. It deserved no better fate. The freedom for which too many Poles fought was simply liberty to make war against one another, to plunder one another. It was not patriotism, but selfishness. Alison, the historian, after quoting the line of Campbell continues, "But the truth of history must dispel the illusion and unfold in the fall of Poland the natural consequences of its national delinquencies. The eldest born of the European family was the first to perish because she had thwarted all the ends of the social union; because she united the turbulence of democratic to the exclusion of aristocratic societies; because she had the vacillation of a republic without its energy, and the oppression of a monarchy without its stability. Such a system neither could nor ought to be maintained."

How different is the history of Switzerland in spite of many dark pages!

Even if the individual be nothing more than a link in the chain of human endeavor his efforts will not be in vain, if intelligently directed. We need not ask ourselves whether we are heirs to a personal immortality. A clear grasp of this doctrine answers the question for every man

who desires to deserve well of his country or of the race. It is not the immortality of the mere time-server who is content with the maxim "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." "The chief impulses of progressive nations are abstract ideas and ideals, unreal and unrealizable, and it is in the pursuit of these that the great as well as the small movements on the arena of national life and on the stage of history have taken place."

Let us take an example of a purely material kind. If a man sets out to accumulate a fortune of a million dollars, does all that he gains count for nothing until he has reached the goal? One dollar is already something toward the end he has in view; ten thousand dollars are something more, a hundred thousand a great deal more. But if he saves nothing or gets into debt he is going in the wrong direction, just as that man in the community is who not only contributes nothing to the welfare of the community, but who subtracts something from it, who is a hindrance to its progress. Ideas are living forces that persistently strive toward realization in fact. Where such ideas do not exist, or where they are not intelligently directed society is at a standstill. All that has been done and thought in the world from the earliest times that has benefited the race has had regard more to the future than the present. The propagators of immortal ideas have so to speak held to the past with one hand, and while their eyes were on the present they reached out to the future with the other. Greek thought is a living entity though Greece has long since passed away. The experience the Romans embodied in their legal system still permeates those of the civilized world. The Christian Church, or at least the spirit of Christianity, is more vigorous now than ever. And while it has never been a political organization, it has never

ceased to influence legislation. The purposes of its leaders have, it is true, often been baneful, but the rank and file, both of its clergy and laity, have for the most part been men and women of honest purposes who sought their reward only or chiefly in the consciousness of having striven to make the world better. With the conquests of Greece and Rome and Christianity compare those of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane and Mohammedism, and mark the contrast. What is there left of the former but a bloody specter, and what is the latter doing to elevate its votaries? The answer can only be a short and emphatic one—nothing. It has no ideal, no sentiment, only a bleak and disgusting and shortsighted materialistic sensualism.

If there is one lesson that history teaches more emphatically than any other it is that true patriotism is idealistic. It is not contented with the present; it seeks something better. It is eminently long-sighted. It neither asks nor answers the miserable interrogatory, "What is all this worth to me," where there is a question of what policy is the wisest. If it is dissatisfied with present conditions it is with the hope and belief that they can be made better. And let us not be misled by the cry, The party wants this or wants that. Parties do not and can not make principles; principles are eternal. Parties can not make men; it is men that make parties. A policy that is based on mere expediency, that is, a mere servant of the passing occasion, is doomed to perish. If men allow themselves to be misled by the shibboleth of parties, if they cling to a name after the substance has departed and do not take heed whither they are going, they are sure to be led to destruction. If the progress of intelligence means any good to the world it must enable men to think for themselves, to act for themselves and make them refuse to be led anywhere

against their better judgment. The world has far less need of a few great men than of many genuinely patriotic citizens. Patriotism means statesmanship, rather than mere statecraft. If it elects war, it is only as an unavoidable necessity and because it will secure a more durable peace. It directs the policy of William of Orange, of Stein, of Washington and Lincoln, rather than that of Louis XIV, of Metternich, of Talleyrand, of Napoleon, of Calhoun and Davis. It is less concerned about immediate effects than lasting results.

But I have been advocating the cause of the sentimental as against the practical statesman and now that I am approaching the end of my discourse, I find that I have been advocating the cause of reason against sentiment, or, at least, against passion, against impulse; it is an appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober. I have made a plea for a practical, for a reasonable policy, if not against a system of politics as yet practicable. I am sure if such a system is as yet beyond our reach it represents the goal towards which statesmanship has been tending, slowly, it may be, but tending nevertheless. Surely as men grow wiser they grow more humane, more capable of self-control, more willing to live and to let live. If they talk less about the rights of men they are not therefore less willing to recognize and accord these rights. It is true, much thought, much energy, much time and much money are still expended on the art of destruction, but I believe still more are expended on the arts of peace, on the arts that increase the happiness of mankind. Sad to say, this is not the case in all countries, but it is so in some, probably in many. Even what is ostensibly intended for war may ultimately promote peace, for no nation lives wholly or even chiefly by war. There are no longer perpetual national feuds, as

there have been and still are perpetual tribal feuds. Some of the great powers may still be ready to fly at each others' throats, but they deliberate more carefully before making the fatal plunge.

It is a noteworthy fact that with the growth of nationalities wars have decreased in frequency. Until comparatively recent times the different portions of Great Britain and Ireland were engaged in almost continual conflict. What is now France was much in the same case. Some of the Italian States were almost continually at loggerheads with others. In nearly all the wars in which Germany has been engaged some of the States were on one side and some on the other. It does not seem easy to say anything bad that is an exaggeration about the government of Russia, yet it can not be denied that the growth of the empire has been conducive to internal peace. We may think of the motive as we please, it can at least not be said that the idea that has for two hundred years inspired the government of this great empire of the north has thus far and on the whole produced a retrograde movement in the cause of civilization.

But, finally, let us not deceive ourselves as to the facts and to the duty of present and future generations. The world will only go forward so long as men *will* to advance. It is easy to stop or to fall behind; it is not easy to go on. In the world of volition we are not dealing with physical forces that can neither be increased nor diminished. United effort toward a common end, toward a common goal that all progressive nations perceive more or less clearly will greatly accelerate the common weal. We must not strive to make ourselves as contented as we can amid conditions as we find them, but rather endeavor to bring them a little nearer conditions such as every normally constituted man would like to have them.

SPIRITUAL VERITIES.

It is not safe to assume that we know much about what is passing in other people's minds; but to judge from what we see going on around us it may well be doubted whether any considerable portion of our fellow-mortals give the question of how to make the most of life any serious thought. Years before they reach the age of maturity the large majority have lapsed into the ruts of the humdrum existence led by those about them, and it is almost a miracle if by some fortunate chance are lifted out of it. The merchant in his buying and selling, the artisan at his trade, the professional man in the pursuit of his daily vocation, are chiefly concerned about making the largest pecuniary gains out of the particular transaction in hand, and about little else. It is true that now and then we find parents who are intelligently solicitous for the welfare of their own children and that of the rising generation as a whole and who are willing to make almost any sacrifices for the attainment of so noble an object; but with the large majority the wish is a mere sentiment that does not find expression in a consistent line of conduct.

We Americans take a great deal of credit to ourselves because we are not idealists and sentimentalists, but practical men and women who have our gaze steadily directed

toward tangible objects. In politics as in business every man has an eye chiefly to his personal advancement, and he who should desire a public office chiefly for the opportunities it would give him for benefiting the public at large would be regarded as a very peculiar sort of a man, if nothing else. A few men can be found who openly advocate the doctrine that in our elective offices the first qualification of the nominee should be character and ability, though many are willing to assign to these the second place, while reserving the first to party fealty and the power to win votes. Yet it sometimes dawns upon us, if only for a moment, that there is such a thing as being too practical; at least we are willing to admit that the other fellows are so. Rich men are coming more and more to fill our important offices because of their practical methods in the canvas. They have a way of carrying elections and of getting places for themselves and friends that is out of reach of him who relies on character alone. And those who elevate them to office are practical men; why should they exert themselves for an abstraction, an ideal, when it is possible to get ready cash, or its equivalent?

"You take my life
When you do take the means whereby I live,"

says Shylock, most truly, if life consists chiefly or wholly in the abundance of the things that a man hath. On the same principle a man will work for those who promise to afford him the means of putting money in his purse, without a very careful scrutiny of the merits of the question involved. The issue is simply between the individual and the whole community. I suppose that the man who accepts what the law calls a bribe justifies himself by the same

reasoning that the man uses who works for the candidate that commands the most influence. Of two equally competent candidates why should I not support that one who is able and willing to give me something of practical value, whether it be dollars or something else? I am persuaded that a good deal of the indignation that now and then breaks out against successful candidates arises from a state of mind like that of the little girl who said, "Mamma, see what a pig my sister is; she took the largest orange in the dish, and I wanted it." It is not so much indignation at the disguised bribery, *per se,* as vexation at the condition of things which made it possible for the other side to bribe heavier than ours. The great misfortune of this condition of things is that it keeps most of the real statesmen, the men who are able and willing to legislate for the general good rather than local interests, out of our legislative halls, and puts in their places men of narrow views and limited information. One does not need to be very widely read to see that much of our bad or impracticable legislation is simply a repetition of the same or similar legislation in other states. If we are not willing to profit by the experience of Europe we ought to be willing at least to profit by that of our sister states, and be only too glad to use their dear-bought experience when it can be had for almost nothing, in preference to buying it over again. And when questions of world-wide interest are to be legislated upon, such as those which concern the currency and international commerce, it is the most short-sighted folly to ignore the experience of the foremost European countries. A man or a nation that undertakes to contravene the laws of nature inevitably does so to his own detriment. The time has passed when any civilized nation can get along without the rest.

To me it is very clear, as it must be to every careful reader of history, that in politics the winning principle is idealistic; it is what the careful interpreter of the past sees and what the mere time-server does not see. It is the pursuit of ideal aims that distinguishes the mere politician from the statesman. The one seeks his country's good in the largest and fullest sense, though it may sometimes be at the expense of his present popularity and personal interest. The other puts self and section first.

In England the years that preceded the American Revolution showed clearly the party of ideals in contrast to those who were interested only in their present welfare and personal interests. When King George proposed to Grenville the alternative of taxing the colonies or resigning his office, he chose the former, though clearly convinced of its inexpediency—let us at least give him credit for this much. Looking at the record of English legislation during this period it is plainly evident that the party of ideals, of principles, the impracticables, though for a time completely defeated were in the end victorious. The English people had to pay for the follies of their rulers. It was not the "king's friends," but his opponents, his enemies, as they would doubtless be often designated, Pitt and Burke, and those who stood with them, those who had the courage to defend an unpopular course, for the reason that it was founded on right, who are now ranked among her leading statesmen. It was these English defenders of a "lost cause," though lost only for a time, that posterity no less at home than abroad, now delights to honor, not so much for what they accomplished in their day, as for maintaining views which time proved to be just and true and expedient. It was the cause of humanity, the cause which the progress of events shows is always and everywhere des-

tined to win. How different the fate of these men from that which is overtaking the defenders of another "lost cause," in our own day. However much we may respect the personal qualities of some of those who were led into it we can not shut our eyes to the fact that they fought for a sectional issue, for a principle that the world had outgrown and that they undertook to do that which has never been done, put back the hands on the dial-plate of time. The world at large is taking less interest in their names and their fate and historians will ere long use these only as they do that of the Napoleons,

"To point a moral or adorn a tale."

For centuries the German people had suffered inconceivable miseries from the all-powerful spirit of particularism that dominated its rulers. Concerned only for that which would prolong their lease of power or conduce to personal aggrandizement her petty princes took little account of the needs of their subjects and of the whole country. The dream of German unity lived only in the books of historians and philosophers, or was whispered from lips to lips in the little coteries of idealists that existed here and there. Yet that which was for centuries but an idea, an aspiration and a hope, is to-day a reality, because there were some who never despaired even in the darkest hour, because they interpreted more correctly than the practical politicians the signs of the times and the tendency of events.

The recent history of Italy closely resembles that of Germany; with this difference that her outlook for unity was even more hopeless. For the century preceding her unification Germany had maintained a vigorous intellectual life, while Italy had sunk into a condition of mental torpor. Yet Cavour and those who shared his views and sympathized with his aims did not despair and only ceased

from their labors when they had been brought to a successful issue. I do not, of course, maintain that all sentimental politics is destined in the end to practical realization. No doubt ends are often proposed by thinking men that are not only visionary, but which are destined to remain forever only a dream. My contention is that every project deserves to be judged, not by its prospect of immediate realization and its evident practical utility, but by its intrinsic worth; for if history can be said to demonstrate anything it is that

> "Nature, in her productions slow, aspires
> By just degrees, to reach perfection's height."

But it is not the aimless material forces that aspire to perfection's height. It is those unchangeable moral forces which must be translated into action by the wisely regulated will of man. "A prince is nothing in the presence of a principle." Things are not what they seem to the merely superficial observer. It is only the solitary student, the true philosopher, the deep thinker who can discern the force and bearing of ideas. There are some ancient writers whose works the world does not grow weary of conning, because the thoughts are always modern. Judged by this standard that coryphaeus of idealistic philosophers, Plato, is better appreciated to-day than he was in his lifetime. And there were others like him though not his equals. They clearly discerned the goal toward which institutional life must strive if man is to realize to the full the life of which he is capable, though they were sometimes mistaken as to the best methods of attaining it. The time for such men as Plato in an active sphere had not yet come; so the moral atmosphere in which he lived was thor-

oughly uncongenial. Not least did he show his wisdom in this that he spent his days in putting on record the truths which few of his countrymen had the prescience to comprehend, as a testimony to the world how different its fate would have been had they heeded but a small portion of his suggestions. Whenever a people has sought purely practical aims by the sacrifice of justice and righteousness somebody has had to pay the penalty. Regarded from the purely practical point of view no course had ever so little prospect of success as Christianity. A little company of converts to a new religion, in an unimportant city of an obscure province of the Roman Empire, calmly planning the conquest of the world with spiritual weapons alone. Sublime was the spectacle, immeasurable the faith in the hearts of these zealots! But time has justified their hopes and set the seal of approval on their vast undertaking. What did it signify that they would be bitterly opposed by both those who held to the religion which they had given up and by those who cared nothing for any religion! What matter that they would come into conflict with paganism in its various local cults and with the whole power of the Roman Empire! The things that were not seen proved mightier than those that were visible and tangible. In a few centuries it was the victor and in a condition to dictate terms to the powers that but recently had despised and hated and striven mightily at times to eradicate it. The same sublime faith and undaunted courage still animates the church. The spiritual regeneration of Asia, with her teeming millions, looks like an idle dream. But it is not any more impossible of realization than the conquest of Europe was eighteen centuries ago.

What is the literature worth that looks only to immediate profits? Things are changing somewhat in this regard,

yet even now they who write what will yield the largest and swiftest returns are producing only for to-day. To-morrow no one will care for it. It is the pursuit of the ideal, the effort to realize so far as may be the subjective conception of what is loftiest and best that gives to the work of the artist in every department that which is of permanent value. If I read history aright the world owes about all that is valuable in it to dreamers and idealists, to men who live in the future rather than in the present. "Human progress depends upon the dreams of enthusiasts. The inventor, the discoverer, the reformer are dreamers who, prophet-like, see in their imagination things that other mortals know not of." Many dreams have become realities and are common-place facts to us now. It is hardly too much to say that civilization consists of realized dreams. We call dreams which are not all dreams, ideals, and the only reason why all dreams are not useful as ideals is because the stuff of which the ideal is made does not conform to the actual state of things and is not handled according to the laws of nature. We must admit that in the domain of physical science the dreamer may often expend toil and anxious thought in that which is destined to remain forever unrealized. We may labor to turn a baser metal into gold and fail, or to construct a flying-machine that will never fly, but it is not so in the domain of the artistic and the ethical. Here no honest labor is ever thrown away. Think of personal immortality as we may, death is no finality and we must not form our rules of conduct to accord with the idea that the exit of our individual life is the end of all. People who have no interests, no care or ideals that reach beyond the grave, may enjoy themselves better than others who live their lives with a constant prospect of immortality; yet in the long run of many genera-

tions they will go to the wall. Nature does not preserve the individual that cares for itself alone. But nature preserves those individual features of great men who conquer egotism, and lead moral lives of self-discipline and ideal aspirations. The moral teachers of mankind found it necessary to build their ethics upon the immortality of the soul; and it is not at all to be wondered at that the fundamental doctrine of the church survived in the struggle for existence against those people who looked upon death as an absolute finality.

Happiness is an important component of life, but it is not the most important; it is not the end and purpose of life. "Let us not look for ease in this world unless it be on the eve of a life that has been full of aspiration and labor. There is no ease for those who wish to progress. And let us find satisfaction, not in the pleasures of life— usually so-called,— but in the noble struggle for advancement and amelioration."

In the summer of '82 I spent some hours wandering about in what is perhaps the most famous of all cemeteries, Pere la Chaise, in Paris. Among other things my attention was attracted by a monument that seemed to be one huge mass of wreaths and flowers. On closer inspection I found it to be that of the historian and statesman Michelet, and the question naturally rose in my mind, Why were his remains thus conspicuously honored above all the thousands and tens of thousands that reposed in the bosom of the earth about me? His monument is by no means the finest there and no noble blood, as men are wont to reckon nobility, flowed in his veins. Though dead nearly half a score of years his friends had not forgotten him and according to the beautiful custom of the French people were continually bringing fresh flowers to his tomb in

grateful remembrance of his services to his country. These profuse floral tributes may have been in part the expression of private friendship and esteem, but that which endeared him to a wider circle was his indefatigable and disinterested zeal in behalf of the rights of the people, in behalf of democracy and against ecclesiasticism. It is probable that he accomplished little that directly benefited his country, but he did much indirectly in the way of stimulating thought and in pointing out to his fellow-citizens in what directions national greatness and prosperity lay. Posterity delights to honor him not so much because he achieved great things, as because he disinterestedly devoted a long life and great abilities, not to the accomplishment of private objects, but to labors for the public good.

It is well to remember that not every life which seems to be a failure is really so, and that not every enterprise which proves abortive, has been undertaken wholly in vain. The list of names of men and women whose earthly careers were a failure, judged only by the common standard of their own day, is a long one; yet as we look back upon their record viewing it in the light of subsequent events few of us would hesitate to take their places rather than that of an equal number who won transient renown and a large inheritance of perishable possessions.

In that most remarkable poem of the nineteenth century, a production into which the author has wrought the subjective experience of a life extending over more than three-quarters of a century, we have finely contrasted, at least by implication, the diverging results of a life spent for selfish and practical ends with the same life devoted to the good of others. In the First Part of Faust the hero is placed before us as a man endowed with the highest intellectual gifts and enjoying the respect of his fellow-men be-

cause of his learning and talents. But his life had been spent solely for self and in pursuit of selfish ends. The time comes when he realizes to its full extent how unsatisfactory such an existence is and he seriously contemplates putting an end to it with a poisonous draught. An evil spirit suggests to him that there is still one thing untried and advises him to seek enjoyment in sensuality, advises him not only to renounce a mode of life that was at least harmless, but to enter upon a course that will stop at nothing, not even the sacrifice of the happiness of his fellow-beings, provided it will contribute to his own gratification. It need hardly be said that to one so gifted, to one who apprehends so clearly the constitution of things, such a course must prove even less satisfactory than the former.

Made a wiser but a sadder man by the bitter experiences of more than half a lifetime of misdirected effort, he is led to take a wider and juster view of his relation to society and the world of which he forms a part. He thenceforth directs his attention to an altruistic object and resolves to devote the remaining years of his life to that which aims at the good of others rather than himself. Here almost to his surprise he finds satisfaction and the internal peace which he had so long sought in vain. We believe the experience of Faust is the experience of every one who is not intrinsically and totally depraved. Fortunately for the world the number of these is small; but unfortunately they are too few who, endowed with talents and learning, never give up the problem of life until they have solved it, and found the solution in the salvation which the hero of Goethe's poem worked out with such determined earnestness of purpose.

German literature furnishes us with another instructive contrast in the person of the two men who by universal

consent stand at its head. Goethe's intellect is confessedly of the very highest order. But two or three other names have by the verdict of scholars, been written so high on the pinnacle of fame. And he was fortunate as the world estimates fortune. Riches were his by inheritance, honors came to him by desert, power and authority were entrusted to his hands, while good health and long life placed the crown upon the mercies which God had so lavishly bestowed upon him. But his moral nature was weak; he was willing to court power for the gifts it was able to bestow, he was more concerned with the study of man as he is than with the efforts to make him as he should be. For the sorrows of an unhappy country he had few words of sympathy, and distressed humanity found in him but a lukewarm friend. People in whom the intellectual predominates over the moral love to study him much as they would study a remarkable organic growth, but his career furnishes no noble example and his memory no beacon light to which future generations may look for guidance and inspiration. In striking contrast is the life of his younger contemporary, Schiller, the favorite of the whole German people. Less richly endowed by nature, he put his talents to nobler uses. The child of poverty, destined to struggle through the whole of his brief life with adverse circumstances, he steadfastly refused to bow to power or to speak a word unworthy of an honest and upright man. He was less concerned with depicting man as he is than in pointing out to him what he might be and ought to be. Moral purity characterized his life and political liberty is the key note of his teachings. Which of these two careers is the most worthy of imitation and in which was the largest promise and potency of future good?

During the former part of the last century a music teacher connected with one of the gymnasia of the city of Leipzig was diligently and unostentatiously pursuing his chosen vocation. He was known as a performer on the organ, of more than ordinary merit, but he cared little for notoriety and his reputation hardly spread beyond the circle of his personal acquaintances. Yet he was a diligent composer for every musical instrument then known and seems to have been satisfied when his thoughts had been committed to paper or at most executed by such inadequate help as could be found among his pupils. Scantily appreciated during his life, doubtless owing to his modesty and indifference to public applause, he was soon almost forgotten after his death except by a few admirers, and his musical compositions neglected and scattered. Two generations later Mendelssohn began to direct the attention of his fellow-musicians to the inexhaustible wealth of harmony treasured up in the works of John Sebastian Bach, and it was soon acknowledged by competent judges that this almost forgotten composer was a genius of the highest order. His organ compositions are now admitted to be not only "unsurpassed but unsurpassable," and in the language of Schumann "music owes to him almost as great a debt as religion owes to its founder." Posterity became possessed with the desire to make some amends for the neglect of contemporaries, by erecting over the grave of this wonderful master of harmony, some token of its appreciation. But lo! the last resting place of the man who was worthy to sit as the peer of Handel and Beethoven could not be found; and to this day his dust reposes in an unknown and unmarked grave. Yet this poor musician who during life earned little beyond his daily bread and who after death had no one to place even a tablet to his memory,

had erected for himself a monument "more enduring than brass, and loftier than the pyramids' royal structure; which not the wasting shower, not the raving northwind can have power to overthrow, or the countless succession of years, and the ages' flight." He had steadily pursued the highest ideal of excellence that he could conceive and had never stopped to see whether his efforts were appreciated. All the millionaires on the earth could not purchase an immortality like his. They might erect costly monuments and gorgeous tombs, but the world would remember that they were nobodies and care nothing for them except perhaps to gratify an idle curiosity, unless there was something more than wealth to entitle them to remembrance.

Here, then, was another life that was a failure, according to the ordinary scale of measurement, but it was a brilliant success when measured by that loftier standard which has regard rather to things as they are than as they seem to be. It is, of course, easy to argue, as men often do, when the matter of aims in life is under discussion, that the example of men of extraordinary talents is worth nothing to him who has all he can do to make a living. But what is the mission of great men if it is not to serve as examples to the rest? The world is not made up of great men, but of ordinary ones. Every man may and ought to work for some ideal; it need not be a high one, and yet be of great advantage to himself and to others. The man whose aim is to make a better shoe than anybody else in his town deserves commendation for that. The man whose ideal is the perfect citizen will serve as a useful example to many. It is not always the man who occupies the most conspicuous position who is the greatest benefactor to the community. The social structure may be compared to a building of stone in which each separate piece has its place and its

office. The key-stone over an arch or the block over a window or a door may be more essential to the solidity of the structure than some of the smaller fragments; and yet not a piece that has once been assigned to its place can be taken away without marring the beauty and symmetry of the building. Nor can it be said that what is used to form the top of the wall is any more important than the bottom, even though some of the latter be quite out of sight. We may say here in the words of Scripture, "If they were all one member, where were the body? But now there are many members, yet one body. And the eye can not say to the hand, I have no need of thee; nor again, the head, to the feet, I have no need of thee; nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary; and whether one member suffer, all members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all members rejoice with it." Or again, "ye also as living stones are built up a spiritual house." Viewed from a purely theoretical standpoint it seems easy to inspire the world with higher aims in life. It is only necessary for each individual to put a better spirit into one person and that is himself, or if that is making too large a demand, we will expect nothing of one-half the members of society, by their own efforts and expect the other half to raise one person besides himself to higher grounds. Or, again, let parents devote themselves solely and singly to the good of their children, and with the next generation the millenium would be ushered in. The orphan alone would be left for some one to take care of, and it would be easy for the childless to take upon themselves that charge. But alas! what is theoretically so easy is practically impossible; too many care nothing for themselves and equally little for others. You all know the story of the man who bequeathed

to his sons a vineyard in which he said a treasure lay buried. As he did not tell them in what part, they were compelled to dig it all over, and to their surprise the treasure proved to be the enriched soil of the vineyard. I am persuaded that the desire to acquire a competence or even riches may be perfectly legitimate, but it ought not to absorb any man's entire attention. He should not forget, no matter how humble his station, that his fellow-men, and especially his children, if he has any, have a claim upon him which he can not ignore. The young man who inherited an ideal treasure found a real one while searching for it; so the man who strives to lay up a competence may not succeed in that, but there is no reason why he should not be a better man because of his object in life.

Ruskin has some judicious remarks on the ideal aims that may inspire a man even in the humblest pursuits. The first thing a man has to do is to find out what he is fit for. "People usually reason in some such fashion as this: 'I don't seem quite fit for a head-manager in the firm of ——— & Co., therefore, in all probability, I am fit to be Chancellor of the Exchequer.' Whereas, they ought rather to reason thus: 'I don't seem quite fit to be head-manager in the firm of ——— & Co., but I dare say I might do something in a small green grocery business; I used to be a good judge of pease;' that is to say, always trying lower instead of trying higher until they find bottom; on a wall set in the ground, a man may build up by degrees, safely instead of disturbing every one in the neighborhood by perpetual catastrophies." He goes on then to show how many parents are in a constant state of feverish anxiety about the future station in life of their children, as if this were anything, and adds, "There is no real desire for the safety, the discipline, or the moral good

of the children, only a panic horror of the inexpressibly pitiable calamity of their living a ledge or two lower on the molehill of the world—a calamity to be averted at any cost whatever, of struggle, anxiety and shortening of life itself. I do not believe that any greater good could be achieved for the country, than the change of public feeling on this head, which might be brought about by a few benevolent men, undeniably in the class of 'gentlemen,' who would, on principle, enter into some of our commonest trades, and make them honorable; showing that it was possible for a man to retain his dignity, and remain, in the best sense a gentleman, though part of his time was every day occupied in manual labor, or even in serving customers over a counter. I do not in the least see why courtesy, and gravity, and sympathy with the feelings of others, and courage, and truth, and piety, and what else goes to make up a gentleman's character, should not be found behind a counter as well as elsewhere, if they were demanded, or even hoped for, there." These remarks though used of English life, may with a slight modification be applied to ourselves. But I shall not speak here of the dignity of labor; we hear a great deal about that and believe very little of it. But I do insist on the dignity of life; upon the supreme importance of striving for the attainment of some worthy object, and of so living that each to-morrow may find us farther than to-day in all the elements of true manhood and womanhood.

But it is not those who are chiefly engaged in labors of a more or less mechanical sort to whom society has a right to look for ideal aims in life. It is the cultured, the intelligent, the educated who should take the lead. And what is knowledge worth to the individual and to society if it does not lift men above the narrow mercantile spirit

of the age. The illiterate and uncultured man may well say, especially if his motives are pure and his life upright, "I do not see that my intelligent neighbor is one whit more self-sacrificing or less grasping or less eager for dollars and cents than I am." He is right when he holds that knowledge alone will not save men. It is not enough to know what ails a patient, it is equally important that one should know how to cure him and be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to his restoration. Yet intelligent men are the saviors of the world. Turkey has not advanced in half a dozen centuries, because she has no scholars, no citizens with ideal aims either in art or science or morals. With the Turk the only question is how to get through the day. Spain is very much in the same case; for the few to whom life means more than merely to eat and drink and sleep have little influence on the unregenerate masses, so largely in the majority.

I beg you to consider whether it is not the pursuit of ideals; and moral preaching that has brought the world to where it is. And if you find it so, will you not put heart and head and hand to this glorious work? Take this stand from principle and pursue your object unremittingly through life. There is hardly a man living who would not like to have the credit of being honest and generous and benevolent, but selfishness hinders so many noble impulses from blossoming into action. Men resort to hypocrisy to gain credit for deeds which they have not the moral earnestness to perform. How much better it is to strive for real excellence than for the mere credit of it; for a reality than a sham. I do not know whether the inhabitants of the spirit world take any interest in what is going on in our mundane life; but it seems to me that if it is possible for disembodied souls to look upon this struggle between what is good

and what is evil, between what is high and what is low, between what is ideal and what is selfish, and the thought were forced upon them: In all this I took no part and had no interest; I never contributed a dollar nor an hour's labor to sustain the good against the evil, but allowed my insignificant self to fill the entire horizon of my mental vision, that would be torment enough.

I know that it is not easy to be true to the ideal of our youth, through a career of disappointment, such as every life is to a greater or less degree. I have no doubt that every successful man in an ethical cause has often had occasion to say with the Psalmist, "My feet had well nigh slipped, when I beheld the prosperity of the wicked." But for the very reason that so many lead aimless lives the obligation is the more binding on the few who have a deeper insight. He that would be greatest among you shall be your servant.

"Not many lives, but only one have we—
Frail, fleeting man!
How sacred that one life should be—
That narrow span!
Day after day filled up with blessed toil,
Hour after hour still bringing in new spoil."

But while we have but one life to live, that is not the end of us even in this world, unless we will have it so.

"So to live that when the sun
Of our existence sinks in night,
Memorials sweet of mercies done
May shrine our names in memory's light,
And the blest seeds we scatter'd bloom
A hundred-fold in days to come."

This is not a mere fancy sketch—it is something that is within the reach of even the humblest, but it requires a fixed and earnest purpose.

I can not more fitly conclude the lesson of the present hour than with some words Carlyle uses in closing his life of John Sterling. Would that the same could be used of us all!

"In Sterling's writings and actions, were they capable of being well read, we consider that there is for all true hearts especially for young and noble seekers, and strivers toward what is highest, a mirror in which some shadow of themselves and of their immeasureably complex arena will profitably present itself. Here also is one encompassed and struggling even as they now are. This man had said to himself, not in mere catechism-words, but with all his instincts, and the question thrilled in every nerve of him, and pulsed in every drop of blood: What is the chief end of man? Behold I too would live and work as beseems a denizen of this Universe—a child of the Highest God. By what means is a noble life still possible to me, ye Heavens, and thou Earth, oh how?" This is the question which every honest, God-fearing man asks himself every day, and even oftener. But the sum and substance is contained in the words: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsover things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things."

SELF-RENUNCIATION.

Not very many years ago a learned and clever Scotchman wrote a book to prove that "civilization is nothing more than the complicated outcome of a war waged with nature by man in society to prevent her from putting into execution in his case the law of natural selection.* All men everywhere, from states very low to states very high in civilization are banded together, weakly or powerfully, to fight this fight, and the measure of success which attends the struggle of each band or association so engaged is the measure of success it has attained."

It does not concern us to examine here whether this correctly states a law of nature; but that it embodies a large measure of truth no one will dispute, and it may be safely accepted as a good working hypothesis. For who that has read history can deny that there have always been at work in the world two antagonistic forces; one tending to disintegrate society, the other to keep it together and improve it? As one force or the other had the upper hand society advanced and improved or retrograded and decayed. Just as in every living body dissolution begins the moment the vital

*The Past in the Present: What Is Civilization? By Arthur Mitchell.

forces cease to be active in building up its tissues; so in the social organism, when the natural forces which exist in man as an individual overpower the spiritual forces developed and strengthened by the attrition of man against man in society, progress is stopped and disintegration begins.

Self-denial or self-sacrifice is a convenient term to designate the law of progress, selfishness the principle that counteracts it. The terms can be reversed and the statement will be equally true. Let us look at their applicability in the explanation of a few historical eras of first rate importance. The fundamental principle of the ancient Greek states, notably Athens and Lacedaemon, was the obligation of the individual to consult the interests of the commonwealth rather than his own. It was each one's duty to sacrifice all that he had upon the altar of his country. As long as their citizens recognized and acted under this feeling their political power was greater than any force that could be brought against them. But though the East could not evercome them in battle it was able by the assiduous nurture of selfishness to undermine their civic virtue so that in time they fell an easy prey to those who were eager for their destruction. The citizen preferred ease and personal gratification to liberty maintained by personal sacrifices. With the decay of civic virtue, literature sank lower and lower until it was no longer worthy of the name. The spirit that once made the Athenian proud of his nationality, of the beauty of his native city, of the splendor of her festivals, the genius of her artists, the glory of her choric exhibitions, that made him boast of the renown of her achievements in everything that was noble, no longer animated him, and the self-seeking Greek had become a byword and a reproach.

Many centuries later on another continent a feeble nation is engaged in a life and death struggle with a powerful enemy. But it was not entered upon in the spirit of self-seeking. No sentiment was more frequently uttered than that growing out of the conviction that it was not so much for the benefit of the contemporaries as for the good of those yet unborn. Luxury had not yet undermined civic virtue and the contest ended as every such contest ends, not in favor of the strongest but of the most worthy.

Less than a century ago Germany lay prostrate before the overwhelming power of Napoleon. He had been victorious as long as there had been but little self in his plans. The baseness of the self-seeking German princes had brought untold misery upon their subjects. But to them as to our forefathers the burden became unbearable and forgetting self they determined to throw it off. They felt that the sufferings of the present, great as they might be, were not to be compared with the glory that should follow. And their faith was not in vain. Just as the degenerate Greek subjects of the Macedonian and the Roman Empire looked back with pride at the deeds of his forefathers, even when he was too weak to imitate their examples, so the German of to-day no less than the American regards the deeds of a century past with an ever-growing satisfaction. Degenerate indeed is he who can dwell in spirit upon those former days of toil and sacrifice and heroism without feeling that he would gladly have shared them because, great as may have been the cost, the reward is still greater. Yet the success of every holy cause must be purchased with sacrifices, not only of blood, which many are ready to make, but of self in a hundred other ways, to which a much smaller number of souls is adequate. Let us not be misled by our admiration for the past; let

us not sigh because we live in these degenerate times, as they are often called; there is a future joined to every present, and opportunity is never wanting to him who will use it.

It is worth at least a passing remark that many are today seeking their temporal salvation through the same methods that preserved it to the foremost nations of antiquity. They would make the commonwealth all-powerful, the individual nothing, except so far as he contributed his mite to the formation of public opinion. Few, I believe, who advocate the self-abnegation demanded by socialism are aware that they are advocating a return to a condition of society that has been outgrown forever. But the obligation of every man to the community is as binding now as it ever was, only the recognition of that obligation must find expression voluntarily. No man's services to his country or to any cause is worth anything if his first object is to benefit himself to the exclusion of others. When two parties contend for a loaf, each expecting to get two-thirds, both are sure to be disappointed. The categorical imperative represents our perfect rule of conduct and we approach perfection as we approach a realization of it in our lives.

The spirited lines of Scott forcibly express the great fact that only the unselfish man can be a lover of his country.

> "High though his titles, proud his name,
> Boundless his wealth as wish can claim;
> Despite those titles, power and pelf,
> The wretch concentred all in self,
> Living shall forfeit fair renown,
> And doubly dying shall go down
> To the vile dust from whence he sprung,
> Unwept, unhonored and unsung."

Those nations, both ancient and modern, have made the greatest progress among whom the law of self-denial was most vigorous in the national consciousness. Otherwise it is simply a thing to laugh at, like the silly pride of the modern Spaniard or Turk. The nations of the East had no coherence, except to some extent the Jewish, because their units were held together by an external force. How proud were the citizens of Rome to be called by that august name, how eager to purchase the title when not born to it! It is not a mere accident that so many founders and reformers of Greek states, as well as of Rome, live in legend as having freely offered their lives for the good of their country. The most ignorant could appreciate this embodiment of the national consciousness in flesh and blood, and feel the inspiration to imitate them.

After the states of modern Europe began to emerge from the darkness of the Middle Ages it was in France first that a strong and permanent national feeling was developed; and it is a trite remark that France led the civilization of modern Europe. National salvation, national greatness, civilization in its highest and best sense is only possible in a country a majority of whose citizens voluntarily place country before self, even to the extent of all that men hold dear.

I do not forget that patriotism in the vigorous language of Dr. Johnson, may be the last refuge of a scoundrel. There is little hope for a country where its citizens say "our country right or wrong." Patriotism is only worthy of that sacred name when it puts national honor and honesty first and national greatness last, for that greatness is alone permanent which is founded upon that rock of truth and right. National power should be used to promote most vigorously only those principles that are imperishable in human constitutions.

A recent writer applies the words of Froude upon Davis, the English navigator, to the case of John Brown, and I use them here because they fully describe the condition of life that I am now trying to sketch, "A melancholy end for such a man—the end of a warrior, not dying Epaminondas-like on the field of victory, but cut off in a poor brawl or ambuscade. Life with him was not a summer holiday, but a holy sacrifice offered up to duty, and what his master sent was welcome. It was hard, rough, and thorny, trodden with bleeding feet and aching brow, the life of which the cross is the symbol; a battle which no peace follows this side the grave; which the grave gapes to finish before the victory is won; and strange that it should be so—this is the highest life of man. Look back along the great names of history; there are none whose life has been other than this. They to whom it has been given to do the really highest work in this world, whoever they are, Jew or Gentile, Pagan or Christian, warriors, legislators, philosophers, priests, poets, kings, slaves—one and all, their fate has been the same: the same bitter cup has been given them to drink."

"Whether on the scaffold high,
Or in the battle's van,
The fittest place where man can die,
Is where he dies for man."

We live in times where personal valor no longer finds constant and fit expression in terms of bodily prowess; it is less necessary that one or a few shall die for the many. But it is not the less necessary that each shall exercise his proper share of self-denial that the community receive no detriment. Salvation through self-denial is the formula

which expresses objectively the idea embodied in the well-known words, salvation through faith.

In one case we speak in the language of philosophy, in the other in the language of theology. Through salvation by faith we save ourselves, through salvation by self-denial we save our fellow-men.

Here we have the law of human progress, yet while constantly recognizing, how constantly do men resist it. Against no other law of the spirit does he make such uninterrupted though it may be silent resistance. In order to get into the kingdom he is willing to expend ten times the strength that would take him into the strait gate, in order to get in some other way, provided his feelings of selfishness be gratified. He wants his own neighbors to see the feat of scaling the wall, of breaking a breach, or to know how much time he spent on it, or a monument to commemorate the achievement. How many there are who would purchase health of body or purity of heart at any price except that of a bad habit! How many there are who would purchase learning, public gratitude or posthumous fame at any price except that of constitutional disinclination to exertion!

But God will not have it so. We all must pay the same price for real excellence, and no one can pay it for us, and that price is self-denial.

The sentiments with which a people regards the spirit of self-denial and self-sacrifice is an index of its place along the scale of civilization. The degenerate Carthagenians endeavored to purchase the favor of the gods by the sacrifice of their children to Moloch. Many an Indian has hoped to purchase heaven by death under the wheels of Juggernaut's car. Not a few Christians have sought to

purchase the same favor by self-inflicted bodily pains, or by large bequests to purposes of charity. But this is only offering selfishness for that which self-denial alone will purchase. It is not by such means as these that we may gain our place among the company of the pure in heart. If such a thing were possible for any one he would soon feel like a rustic in the company of the Immortals of the French Academy. We do not even need the Gospel to teach us this. Socrates and Epictetus, with many of their countrymen, knew better; Cicero and Seneca knew better, in spite of their many shortcomings. Yet there are hundreds of so-called Christians living to-day who have not learned this foundation principle. It is a sad fact but undeniable in the history of nations, that selfishness increases with national prosperity; yea, here and there outruns it.

I believe it is true everywhere that the poor are much readier to make sacrifices than the rich. It is certainly true that it is not the richest governments that contribute most liberally to the promotion of enterprises that are worthy in themselves, though they may not be of immediate utility. Unquestionably not our millionaires have done most to aid the great enterprises that make men wiser and better. Yet it is they above all others who, upon merely mercenary grounds, ought to contribute most liberally toward those enterprises which make society stable, and to show the poor that all human interests are common to all.

No one has more profoundly fathomed the motives of the human heart than that somewhat unamiable philosopher, Thomas Carlyle, and there is no thought to which he more frequently recurs, nor any precept which he enforces with more persistence than this one that self-denial, self-sacrifice, self-renunciation, is the beginning of all

moral excellence. Almost in the same words the historian of European morals says: "The first condition of all really great moral excellence is a spirit of genuine self-sacrifice and self-renunciation." Nor is there anything surprising in this. So long as our lower and carnal self is our master it is not possible for us to follow the guidance of our higher and spiritual self. Men in all the stages of civilization have instinctively felt this and unconsciously recognized it. The Buddha's highest claim to admiration lay in the fact that he renounced kingship to minister to the poor and humble. The Savior of mankind left a greater kingdom for a like purpose. There are no heroes, whether real or legendary, so fondly remembered as those who have sacrificed themselves for the good of others. The Athenians thought no one worthy to reign after King Kodrus, who made himself a voluntary offering for the salvation of his country.

The Romans cherished with feelings stronger than veneration the remembrance of Horatius and Regulus. Arnold Winkelried is held up as an example not only by his own countrymen but his devotion to country is regarded as an inheritance in which all patriots may share. No man is so great that he could not enhance his reputation by saving the life of a child at the risk of his own, or sacrificing his own in the attempt to do so. Some people may think that it is the element of personal bravery that charms men in instances such as these. But personal bravery displayed upon an unworthy object is mere foolhardiness for which all right minded persons feel only contempt. If there be any virtue in this it is that of the bull-dog rather than of a human being.

But self-sacrificing for a national cause is not the only sacrifice that finds a permanent and cherished place in the

human heart. There are no scenes in the Greek mythology which poets have dwelt on more fondly and which audiences tired less of seeing upon the stage than Antigone braving the wrath of the cruel Kreon and a horrible death in order to perform the last rites of affection over the dead bodies of her brothers; than Alkestis laying down her life voluntarily that her husband might live; than the strife between Orestes and Pylades as to which should die for the other. Few are they in any audience who would not admire and applaud such heroic deeds though they might fall far short of the nobleness of mind which would enable them to do likewise. It is when no element of personal interest hinders the soul from seeing an act of self-denial in its divine loveliness that the highest motives of the human heart assert themselves. It is then that the spark kindled from heaven is fanned into at least a momentary flame and the ignoblest soul manifests its divine origin. The chief spiritual nourishment of the mediaeval church for centuries was the lives of the saints which abounded in acts of self-denial, voluntary poverty and devotion to the cause of the poor and lowly. The legend which bore the current epithet of the golden and which Longfellow has clothed in a modern poetic garb is a type of this class of stories. And these gained new currency by the example of many whose lives are briefly recorded in the New Testament. No matter how little is told us of the representative characters therein named, we find at least this, that they strove to do their Father's will rather than their own. It was not alone the divinity of Christ that charmed the world, it was also the essential humanity of his disciples that centered not in self, but in others. He who would never cease to grow, intellectually, morally and spiritually, must engage in a life-long contest with the unconscious selfish impulses of his nature.

I am not of those who look back with regret upon those good old times, as men of superficial knowledge are apt to regard them, and sigh because they are gone never to return. Yet I can not but think that in many a good deed now done there is an uncommonly large element of selfishness. The times foster it. This will generally make no difference to the recipient, but it detracts from the purity of the favor conferred. Not a little good that is done now-a-days would not be done were it not certain that it would be widely reported. It may be true that as Marcus Antoninus says it is in accordance with man's nature to be concerned for all men; yet it is equally true that this concern is apt to remain a mere sentiment that is never translated into action.

But can the spirit of self-denial never be mistaken? Certainly. Men may exercise it so as neither to benefit themselves nor others. If not kept under the control of reason and an enlightened conscience it leads men astray—sometimes widely astray. It is a darkened intellect and a perverted conscience that makes the fakir, the dervish, the flagellant, and the ascetic. If we did not see in so many other matters the perverseness of men to go amiss through ignorant fanaticism, the constant tendency to mistake form for substance, we should be surprised that any could be found who saw virtue in studiously abstaining from doing good to others and in doing harm to themselves. Equally wrong is the man who denies his reason, who stultifies himself to believe a dogma almost on the sole ground that it is contrary to reason. A man may do violence to all his better impulses for what he regards as a temporal advantage. The trimmer in politics or religion practices self-denial, but it is to no one more evident than to himself, I ween, that he is wronging his own soul. The world

belongs to those who can practice self-denial. Few men acquire riches by accident: they are generally the reward of self-denial in early life. For every man who is poor and dependent through circumstances over which he has no control, a score are poor from lack of self-denial or rightly directed self-denial. For every good deed that we fail to do because of inability, we fail of a hundred from lack of the power of self-denial. For every young person who does not succeed in life from lack of talents a thousand are but partially successful because they are not willing to pay the price in self-denial that alone will purchase what all are eager to possess. The bitter taste of the bud deters them and they never have the glorious privilege of looking back upon the flower that blooms in honest achievement. It must not be said of the man who accomplishes little in this world from lack of talent to do more, that he has failed. They only fail who *can* but will not, whose efforts end where they begin, in self, and whose mental ingenuity is chiefly employed in devising means to best serve themselves at the expense of their fellow-man without being found out. The world in its moments of frivolity laughs at the missionary who leaves home and friends to wear out his life among savages or those who have renounced what is best in civilization; but it acknowledges in its better moments that he has chosen nobly. A great majority of men ridicule the self-denial and devotion of the investigator who counts truth and knowledge of more value than any other possession; yet they may be reminded in a thousand ways that these choice spirits are the salt of the earth and represent the high-water mark of human progress. The world is pretty sure to shrug its shoulders at those who, born to position, descend voluntarily from their natural place in society to labor among

the lowly; yet it is only the self-denying efforts of such that keeps the social classes from arraying themselves against each other for mutual destruction.

It is becoming more painfully evident from day to day that our traditional political economy needs to be in part reconstructed, and merged in or at least largely reconsidered with reference to that wider subject, social ethics. No people can be permanently prosperous whose policy it is to build up their own enterprises at the expense of all other nations. The doctrine of the mutual interdependence of all governments has always had some advocates, but their ideas are found in books rather than in practice. Albeit, there are some clear signs, it seems to me, that some of the nations of the earth are beginning in their dealings, both with each other and with their own subjects, to recognize that secure possessions are more to be valued than large ones. And I would fain believe, too, that an increasing number of persons are coming to recognize the fact that the most valuable possessions are not those that can be measured or weighed or counted, but are something far less gross, and in several senses far less difficult of attainment.

Christianity is pre-eminently the doctrine of self-denial. Not that it has not been taught elsewhere in isolated cases; but nowhere else is there so much stress laid on the fact that it is better to suffer affliction with the children of God than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season. The author of "Four Phases of Morals" truthfully says: "We must observe that the Christian is pre-eminently equipped with that self-denial and self-control * * * which are the necessary postulates of all moral excellence. A man who will take the world easily will never take it grandly; all excellent things are difficult. The Christian

recognizes the difficulty but delights in it as the stout old Roman did in the foes which added fuel to his victories, or as the strong modern engineer does in mountains, that he may show the triumph of his art in boring through them or in winding around them. The man of genius denies himself in a thousand ways that he may work out a perfect body for the imaginary ideals that possess him; the great soldier denies himself through leagues of hardships that he may repel the rude invader and preserve the honor of his country unstained; and the man of virtue must deny himself also, if virtue is a thing which a creature of high enterprise and lofty purpose may reasonably have to do with." It is every man's bounden duty "to realize as much goodness as possible in his own personal life and in the life of that society of which he is a part, by the two-fold process of nursing virtues and weeding out vices: an ideal which can never be reached by those who commence life, after the Epicurean fashion, with a low calculation of pleasures and pains, but by those who are inspired by the vision of what Plato preached as divine ideas and Paul as divine commands."

The vitality of this doctrine is something wonderful. Despite the constant assaults of all the lower impulses in man's nature it has lived, has never been without its representatives. It is the vital and vivifying spark that is found in every human bosom, and which is almost sure to be at least occasionally fanned into a momentary flame. But in the heart of the Christian it burns steadily casting light upon his pathway and making him a conspicuous object among his fellow-men. It must not be lost sight of that Christianity does not mean ecclesiasticism, yet people make no more frequent mistake than to regard the words Christian and member of a Christian church as synonyms.

Often a man's zeal in behalf of his church makes him totally forgetful of what his profession as a Christian demands of him. Christ Himself founded no church, but only laid down a rule of life the fundamental precept of which is that men ought to deny themselves in obedience to a higher law, a diviner impulse. But alas how many mistake form for substance, ceremony for sacrifice, and a less gross form of selfishness for self-denial!

It might be supposed that the evolutionary doctrine of ethics would look coldly upon the enthusiasm of kindness. But it, too, is found upon the side of Christianity when comparing the respective merits of egoism and altruism. It leaves us in no doubt as to which represents the higher law. Its great Apostle expresses surprise "that any one should have formulated his experience by saying that the conditions to success are a hard heart and a sound digestion." He regards this formula marvelous, considering the many proofs that success, even of a material kind, depends upon the good offices of others. He further says: "That to see that those who care nothing for the feelings of others are, by implication shut out from a wide range of aesthetic pleasure it needs but to ask whether men who delight in dog-fights may be expected to appreciate Beethoven's Adelaide, or whether Tennyson's In Memoriam would greatly move a gang of convicts."

The pedestrian along the eastern shore of Lake Zug in Switzerland may notice near the highway where it crosses a narrow valley, a plain monument. Drawing near he may read that it was erected to commemorate the brave deed of a young man who lost his life in an unselfish but vain attempt to rescue two girls who were carried down the ravine by a sudden rise of the mountain stream flowing through it. Had he died the death of thousands of his

peers he would be quietly sleeping to-day in an unknown grave. Though the three persons were irrevocably buried in the lake, their neighbors were not willing to let the memory of the heroic attempt at rescue be forgotten, and they in their humble way immortalized it. In like manner Grace Darling, Ida Lewis and others would never have been known outside of a narrow circle had not similar deeds immortalized them and caused their names to be placed in every cyclopedia.

While it may be true to some extent that the evil which men do lives after them, it is not so tenacious of life as the good that they have done. Each succeeding biographer of the men and women whom the world used to regard as bad and only bad finds a little more to commend in their lives. In many cases a single good deed has illuminated a life which but for it would have been wholly dark. Hardly a year passes that we do not hear of some new project to commemorate a life or a deed that had, for a time, perhaps for centuries, been forgotten. Time makes a wonderful change in the relative importance of human actions. Stephen Girard was an important man in his day, but he is now remembered not because of his wealth as a whole but because of that portion which he devoted to the establishment and support of a college for orphans. The millionaires of our day will be remembered only so long as the monuments of their benevolence endure. But for these, future generations will take no more interest in their names than it does in that of Croesus or Lucullus.

It is a sorry spectacle to see a man or woman of intelligence frittering away a large part of life over such trivialities as how a thing is to be eaten or how it is to be worn. Not that such things are not entitled to any share of our attention, but verily not the chief share. What does justly

claim our chief attention is self-improvement through the diligent and constant search for truth and knowledge, and the purification of the soul from vulgar fears and base desires: those things which tend to lead us in pursuit of that which is worthy of a true man or woman. Next in order come those objects which tend to elevate the community of which we form a part. If we can not do both we can at least do one. It is right that charity should begin at home, no matter how narrow the circle which you designate by this name; but it is worth little if it stops there. To do these things so as to accomplish any results worthy of the name there is needed no small amount of intelligence, a pure heart and an honest purpose, on the part of our better and higher self as against our baser and lower. The greater part of our efforts will not be appreciated by our contemporaries, yet they will not therefore have been in vain. The sublimest courage is often the courage of failure, the courage to lead a forlorn hope. We dare not say, I have done some deeds of benevolence, but they were not appreciated or were met with ingratitude, henceforth I propose to serve myself only. It is those few disinterested, though it may be temporarily unappreciated benefits, that are from time to time conferred upon others that advance the world, and elevate the human race: all the rest that we do perishes with us, or in the doing.

I believe that the true philosophy of life is found in the words of that mother who said, "I have spent more than half a lifetime of self-denial in bringing up and properly educating a large family, in the constant effort to set them a worthy example, and to provide for them everything really needful. And now, as I begin to see that my voluntary cares have not been in vain, that my labors do

not end with those upon whom they were bestowed, but go on in ever widening circles, I am a thousand times repaid. The seedtime and the sowing that was spent in sacrifice is nearly past, but the harvest is becoming richer and more abundant as the years go on."

It is a current tradition that when Anne Boleyn learned of her condemnation she said, "I care little what becomes of me—my child will at least be royal." The sentiment is a noble one and well worthy of the mother of the illustrious Elizabeth. But it may have a wider application. It matters little what becomes of each present generation if that which succeeds is better and wiser.

I may fitly close this discourse by a brief reference to one of Browning's poems in which as in so many others the author gives us his interpretation of life and its relation to duty. In "The Boy and the Angel" a boy in a monastery follows his craft as a shoemaker, doing his work well and praising God. Blaise, the monk, tells him that his praise reaches his Creator as surely as the Pope's at the Easter Festival in Rome. But this did not satisfy the youth's ambition; he longed to praise God in some great way. In time he realized his ambition, and with Gabriel's help became Pope. As there was now no one to do the work the boy had left the angel took his place; however, the work and the praise were not the boy's. When the angel became conscious of this he went to Rome, found there the Pope preparing the great Easter Festival, proud of his realized ambition. Gabriel made known to him life as he now sees it: man can only do God's work in his own proper sphere. The Pope, too, saw his mistake, went back to his bench and remained there till he died. A

new Pope dwelt in St. Peters. He died also, and both shoemaker and Pope went to God together.

"One vanished as the other died:
They sought God side by side."

How much better it is to encourage ourselves as well as others to do to the best of our ability whatever is worth doing rather than to strive for some larger sphere in which we may perhaps waste our strength in the struggle, so that even if we reach the goal of our ambition we shall have little energy left to make ourselves useful in it. If we fail our life is sure to fall short of its full fruition and it may fall far short. Better is it to be a thoroughly honest and competent shoemaker than the inefficient ruler of the widest realm the world ever saw.

FICTION AS A FACTOR IN EDUCATION.

It must be evident to every one who takes note of the main current of contemporary thought that it is essentially materialistic. "Other-worldliness" is one of the least prominent characteristics of the present generation. It is bent on having a good time in this world, be the consequences in the next what they may. In education the cry is, "Teach facts," and by facts thus understood are always meant external phenomena, rather than the experiences of psychic life. It is demanded of teachers that in their instruction they shall lay the chief stress on those things that can be weighed and measured and counted. A liberal education, one that is not a direct aid to getting on in the world, has come to be almost a thing of the past.

It is not here contended that this state of affairs is wholly new. More than half a century ago, Thomas Gradgrind, who may be taken as the type of a class, said, "Now, what I want is facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else and root out everything else. You can only form the mind of reasoning animals upon facts; nothing else will ever be of any service to them. This is the principle upon which I bring up my own children, and this is the principle upon which I bring up these children. Stick to facts, sir." Yet, as is so often the case in this

world reputed to be so thoroughly matter-of-fact, Gradgrind, when in sore trouble, was consoled and strengthened by two of the most unpractical people imaginable. While, then, the clamor for facts is not now heard for the first time, it was probably never heard in so many quarters, nor does it seem to have been so persistently reiterated.

In view of these conditions it will be interesting to take a passing glance at the part played by fiction, the culture of the imagination through poetry and the novel, in the education of the human race. Let us begin with the people that may justly be regarded as the torch-bearers of civilization. Such a survey, however brief, must make it plain that the fictitious element in literature has been a very potent force in human progress—a great deal more so than what is usually called history. So much that is subjective is injected into almost all history that rises above the grade of mere annals that if the reader had not the names of leading characters to guide him he would sometimes be led to question whether two authors who are professedly dealing with the same period or persons are doing so in reality. History, if of any value, must set forth the truth; yet as a matter of fact almost all history is rewritten two or three times in a century, and always according to a standard more or less determined by the personal equation of the writer. Less than half a dozen historical works produced three or four generations ago are still regarded as well worth reading. While it is true that time has not dimmed the luster or impaired the value of some of the histories that have survived from pre-christian times, it might be said of at least a few of these that they are the only records we have. If we are unwilling to accept their testimony there is nothing to put in their place. Plainly, then, the student of history is rarely cer-

tain that he is dealing with facts, and sticklers for facts can hardly hope to find them except where they can be brought under their personal observation or verified by experiment.

A careful study of the laws of the physical universe and their application to the affairs of life has probably done much to increase the happiness of mankind; yet as we have no method by which we can measure pleasure and pain, it would be rash to affirm this with positiveness. But it can not be denied that our knowledge is far in advance of our practice. Would it not be a fortunate thing for the world if not another new discovery were made for a hundred years to come, to the end that men might have time to make full use of what they already know? If progress in this direction were barred, the next two or three generations would have time to exploit fully and in a practical way the truths that are already common property, as well as to give the more earnest heed to man's spiritual and moral needs. The saddest reflection suggested by the history of mankind is that their knowledge has always been far in advance of practice.

The imagination has played a large part in the drama of human life and has had much influence in shaping the destinies of nations. It enables men to put themselves outside of their bodies and above their *milieu* where they may realize with greater vividness the hopes, feelings, emotions and sentiments of their fellow-beings. When the imagination is kept under the control of reason and trained by logical methods so that it shall not run into the wild extravagances that characterize the literature of the East, as exemplified in the Arabian Nights, it is man's noblest faculty. Its influence in art, in literature, in morals, even in science, can not easily be over-estimated. The

grade of civilization that a people has attained can be measured by the imaginative literature it has produced and delights in. Such being the case, the culture and training of the imagination ought to receive a large share of attention on the part of educators.

It is a commonplace among intelligent persons that the ancient Athenians were the most cultured people of which we have any knowledge. The evidence is of a very varied character. The most convincing is that furnished by their art, their literature and their philosophy.* But there is other evidence of a less direct and tangible character. Litigants pleaded their own cases in the law-courts. There was in Athens a class of men whose functions corresponded in some measure with that of the modern attorney-at-law. But they extended no further than the writing of pleas. These were committed to memory by the litigants and spoken before the jury. There are still extant a number of such pleadings that are classic in form, though the questions at issue are often trivial. The speakers were frequently men of low degree, sometimes of the lowest, yet they were sufficiently intelligent to put their cases before the jury with vigor and effect. And these juries always consisted of hundreds, often of thousands of citizens. How many of the lawyers of our day are competent to prepare pleas that are worthy of a moment's consideration as to beauty of form? A lawyer with a style is about as often met with as a white elephant. And how many modern juries composed of but twelve men chosen at random can distinguish between grammatical and ungrammatical language? Not one in a thousand. How many citizens

*This question has been more fully discussed in two essays in this volume.

who are not professional speakers could be found even in our most intelligent communities who would undertake to plead their own case before the ordinary jury, to say nothing of a large audience, no matter how carefully they prepared beforehand? We are forced to conclude that every male Athenian adult, and to a considerable extent every educated Greek, was an orator. Take, for example, the numerous orations scattered through the works of their historians. We do not need to assume that the speeches recorded were those actually delivered; but we shall not go far wrong if we accept them as embracing the spirit and substance of what was said. Most of them, especially those found in Thucydides, exhibit a grasp of the situation, a discernment of motives, a keenness of analysis and a lucidity of exposition that not only bear the marks of verisimilitude, but testify likewise to the splendid intellectual training of the speakers. This was chiefly due to the social conditions that prevailed in Greece, especially in Athens. Nearly all the Greeks laid great stress on the ability to speak well. The dialogue plays a conspicuous part in Greek literature; speaking and hearing rather than reading was the mode by which intelligence was gained and communicated. The social habits of the Greeks, their eagerness to know—which is but a refined form of curiosity, from which it always springs and above which it does not often rise—prompted them to investigate every problem they encountered, while the paucity of books made them as eager to listen as they were themselves ready to contribute something to the discussion. So late as the time of the Apostle Paul there was no lack of persons on the *qui vive* for what a stranger might say. Under such conditions every conceivable problem of human interest was discussed in a semi-public way, while problems of a more abstruse

character received the careful attention of smaller coteries of philosophers. No one needs to be told what a superlatively excellent mental discipline it is to be associated with persons who habitually express themselves with precision and conciseness, nor how much modern life loses in this respect by the reading habit. The finest thoughts are only half comprehended in the haste to get over many pages. Little time is taken for reflection and none for reproduction.

If by education we mean the putting in action all those forces that enlighten the understanding, stimulate the power of thought and cultivate the taste, the ancient Greeks had formulated, in a large measure unconsciously, an educational system that has not been surpassed, probably not equaled. That it had its limitations and what they were has to some extent been pointed out in another paper. When we consider the small number of free citizens that Athens contained at any one time and the extraordinary large proportion of great men among them we are compelled to admit that a like condition of affairs has never existed since. Indeed it is doubtful whether during any one century in the history of the world there have lived as many men that have exercised so profound an influence on human thought as those who spent the whole or part of their lives in one small city in the century that was about equally divided by the year B. C. 400. What will seem most surprising to many persons is the fact that this intellectual pre-eminence was produced upon what would at the present day be regarded as pitifully meager pedagogical material. This consisted of little else than the Homeric Poems and political institutions of such a type that the intellectual powers of those living under them were stimulated to the highest degree. The Greek people were in a

large measure educated in fiction. Of course, there is fiction and fiction. There is fiction that is true to life and there is fiction that is but the wild product of an uncontrolled imagination. Greek fiction was true to life. It portrayed the passions, the desires, the emotions, the social conditions of real life: conjugal fidelity, romantic love, parental and filial affection, sorrow for the dead, personal bravery, indignation at real or supposed grievances, cunning, fortitude, patriotism, resignation, and so on. Well might their greatest critic, the "master of those who know," say that poetry is more philosophical than history. He explains that it is not the purpose of the poet to set forth reality, but rather that which is possible according to the laws of probability and necessity. Or, as the author of "The Last Days of Pompeii" expresses it, "The first art of the Poet (the Creator) is to breathe the breath of life into his creatures—the next is to make their words and actions appropriate to the era in which they are to speak and act. No man who is thoroughly aware of what Prose Fiction has become—of its dignity, of its influence, of the manner in which it has gradually absorbed all similar departments of literature, of its power in teaching as well as amusing—can so far forget its connection with History, with Philosophy, with Politics—its utter harmony with Poetry and obedience to Truth—as to debase its nature to the level of scholastic frivolities: he raises scholarship to the creative, and does not bow the creative to the scholastic." Though Greek fiction, or poetry, if that name be preferred, attained its final and classic form in the Iliad and the Odyssey, we know from the tragedies and from other sources that these poems represent a comparatively small part of an immense mass of similar tradition. Owing to the innate propensity of the human mind for con-

crete thinking, names stand for types. Thus the poet arouses an interest in his men and women when clothed in flesh and blood and named that could be affected in no other way. Impersonal character studies are to most people insufferably dull reading. To the majority of the Greeks their national heroes were real persons, and some of them may have been so, but others judged more correctly: yet even with this deduction their legends had their interest and value, as they still have. They are portrayals of Greek life, thought, and institutions. They could scarcely be less true if such persons as Agamemnon and Achilles, Hector and Andromache, Ulysses and Penelope and many others never existed. In this respect they are to be classed with the great novels of which the present century has produced such a number that it seems invidious to name any. It would be hard, if not impossible, to point out works professing to be history that are truer to life than Waverley, Guy Mannering, and Ivanhoe; than Tom Jones or Lorna Doone or Romola. What single book gives the reader a more just idea of the means and methods by which France was consolidated than Quentin Durward; or of the character and last days of Charles the Bold, than Anne of Geierstein; or of the morals of a certain class of Englishmen and English women during the Napoleonic era, than Vanity Fair, or of the feelings of the common people in France during the same period, than the Erckman-Chatrian novels? In all these the purely fictitious is no more than the frame in which the picture is set or the canvas on which it is painted. It may be compared to the sugar-coating on the pill; the medicine thus disguised is easier to swallow while its efficacy is in nowise impaired. The life of Washington as a whole is none the less true or his character none the less

correctly portrayed if the story of the hatchet be a myth; nor is Tell any the less truly a representative man of his time if a person bearing this name never existed. The tragic death of Antigone, as represented by the poet, for performing what she believed to be a pious duty moves us no less profoundly than the closing scene in the cell of Socrates as set forth by the historian. For the culture of the mind and heart, psychological truth is more valuable than the historical verities; it is neither limited in time nor confined by space. Hamerton has well stated the case when he says, "Thackeray and Balzac will make it possible for our descendants to live over again in the England and France of to-day. Seen in this light the novelist has a higher office than merely to amuse his contemporaries; he hands them down all living and talking to the remotest ages." Thackeray himself said, "Out of the fictitious book I get the expression of the life, of the times, of the manners, of the merriment, of the dress, the pleasure, the laughter, the ridicule of society; the old times live over again and I tread in the old country of England. Can the heaviest historian do more for me."

If we desire to harmonize our conduct with the moral order of the world or contemplate the manifestation of the laws of beauty and truth we can find lessons anywhere and everywhere.

The common people of mediaeval Europe fed the cravings of their moral nature almost entirely on fairy tales and legendary lore of a similarly unhistorical character. Amid the social chaos of a thousand years the sagas of the Nibelungen Circle, the stories of the Knights of the Round Table and the myths that attached themselves to the name of Charlemagne—the last two especially—are noteworthy for certain moral qualities that pervade them in spite of

much that grates harshly on modern nerves. The Gesta Romanorum and Aesop's Fables, with their numerous progeny, are more prosaic, more allegorized and more directly didactic. While much of this literature has its somber side, I recall but one popular allegory that sets forth in detail the career of a successful villain, namely Reynard the Fox. Yet even this cunning rogue is more shrewd than wicked. Usually he makes his enemies to fall into the same pit they had digged for him. Generally the authors of mediaeval romances of whatever name or sort linger with evident satisfaction on the virtues of courage, self-sacrifice, chastity and their kin. They rarely fail to make prominent those higher aspirations that dwell in the bosoms of almost all men and at times influence even the worst. In spite of the fact that the founder of Christianity manifested a deep interest in children and that his immediate successors followed his example the pedagogy of the Christian Church almost up to our own day was brutal in the extreme. Not only is this true of the schools, but family government was usually of the same type. Hardly anybody seems to have cared to take the trouble to understand children. Every real or supposed delinquency was treated as a willful crime, not as the result of an error of judgment. The government and training of children remained essentially heathen long after Europe had become nominally Christian. The Roman Orbilius, whom the poet Horace has immortalized with the epithet "plagosum," has had a numerous spiritual progeny. I remember a saying of Luther's to the effect that he was whipped at school fourteen times in a single half-day. At home he fared but little better. I recall but one child that is treated by an ancient classical author with marked interest and affection: it is the boy Ascanius. But he is

chiefly of importance to Virgil because he is destined to be the progenitor of a royal house. It is true Plato, Quintillian and other writers have more or less to say about the training of children; but the former regards them as a sort of necessary evil, a species of wild animal that needs to be tamed before anything can be made of him.*

Careful students of Shakespeare have called attention to the fact that in spite of his many-sidedness he shows little sympathy with children and child-life. When he appears to take any interest in children—and this is rarely—his interest is akin to that which we find manifested in Greek and Roman antiquity; it is not because of what they are but because of what they may become or on account of the importance of their ancestors. With all his myriad-mindedness the prince of poets could or would not grasp the significance of childhood in the development of the human race. That it is possible, in a great measure, to change

*Terence says: "He is sadly mistaken, at least in my opinion, who holds that the government is more potent or more stable which constrains by force rather than binds by amity. This is my way of thinking, and so I have made up my mind. He who performs his duty under compulsion only does so as long as he thinks he is watched. When he believes that he is not observed he returns to his natural state of mind. He whom you bind by a favor acts in sincerity, seeks to repay in kind, and, whether present or absent, remains the same. This is a father's duty: to accustom his son to do right of his own accord rather than from fear of another. This is the difference between a father and a master. Let him who can not do this acknowledge that he does not know how to manage his children."

These reflections are not original with the Roman poet. Socrates and other Greek thinkers had said the same thing centuries before. That you can not always trust to mild measures goes without saying; that they ought to be the rule, not the exception, should be equally self-evident.

the course of events by the judicious training of children seems not to have occurred to him. Most of his dramas show that a fundamental article of his creed was, If you do wrong, if you sin against the moral order of the world you will surely be punished for your evil deeds; but it does not seem to have occurred to him that society is under obligations so to train the rising generation that when it comes upon the scene of active life it shall deviate from the right as little as possible.

Interest in childhood and children really dates from the time of Rousseau. Of this paradoxical man it may almost be said that he discovered children; he at least succeeded in convincing the world that they have rights that adults are bound to respect. No single writer has contributed so much toward revolutionizing the current theories of education as he. Everybody read his books, and to read was to be converted to his theory. Here was a man who at last realized to its full significance that instruction should be adapted to the child, not the child forced to conform as well as might be to a ready-made system. As no one had ever seriously attempted to put in practice such a theory as he advocated, except possibly on a small scale, he was obliged to resort to fiction to show how his plans were to be carried out. Like all writers of fiction he exaggerated. Not only did he paint social conditions darker than they were, but he proposed reforms than can never be realized to the extent that he believed possible. In order to get something he demanded a great deal. In order to make his readers see the need of a process of purification for the social system he boldly asserted that society was rotten to the core. In order to expose the defects of the current educational methods he declared unequivocally that they were without a single redeeming feature. Except for him we should never

have had Pestalozzi and all that his name implies in the history of modern education.

Among England's great writers Wordsworth early in life showed a deep interest in children and gave his studies of child-life an artistic form. Before the year 1800 he had written, "We Are Seven," "Anecdotes for Fathers," "The Idiot Boy," "Matthew," and "Ruth." During his whole life he occasionally recurred to similar themes, though the public was for a long time rather indifferent. Though Lamb might find fault with Wordsworth's poetry because "the instructions conveyed in it were too direct; they don't slide into the mind of the reader when he is imagining no such thing," Wordsworth was fully aware of this and continued his chosen course with a full knowledge of what he was doing.* He said, "Every great poet is a teacher; I wish to be considered as a teacher or as nothing." Still some of his teaching might have been more effective if it had been less obtrusive, and a good deal of his poetry would probably be less tiresome if less didactic.

About the same time Miss Edgeworth with her Tales contributed a good deal to dispel the popular fallacy that teaching the young is a mere trade that can be picked up by anybody, and promoted the enlightenment of the British public on the importance of a better education for the young. The pedagogic influence of such female writers as Mrs. Barbauld, Hannah More, Fanny Burney, Maria Edgeworth, Jane Austen and others seems to have been helpful and far-reaching; yet educational reforms in Great Britain went their own way and were but slightly influ-

*In 1809 there appeared in London two volumes of "Poetry for Children, Entirely Original." By the Author of Mrs. Leicester's School (Charles and Mary Lamb). The edition must have been very small, as copies are excessively rare.

enced by Continental thought. The female writers above named, however, did much to enlighten the general public and improve the elementary schools, or at least the instruction given in them. It is somewhat remarkable that English pedagogy of a certain type owes so much to women, though it is perfectly natural that this should be so, and the Continent so little, which may be regarded as unnatural. About 1775 Mrs. Barbauld's "Early Lessons" appeared, and the fact is only mentioned here because it is said to have been published at a time when, as Hannah More said, there was nothing for children to read between Cinderella and the Spectator. Extracts from the writings of this gifted woman were quite numerous in the reading books used by men and women not yet past middle life. In Germany Campe's Robinson Junior passed through more than fifty editions before the end of the eighteenth century. It was one of the first books written expressly for children. In his day Luther found reason to exclaim, "This is a hard world for girls," and if he had lived three hundred years later he might still have added "and indeed for all children." Happily for them they were not aware of it.

It may strike the average reader as somewhat amusing to hear Charles Dickens classed among the great educators —this man whom most people regard as the author of but one serious book, "A Child's History of England;" yet if the work of an educator be to enlighten public opinion and to interest his readers in the training of the young in a large sense, Dickens was pre-eminently an educational reformer. He instructed the public without the public being aware of it. Horace said long ago: "Quamquam ridentem dicere verum quid vetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi Doctores elementa velint ut discere prima."

This method of instruction Dickens employed on a large scale and with eminent success. Dean Stanley said of him, "He taught the world great lessons of the eternal value of generosity, of purity, of kindness and unselfishness." And Webster was not far afield when he said that Dickens did more to ameliorate the condition of the English poor than all the great statesmen Great Britain sent to Parliament. If a Parliamentary committee had reported on the condition of such establishments as Dotheboys Hall and Stone Lodge, how many persons would have read their report? How many would have believed it? Yet we are assured that this writer of fiction made such concerns henceforth impossible. What higher praise could any man covet than to have it said of him, "He has not only pleased us—he has softened the hearts of a whole generation. He has made charity fashionable; he awakened pity in the hearts of sixty millions of people. He made a whole generation keep Christmas with acts of helpfulness to the poor, and every barefoot boy in the streets of England and America to-day fares a little better, gets fewer cuffs and more pudding" because Charles Dickens wrote. If it is the highest attainment of art to conceal art, Dickens was a master artist. He seems to have always to have written with a purpose, though few people suspected it. As tributary to the main theme of some of his books it was essential that he should hold up to ridicule or to execration such creatures as Creakle, Choakumchild, Squeers, Pecksniff and their like. How he interested and instructed the public everybody knows. Dickens was not only the first English author to assign a conspicuous place to children in his works of fiction, but he created types that will endure as long as his writings. He possessed that consummate artistic skill which enabled him to make children interesting

without making them unnatural. Little Dorrit, Little Nell, Little Paul, Oliver Twist and others of his juvenile characters have become household words.

Recent French literature brings to our attention some interesting children of both sexes. Little Gavroche is a masterly study of the typical Paris gamin. But his untimely end leaves a sad impression on the mind of the reader. An English writer would hardly have closed the career of the poor waif as Hugo has done. On the other hand the vicissitudes of Cosette, in spite of her ignoble origin, arouse a multitude of varied emotions in the reader and exhibit the remarkable gifts of the great Frenchman in a striking light. Indeed, Hugo, is at his best when portraying children. Rose and Blanche, in the "Wandering Jew," are two girls that hold the attention of the reader through a long and somewhat rambling story. The myriad minded Balzac is also at home in this field. Little Pierre in George Sand's Mare au Diable is a delightful study and serves to show both the skill of the distinguished author and her insight into the juvenile mind. German literature, too, possesses an extensive gallery of children's portraits; which is but natural for the land that has produced the charming Tales collected by the Brothers Grimm and others. The novelists had lovingly studied children long before the psychologists thought of doing so, and many of them were quite as successful, if they did not follow strictly scientific methods. Verily, ours is the age of children.

Just as we can gauge the culture of an individual by the kind of fiction he reads when left to his own choice, so we can, at least in a great measure estimate the moral qualities of a nation by the imaginative literature on which it feeds. It is perhaps unduly venturesome to pronounce judgment

upon a people's literature except after a very wide reading; yet I am compelled to believe that there is a sad lack of that imaginative element in French literature, including its poetry, as well as in that of the Latin nations generally, which discerns intuitively the moral order of the world and seeks to represent it concretely both in the life of individuals and in the social group. No German or English poet would treat the memory of a national character of such prominence and sanctity as Joan of Arc, as Voltaire, the greatest name in French literature has treated hers. Matthew Arnold rightly says: "When we look at the popular literature of the French at this moment and at the life of which this literature of theirs is the index, one is tempted to make a goddess out of a word of their own, and then, like the town-clerk of Ephesus, to ask, 'What man is there that knoweth not that the city of the French is a worshipper of the great goddess Lubricity?'" French literature is primarily scientific in spirit; then ascetic in form, and only lastly ethical in purpose. In English fiction these three attributes are reversed.

Of Germany's great literary trinity, at least two members, Lessing and Schiller, persistently keep the moral element in the foreground, while Goethe divides his attention about equally between the three factors. Is it too much to say that the remarkable growth and expansion of the Germanic peoples, especially those whose native speech is English, as compared with the static condition of the Latin races, is largely due to their view of life as reflected in their imaginative literature? The person who fears not God nor regards man is a favorite character in French fiction. Not so in English. The English have the reputation of being eminently practical; but in their fiction they are pronounced idealists. The ever recurrent theme, the

one on which constant changes are rung, is the need of moral and social regeneration. In the realm of the imagination no leading part must be assigned to the man or woman that is out of harmony with the moral order, by a writer who seeks popularity. What is morally hideous must be kept in the background. In French fiction the conditions are in a great measure reversed. The villain is a favorite character. Ignoble characters and the social conditions amid which he moves and thrives are a favorite theme. Noble characters are not lacking, but they are too often weak; they arouse our sympathy more than they excite our admiration. They seem to be created merely to provide victims for the strong and wicked.

America has not been behind the other civilized nations in assigning an important place to children in its literature of fiction. Many of the novels of the last half century are veritable revelations in this regard. It would be an interesting study for one who had the time and the capacity for such work, to extract from representative recent novels the varied conceptions of childhood as set forth by their authors. What has already been done has shown that Wordsworth was right when he called the child father to the man, and that the field for the study of child-types is almost as illimitable as that offered for the study of adults. It would not be the less interesting to estimate, so far as that is possible, the debt the children of the present generation owe to these delightful and instructive studies. There is no doubt that the important place assigned to children in modern fiction has produced the most far-reaching results, at the same time that it is of permanent psychological importance. As has already been shown, antiquity took little interest in children. The Middle Ages followed its example. Of all the Greek poets Euripides

had the widest sympathies and the largest intellectual outlook, if not the deepest penetration. He brings several children on the stage in his dramas. But what caricatures they are! He shows at once that he knew nothing about the mind of the child, for we may be sure that the children of his day were not so unlike those of our own that they talked and acted like adults. He makes it plain to his readers that he never thought it worth while,—perhaps he considered it beneath his dignity,—to try to comprehend a child's thoughts and feelings.

The wide currency of the fables attributed to Aesop has already been alluded to. In fact, the Fable, the Allegory and the Parable or Story have from time immemorial been favorite vehicles of instruction among peoples both civilized and uncivilized. The phenomenal popularity of Bunyan's works, especially his "Pilgrim's Progress," the greatest and best sustained allegory ever written, is well known. While it is not historically true, and the author's *dramatis personae* never existed under the names he gives to them, they are real men and real women nevertheless; the situations in which he places them are so true to life that every Christian recognizes at a glance the experience they are designed to portray. Christ frequently conveys His lessons in the form of a parable, and those of Jotham and Nathan in the Old Testament are among the best of their kind. The fables current under the name of Pilpay belong to the oldest in existence. Their origin reaches back to the remotest antiquity. "In India from the earliest time the parable or example has been the recognized method of conveying moral instruction. In the didactic literature, some general truth or some rule of life is stated in the form of a maxim and a fable or other story is added as a concrete instance. The folk-lore of which these are

a reflex is not the exclusive property of the great religions of India, but is common to Buddhism, Jainism and Brahmanism alike." A selection from these fables is contained in one of the earliest books printed; and their popularity is attested by the fact that four editions were issued from the press in Ulm between 1483 and 1485. In about a century the number of editions had increased to seventeen. Professor Lanman says: "The great number of editions of the work and their rapid succession are the best proof of its importance as a means of instruction and amusement at the beginning of the age of printing. The examples themselves had doubtless pointed the moral of many an ancient homily before the days of Gutenberg."

Notwithstanding Christ's rebuke to those who thought he ought to ignore children, it was not till after the lapse of nearly eighteen centuries that the world began to take his exhortation to heart. Both Christians and non-Christians now sought to turn toward the most important members of the family. Through literature, in fiction and in life, practical philanthropists began to labor with increasing earnestness for the amelioration of their condition and to make some amends for the long neglect. At last their claims upon the adult world received recognition here and there. It hardly admits of a doubt that the relatively rapid progress of pedagogic science within the last half century is more due to fiction than to any other single agency. Its unlimited resources enable the novelist to study and exhibit society from every possible point of view. While then fiction has from time immemorial been the greatest teacher of the world it has recently become not only a preacher but a practical reformer.

If we were to eliminate from the literature of the world the element that is usually regarded as fictitious, all the

delightful aroma that pleases and attracts would go with it. Such a process would deprive us of Homer and Virgil and the great tragedies of ancient Greece. It would take from us the Nibelungen sagas, the Divina Commedia, Don Quixote and Faust. It would expunge the greater part of our poetry and the most attractive of our prose. If it did not sweep away wholly the fruitage it would leave us little of the bloom of what men have thought and felt and striven for. It would make the vast field of human experience one dead level of uniformity instead of the varied and instructive panorama of mountain and hill and valley, of sea and lake and river that is spread before us whenever we become absorbed in some great literary masterpiece. The serious question is not, Can our boys and girls, and our adults, too, for that matter, afford to read fiction? it is rather, What fiction shall they read?

Whatever may be thought of the dictum that the true artist must neither preach nor teach, it has never been generally recognized by the English-speaking people. Their great writers have made it a paramount object to harmonize the conduct of men with the moral order of the world, and to lead them to a recognition of this all-pervading law. That the poet should be a teacher rather than a creator was a belief that inspired Milton, Wordsworth, Shelley, Tennyson, Browning and an innumerable host on both sides of the Atlantic. The same creed is constantly cropping out in those writers of fiction that best hold their ground in popular esteem. On the other hand poets who, like Keats and Swinburne put the sensuous factor in the foreground are either without a well-defined position in English letters or are not generally read. While, then, it is true that the English school system has always left much to be desired, it has been the conviction of the

leaders of British thought that the teaching agencies should take a wider scope. The school has been regarded as but one of the many forces by which the body politic is to be enlightened and stimulated. The result has justified this half unconscious faith. Where the school has been looked upon as the sole, or at least the principal agency for moral instruction the result is almost sure to be disappointing, as has been demonstrated by the recent experience of France.

As the Roman poet would not voluntarily take refuge under the same tree during a shower nor embark in the same boat with one who neglected the gods, we should with equal prudence stand aloof from those who are unwilling to enter with us the delightful region of the imagination to seek there surcease from the sorrows and disappointments of practical experience and to gain new strength and new inspiration to sustain us in our labors for the Good, the Beautiful, the Just and the True. Wisely does Thackeray say, "Novels are sweets. All people with healthy literary appetites love them."

I can here quote with entire approval some words from Ruskin's Introduction to an edition of Grimm's German Popular Stories. "Every fairy tale worth recording at all is the remnant of a tradition possessing a true historical value,—historical, at least in so far as it has naturally arisen out of the mind of a people under special circumstances, and risen not without meaning, nor removed altogether from their sphere of religious faith. It sustains afterward natural changes from the sincere action of the fear or fancy of successive generations; it takes new color from their manner of life and new forms from their changing moral temper. As long as these changes are natural and effortless, accidental and inevitable, the story remains

essentially true, altering its form, indeed, like a flying cloud, but remaining a sign of the sky; a shadowy image, as truly a part of the great firmament of the human mind as the light of reason which it seems to interrupt. But as the fair deceit and innocent error of it can not be interpreted nor restrained by a willful purpose and all additions to it by art do but defile, as the shepherd disturbs the flakes of morning mist with smoke from his fire of dead leaves." The editor himself says: "Among the most pleasing of the German tales are those in which animals support the leading characters. They are perhaps more venerable in their origin than the heroic and fairy tales. They are not only amusing by their playful and dramatic character, but instructive by the purity of their morality. Justice always prevails, active talent is everywhere successful, the amiable and generous qualities are brought forward to excite the sympathy of the reader, and in the end are constantly rewarded by triumph over lawless power."

HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT.

The belief in heredity, in the transmission of certain mental qualities from father to son, is as old as the recorded history of the human race. Without entering into a discussion of the origin of tribal society, we find already among the Israelites a strongly marked feeling of exclusiveness growing out of their belief in a descent from a common ancestor, in virtue of which they belonged to a higher order of men than the Semitic tribes by whom they were surrounded. Though Christianity in its inception was intended by its founders to break down the middle wall of partition between Jew and Gentile, the early Christians attached great importance to the evidence that its author was a legitimate descendant through both parents from the father of God's chosen people. After the adoption of sacerdotal celibacy the transmission of merit from father to legitimate son became impossible. On the other hand it may be argued that the doctrine of apostolic succession was but the reappearance of the same belief in another form.

It is well known that the ancient Greeks laid so much stress upon a legitimate parentage that their idea of the state both in theory and practice was entirely founded upon it. Only under exceptional circumstances were persons of alien birth admitted to civil rights. The Spartans traced

the genealogy of their kings to Herakles; and Leonidas felt the force of the heroic blood in his veins when he resisted the onset of the Persians at Thermopylae, though his divine ancestor was removed from him by twenty generations. Aristotle argues at length to prove that some men deserve to be free and others to be slaves by their very nature; that particular peoples are born to be subjects to others; and that it is nearly or quite impossible to change this natural relation by artificial means. And it is not yet proved that his doctrines were fundamentally erroneous. He maintains further that the best, the most worthy, ought always to bear rule in the commonwealth. The most worthy were, however, not so because of their character, as we understand this term; their pre-eminence rested almost entirely on the accident of birth into the ruling class.

We find the same notion an article of the popular creed in ancient Rome. It was professed by the patricians and generally admitted by the plebeians. The members of the Julian family were invested with an odor of quasi-sanctity because of their descent from Aeneas, the reputed progenitor of the Roman people. More was expected of a Scipio or a Fabius than of a *novus homo,* because it was assumed as a matter beyond question that with the name he had also a large measure of the virtues that were traditionally associated with it. On the other hand some families, like the Claudian, were notorious for the traits that made them either feared or despised by a large portion of their countrymen. With what scrupulous care do the reigning families of Europe guard against contamination by intermarriage with persons of common blood! Just as the history of ancient Rome is little more than an amplified biography of a score or two of its leading families, so the history of modern Europe may be pretty fully traced in the

record of its leading dynasties. So completely has the great mass of mankind been held spellbound by what many men regard as a mere delusion that we have no political history, until comparatively recent times, that is not completely dominated by it.

No man that has ever lived was less influenced by purely sentimental considerations than the first Napoleon. He looked forward only, not back. He aimed at tangible results of a strictly practical kind, viewed from his personal standpoint. Yet the time came, and it was when he was at the acme of power, when he found it advisable to strengthen his position among the monarchs of Europe by intermarriage with one of its oldest dynasties. One might suppose that a man who had achieved what he had, by the force of genius alone, would take a keen pleasure in casting ridicule on the pretended claims of superiority made by the contemporary sovereigns from whom he had compelled obeisance, by showing the world that he had no need of the adventitious support of a hereditary royalty. But he had a mightier force than genius to reckon with, and he was compelled to bow to it. The time came when he saw himself forced to secure for himself and especially for his successors the prestige that noble birth alone could give. He seems to have believed that a sentiment would hold for all time to come what force had gained in less than a generation. But in the end he was sadly mistaken.

It is hard in our day to conceive of anything more ridiculous than the tenacity with which many an insignificant nobleman, whose only tangible possessions are his debts, to use an oxymoron, clings to his pedigree, unless it be the recognition of his silly pretensions by persons who display good judgment in most other matters.

It is a tendency of the human mind to expect something

more than ordinary from the descendants of an extraordinary man. There are few persons who will not go at least a little out of the way to get a glimpse of a man who bears a name he has inherited from a distinguished ancestor. Though the teachings of Christianity have from the beginning been diametrically against anything that savors of caste, the Defender of the Faith or his most Christian majesty would have scouted the suggestion to put himself on an equality with any of his subjects, even though they might have had an undisputed claim to an unquestionable apostolic succession. So widely do men's professions often diverge from their practice.

Strange as it may seem, the doctrine of the essential equality of all men on a practical basis did not find its most vigorous and most eloquent defenders among the clergy, but among a class of thinkers who acknowledged scant allegiance to the Christian church. This doctrine took its rise in France in the middle of the last century, and found its first application in the sphere of the state in the American Declaration of Independence; yet with the usual inconsistency the signers of that document gave the lie to their professions by holding in slavery some of their fellow beings on the ground that they were the inferiors of their masters. Plainly enough "all men" to them did not mean every man. We are here reminded of the lamentations of the Roman aristocracy over the loss of their liberties, a loss which in the mouths of most of them meant no more than the curtailment of the privilege of plundering those who had no redress. The ancients, who never questioned the justice of slavery as a status, did not deny that it admitted of exceptions. They freely recognized that an inherited social condition does not predicate a servile intellect. Accordingly the manumission of slaves be-

cause of talent or of services rendered was of frequent occurrence. The notions of political equality prevalent in all civilized countries a little more than a hundred years ago had not yet advanced beyond those maintained by Aristotle. "Man" was not necessarily conterminous with "human beings," nor did mere manhood postulate a claim to the rights of citizenship.

History thus clearly testifies to the almost universal belief in heredity; and the belief is still widely held in one form or another. For thousands of years it has been regarded as an almost axiomatic truth that one man is by nature better, of higher worth, than another, and that this superiority is inherited not only by individuals but by classes or castes, by those forming the social environment wherein the individual moved and had his being. Modern historians admit the truth of this belief, so often and so persistently maintained by the ancients, by attributing the decay of most pre-Christian states to the introduction of alien elements in the population, that had not inherited the conservative traditions of government which were the birthright of the ruling families. Yet nothing is plainer to the student of political history than that some of the worst governments the world has ever seen were those of families that had for several generations held the reins of power. On the whole it may be accepted as an established truth that every aristocracy inherits an increasing number of social and political traditions of a conservative type, the mass of which in the end becomes so great as to bar effectually every initiative toward progress. This not being the case in a democracy, talent more readily makes its way to the front and to a leading position in the direction of affairs. From the nature of the case this form of government is everywhere more or less gradually superseding every other.

Though the belief in heredity had been almost undisputed from time immemorial, we have seen when and how it began to be called in question in the sphere of the state. In quite recent times attempts have been made to ascertain to about what extent this belief rests upon a scientific basis so far as it concerns individuals. Galton's "Hereditary Genius" is generally regarded as the first systematic attempt to show that this widely accepted dogma rests on a basis of fact. But, with all due deference to its distinguished author, it may be questioned whether he is strictly scientific, for he says, "I propose to show in this work that a man's natural abilities are derived by inheritance, under exactly the same limitations as are the forms and physical features of the whole organized world." As to the method, it may be said that science, strictly so called, does not seek to establish preconceived theories; it seeks only the truth. Moreover, if this dictum be true we may well ask, Where do the progressive forces of society come in? If we merely transmit to posterity what we have ourselves inherited, civilization must always remain at the same level. This is an application of the law of the conservation of energy where it manifestly does not belong. Fouillee seems to be nearer the truth in holding that heredity is merely a conservator, and that evolution must supply the motive power that is to carry each generation beyond its predecessor. Galton limits his remarks to a single category of prominent men, to-wit, the English judges between the years 1660 and 1885. In a subsequent part of the same volume he makes analogous investigations in the parentage of noted men in all departments, and arrivs at similar results. On the first point it is a question whether the favoritism so often shown in English politics, as in that of all other nations, particularly in the earlier period under con-

sideration, is not calculated to throw a good deal of doubt on the ability of many of those who obtained preferment by royal favor. Further, it cannot be denied that the epithets, illustrious, eminent and remarkable, are very vague; yet for more than half the men on his list the author has been unable to find any ancestors to whom any of these designations would apply. Besides, it is very natural, and has of late become much the fashion, to attach undue importance to what we may call the reflex influence of a great man. We are loth to believe that a high order of intellectual ability can appear unheralded.

This removal of the cause a generation or two upward does not really help in the least to an explanation, but it seems to have satisfied many a seeker for a cause. The recent "Life of Goethe" by Heinemann is a striking case in point. He undertakes to show how such a man as his hero came into the world just when he did; how he combines in character and disposition traits inherited from his father and his mother; how much these in their turn had inherited from their parents; how Goethe was a sort of condensed encyclopaedia of his blood relations that preceded him for several generations. He attempts further to set forth to what extent North and South Germany were united in this remarkable man; why such a personality had to be born and brought up in a city having a particular political constitution and in what class of its citizens he must necessarily be born. This "Life" is a striking example of the psychological method applied to biography. That it breaks down utterly when employed in the case of scores of men is evident on a moment's reflection. The thoughtful reader can hardly help asking himself why there has been but one Goethe when the conditions amid which he was born and brought up were by no means

unique. It is no disparagement of scientific methods to say that there are domains to which they can be applied in but a limited degree.

Another striking case is that of the first Napoleon. Here it is next to impossible to find any antecedent cause for his exceptional genius. All his blood relations, both ascending and descending were thoroughly commonplace people. A recent review of his life by Professor Sloane says: "Capricious, unscrupulous, destitute of feeling he was; but what could one expect of one almost destitute of religious training, thrown upon his resources at an early age by the death of a thriftless father, buffeted by fate, knowing almost every vicissitude of adverse fortune, and cast into the seething chaos of ideas and events of the Revolution? His genius was titanic, but there was nothing mysterious about his character. It was the natural product of his training."

In Galton's later work, "English Men of Science," he continued his researches by addressing to 180 contemporary members of the Royal Society a large number of questions bearing on their nurture and training. This method gave inadequate results, for the reason that many of those to whom the inquiries were sent returned no answer at all; others answered them only in part or without sufficient clearness. Besides, the author himself admits that the list should have been extended to three hundred to have made it fairly complete.

It is evident from the answers reported, as well as from much that has been written on this subject, that the term "heredity" is used in different senses. It surely does not follow that because a man has a liking for mechanics he inherits his taste and skill from a father or grandfather who was equally clever. A man may completely underes-

timate the influence of the *milieu* in which he was brought up. Physicians' sons are often physicians, yet heredity has probably in most cases nothing to do with the choice. We may inherit our occupation just as we inherit our religion, but the law of heredity has, strictly speaking, little to do with either. Gray's "mute, inglorious Milton" is not a figment of the poet's imagination. Many a man has come into the world whose "lot forbade" his attaining the renown he might and would have attained in a different environment. There is ample evidence to prove that the English who emigrated to America were not inferior in mental capacity to those who remained behind. But the conditions that surrounded them in their new home compelled them to turn their attention toward material and away from intellectual pursuits. It is highly probable that the Audubons, the Bartrams, the Rafinesques, to name only a few, would have attained greater distinction had they been born under more favorable circumstances. Other men of talent still more unfavorably placed were never heard of, while the Wests and Copleys found a more congenial sphere abroad. It required more than two hundred years before the hardships incident to the opening up of a new country were sufficiently overcome to permit any portion of the people to give some attention to purely intellectual pursuits. During all this time the indispensable mental pabulum was drawn from the mother country, where the supply was abundant and easily brought into use by identity of language. That Americans were not inferior in talent to Englishmen is plainly evident from the fact that in those departments of political activity to which they turned their attention the new product was fully equal to the old. The United States produced an array of talent in oratory, in statecraft, and in war that ranked high, the British people themselves being judges.

The importance of environment is also attested by the direction which the intellectual development of the South took as compared with the North. In the creation of what properly constitutes an American literature the former had virtually no part, but her statesmen were for a long time more than a match for those of the latter section. It may be questioned whether the traditions inherited from the mother country were as favorable for the creation of a literature in the northern parts of the Union as in the southern; the environment, however, turned the intellectual energies of the people wholly in another direction and completely absorbed their talents. With the suppression of the Rebellion, material interests again came to the fore. Few people were content to use, in the enjoyment of intellectual pursuits, the means they had already acquired. A veritable craze began to show itself among rich men to become richer, and among the well-to-do to become rich. While education has been vastly the gainer by this state of things, we may well ask, Where are the successors of Irving and Cooper and Bryant and Lowell and Whittier and Holmes? Yet our literary poverty is hardly greater than that of England or indeed of most of the European countries. Material interests predominate everywhere. Authors are more concerned to write what will sell well than what the world will "not willingly let die."

De Candolle, in his "Histoire des Sciences et des Savants depuis deux Siecles," recognizes the fact that researches in heredity have not been conducted according to rigidly scientific methods, and that its influence has not been clearly established. He holds that it would be better to select without any preconceived notions, and without regard to merit or capacity, as large a number of persons as possible whose distinctive characteristics were known,

as well as those of their parents and, if possible, of their grandparents, in order to ascertain how far these characteristics have been transmitted or not transmitted from one generation to another. Here again the difficulty of obtaining strictly accurate data is very great, and one is especially liable to underestimate the influence of environment. The author's conclusions, briefly summarizeed, are that the inheritance of mental and physical chracteristics is a law that suffers few exceptions; that the interruption of heredity during one or several generations is rare, perhaps five or ten times in a hundred; that inheritance through the female line is less distinctive than through the male, especially in the domain of the intellect; that it is difficult to ascertain whether characteristics acquired by education and social influences are transmitted; and that the most marked characterostics of an individual are those that he receives from his two parents and other relatives.

He next studies the Associate, Foreign and Corresponding members of the Royal Society of London, the Academy of Sciences of Berlin, and the Academy of Sciences of Paris. His list again testifies to the fallibility of human judgment, the strength of human prejudice, and the limitations of human knowledge. But twenty-two per cent. of the names are found in two of the lists, and but five in three. Both Franklin and Lavoisier occur in but one. Evidently the personal equation, or the political *milieu,* had had not a little to do with election to membership in these societies. De Candolle attached less importance to heredity than Galton. While admitting that the number of persons connected with families producing men of merit is much greater than one would obtain from the mere calculus of probabilities, he does not think this to be neces-

sarily due to inheritance in the strict sense of the term. He says: "From these facts and from biographical data known to me * * * I have not concluded that everything is due to heredity. It appears to have had little influence except in the case of mathematical science. It would rather appear that the preponderating influence was produced by education, example, advice," etc. In other words, "celebrity is less hereditary than a specialty." Another question De Candolle sought to answer was, "From what classes of society have the associate members of the French Academy of Sciences sprung? He finds that forty-one per cent. have had a rich or noble parentage; fifty-two per cent. came from the middle classes; while but seven per cent. were born in the class of laborers, tillers of the soil, etc. For French savants as a body he finds the three classes to be represented by thirty-five, forty-two, and thirty-three per cent. respectively. His data, however, are too meager to make them of much value, embracing as they do only one hundred foreigners and sixty Frenchmen. There is the additional difficulty of comparing the social classes of different countries. The figures are valuable for the general tendency they indicate, but they can not be used as a basis for wide generalization.

De Candolle attaches a good deal of importance to the religious environment, perhaps the most artificial of all. He observes that of the foreign associate members of the French Academy, but one in a population of six millions has been brought up in the Roman Catholic faith, while in Protestant countries it required less than a million inhabitants to produce a member. An examination of the foreign members of the Royal Society of London discloses facts of the same nature. Nearly all belong to the Protestant portions of countries having a mixed population, or to dis-

tinctively Protestant countries. Thus, Switzerland, which is only about three-fourths Protestant, furnished fourteen members, without a Catholic among them. The Catholic population of Great Britain and Ireland has no representative; nor has Austria; while the Catholic portions of Germany are represented by very few.

In 1881 Dr. Paul Jacoby published a work in which he treated of the genesis of great men chiefly from the pathological point of view. His object, like that of Dr. Max Nordau more recently, was to establish the degeneracy of every aristocracy, including that of men of talent. His conclusions are in the main in accord with a statement sometimes met with, that the greatest men never have equally great sons. As a basis for his calculations he takes the "Biographie Universelle," and selects therefrom the names of all the prominent men born between January 1, 1700, and December 31, 1799, and dead before 1845. His list embraces 3,311 names. It is not easy to see how a better list for the author's purposes could be made. But it must be evident on a moment's reflection that its defects are grave. What weight can be attached to the mere appearance of a man's name in a biographical dictionary? It always means that its bearer was for a time in the public eye, but frequently nothing more. One can easily convince himself of this truth by a glance into any similar work.

Another work that contains much interesting information in a brief compass, bearing upon heredity in its relation to pauperism and crime, is R. L. Dugdale's "The Jukes." It is here shown that inheritance and environment have an important reciprocal influence upon each other, and that the latter in many instances entirely neutralizes the former, while the converse does not often take

place. The following are a few of the author's tentative inductions. Pauperism is an indication of weakness, and is divisible into hereditary and induced. Hereditary pauperism rests chiefly on disease, and tends to extinction. Pauperism in adult age indicates a hereditary tendency which may or may not be modified by the environment. Hereditary pauperism is more frequent in men than in women. Harlotry may become a hereditary characteristic, but is in most cases accompanied by an environment that runs parallel with it. Where chastity is inherited it is accompanied by an environment favorable to it. Where the heredity and the environment are in the direction of harlotry, if the environment be changed at a sufficiently early date, sexual habits may be amended.

Further testimony to the important bearing environment has in neutralizing the influence of heredity is furnished by the experience of our government in its effects to civilize the Indian. It will not be denied that up to a certain point these efforts have been remarkably successful. The experiment has not, however, been in progress a sufficient length of time or on a sufficiently large scale to make a prediction as to its final outcome entirely safe. But present indications seem to warrant the conclusion that at no very distant day the Red Man may attain to a civilization not much, if at all, inferior to that of the whites.

Among recent writings on heredity those of Professor Cesare Lombroso, of Turin, have perhaps attracted the most attention. This has been owing more to the agreeable style of the author and the oracular tone in which he writes than to the intrinsic merit of what he says, though it will not be denied that he has published a good deal that is valuable. In his "Men of Genius" he undertakes to prove that genius is a form of neurosis, and is closely re-

lated to mania, if it is not mania itself. While this theory is not new, it has never been treated so systematically and supported by so considerable an array of data. But here we are met at the outset with a serious difficulty. If one is permitted to choose his own subjects it is easy to make out a case. But who will tell us exactly what genius is? And who among the large number of great men that have passed across the world's stage are to be ranked as geniuses, and who are merely men of talent? No doubt the genius differs from the normal man in several ways; yet no one would contend that mere abnormality constitutes genius. Many great men have exhibited signs of insanity; but suppose that we could get together one hundred or one thousand of the world's most prominent characters and an equal number of ordinary men in any community. Does anybody believe that one set would exhibit a larger number of peculiar traits than the other? The evidence is all against an affirmative answer. It may be regarded as an established fact that there is no connection between intellect and character. Men of the most gigantic intellect have often shown the most painful weakness in the latter respect. But this is something quite different from mania. It needs but a moment's reflection to convince anyone that many persons who have an undisputed claim to the possession of genius have shown a "level-headedness" that would do honor to the veriest plodder. No one denies that genius is *sui generis*. Thou hearest the sound thereof, but thou canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. Yet it is wholly out of place to call it abnormal, even in a majority of cases. A tree is not abnormal because it is higher than other trees far and near. Genius frequently embodies the normal in a high degree. The consciousness of power makes its possessor in most cases disregard or defy public

opinion and aim at results by the shortest method. With it there is often connected an unusual sensitiveness and intensity of feeling. Yet we find those qualities in thousands of the most ordinary persons; but because they are unaccompanied by a high order of intellect they are not generally noticed. There may be and often is a lack of balance or proportion between the psychical powers of the least as well as the greatest minds. This may result in mania, though it is not more likely to do so in one class of cases than in the other. The reputed thin wall of partition between genius and insanity is found to be less thin than has generally been supposed. Every unduly sensitive mental organization is ill-fitted to contend against the obstacles that most men have to encounter in this world; but our insane asylums furnish abundant testimony to the fact that those who go down under the strain of life do not belong in a large measure to the highest order of intellects. It is a serious error to suppose, as has generally been done, that a fair measure of common sense is incompatible with a large measure of ability.

An assertion often met with is that men of genius are not as long-lived as the common order of men. An examination of the biography of 854 Frenchmen of this class discloses the fact that only about four per cent. of them died before the age of forty, among which number a few perished on the scaffold. This rather effectually disposes of the contention of Lombroso that men of genius usually die before the age of forty. With regard to France there is some variation in age between the different epochs. From 1300 to 1800 the lowest mean lies between 1510 and 1600, when it was rather less than sixty years, and highest between 1650 and 1700, when it was nearly seventy-six. Comparing this average with that of the entire population

we find it largely in favor of the most prominent men of letters, as the average of human life in the seventeenth century—there are no earlier data—was about twenty-three years, while as late as 1776 it was but twenty-nine. In 1835 it had risen to thirty-five years, while at present it is above forty. Or if we take the expectation of life as given in most insurance tables, we find that for a person aged twenty-five it is about twenty-nine years. If we add the two together we get fifty-four. It is plain from these figures that the possession of great literary talents *in posse,* that is, by persons in childhood, or *in esse,* that is by the man of twenty-five years, is no premonition of an early death.

By far the most ambitious attempt that has yet been made to investigate the causes that have produced remarkable men is a work by Alfred Odin, recently a professor in the University of Sofia, entitled "La Genese des Grands Hommes." In the two octave volumes that embody his researches he not only endeavors to trace the influence of heredity, but he examines the whole environment amid which men grow up and the influences that bear upon their development, such as race, locality, religion, government, financial circumstances, education, etc. He has no preconceived hypothesis to prove, and his investigations are conducted according to the strictest scientific method. He confines his researches to comparatively modern times for the reason that dates previous to 1400 are often uncertain and data generally meager. Neither does he take into account persons born after 1830, because sufficient time has not elapsed to test the merit of their works. The judgment of contemporaries is frequently not that of posterity. As it was important to make the basis of his studies a literature that has had as nearly as possible a uniform develop-

ment between the dates named, Professor Odin finds none so well suited to his purpose as the French. After a careful study of its biography and bibliography he selects from the complete list before him 1,136 persons, whom he feels justified in designating as *gens de lettres de talent.* The elite of French literature, however, contains but 144 names, and those who belong to it he calls *gens de lettres de genie.* By *gens de lettres* are to be understood persons whose writings are of general interest, though he includes among these a few persons who have written little themselves, but who have, nevertheless, contributed greatly to the development of French letters. The list excludes great military captains, explorers, actors, investigators, princes, composers,—in short all who have not made permanent contributions to literature. By this method of inclusion and exclusion it becomes possible to grasp all the influences that bear on the genesis and nurture of French letters, so far as this is possible from the study of printed records. When we examine somewhat carefully the civilization of the five principal nations of modern Europe and make comparisons between them, we are soon struck with the unevenness of the growth of their literature. French, as before stated, is to a considerable extent an exception. At the close of the Middle Ages the social conditions in southern and western Europe were not widely different. It is, therefore, not easy to see why there should be so marked an ebb and flood in the tide of literary productiveness within the next four or five hundred years. Evidently the doctrine of heredity, broadly stated, will not solve the mystery, for a period of decay would not follow a period of growth throughout an entire nation.

If we divide the literary history of Europe, excepting France, beginning with 1400, into periods of fifty years,

we find the primacy for the first to be with Italy; neither Spain, Germany, nor England having produced a name of first-rate importance, except Chaucer, whom, strangely enough, Professor Odin has not in his list. During the next period Italy is still at the head, and furnishes more great names than the other three countries combined. In the third period Spain stands at the head. During the fourth, Spain and England keep abreast of each other, Italy having fallen behind, and Germany far behind. All through the seventeenth century England is in the lead, Italy in the first half furnishing but one name of prime importance, and Spain in the second half none at all. Even in France, where the production of literary men has been remarkably regular, there is some fluctuation. In the period extending from 1600 to 1650 the number of great writers was above the average, while in that between 1725 and 1750 it was considerably below. From 1700 to 1750 England and Germany furnish about an equal number of names, Spain being lowest in the list. Between 1750 and 1800 Germany stands first, England second, and Italy last. There seems little doubt that of the world's great literati born in the first half of the nineteenth century a much larger number used the English language than any other language.

A study of the genealogy of the literary men and women of an entire nation is beset with great difficulties. The first is that, for the earlier periods especially, biographies are seldom sufficiently full. Sometimes a remarkable man has had among his direct ancestors one or more persons of merit of whom little or nothing is known. Then, again the reflex influence of a distinguished man upon his ancestors obscures the vision of posterity and makes the real facts hard to ascertain.

It is unquestionable that mental traits, like physical characteristics, are inherited. We often read the remark that the different members of the Bourbon family not only bore a more or less striking resemblance to each other, but neither learned anything nor forgot anything. This, however, is quite different from predicating the inheritance of intellectual pre-eminence in general. It needs to be kept constantly in mind that all men fall heir to a good deal besides those qualities that are personal to their progenitors. This is what we have designated by the comprehensive term, environment, or *milieu*. A study of French statistics, so far as they bear on this point, strikingly shows this fact. Of the cases investigated by Professor Odin, twenty-four per cent. of France's distinguished men and forty per cent. of its celebrated women were descended from the nobility; thirty and twenty-four per cent. respectively of both sexes were born of the office-holding class; twenty-three and sixteen per cent. sprang from parents who were engaged in the liberal professions; while for the *burgeoisie* the figures are twelve and ten per cent., and for laborers ten and eight per cent. respectively.

A striking fact made prominent by these figures is the subordinate part played by systematic education. Until the present generation, the education of young women in France would now be considered very defective. At any rate, the advantages afforded them in this respect were much inferior to those provided for boys. Nevertheless, a comparatively large number of women have made a permanent impression upon literature. This is true not only of France, but of some other European countries. Not merely genius, but even a high order of talent educates itself. Just as all animals find in their habitat the things needed for their nourishment, selecting the nutritious and

rejecting the baneful, so a great mind instinctively finds its mental pabulum in whatever circumstances it may be placed. The cases of Shakespeare and Burns will have at once occurred to the reader; but there are many others. It is very doubtful whether a system of education that affords equal opportunities for both sexes will materially increase the proportion of the lower classes as contributors to a national literature. Such a system undoubtedly makes broader and solider the foundation of national prosperity, but it can do nothing for genuine talent.

The importance of environment is further confirmed by the birthplace of noted French *litterateurs.* Out of 5,233 such men, 1,229 were born in Paris, 2,664 in other large cities, 1,265 in other localities, and 93 in country-seats. Of women the proportion falling to cities is much larger, rising as high as eighty-four per cent. of the entire number; while about one-half were natives of the capital. The testimony of these figures bearing upon the predominating influence of what are called the "centers of civilization" is further corroborated by similar data taken from other countries. Of fifty-five eminent Italian *literati,* twenty-three were born in large cities, and most of the remainder in small municipalities; though, strange to say, not one had Rome as his birthplace. Of the fifty Spaniards who are generally regarded as holding the highest rank in the literature of Spain, sixteen were born in Madrid, and a large proportion of the remainder in cities of the first rank, several of which contain universities. The coryphaei of German literature seem at first sight to make an exception to the conclusions that naturally spring from the above-stated facts. The great writers are quite evenly distributed over what now constitutes the Empire and Switzerland. Three large cities are the birthplace of three great writers.

each; two, of two each; while the rest have produced but one each. This calculation embraces about thirty who stand confessedly at the head; yet if we increase the number the results are not widely different. Here again the importance of the environment is strikingly made prominent. During the last five centuries Germany has had a large number of capitals, many of which the reigning monarch tried with more or less success to make centers of art and literature.

It is also shown by statistics that the occupation of the parents, especially of the father, has exercised an important influence on the career of the sons. The nobility, the office-holding class, and the liberal professions in no country of Europe form so much as a tenth part of the population. Yet from this small minority seventy-eight per cent. of the primates of Italian and German literature, eighty per cent. of Spanish, and sixty-nine per cent. of English were descended.

If we examine the nativity of French writers according to their geographical distribution, including as before the adjoining territory in which French is the native speech, we find that northern and eastern parts have been most prolific. Taking France by provinces, Ile-de-France leads the list, with 1,572 names out of a total of 5,617. Next in order comes Normandy, with 413 names. The adjacent districts of Picardy and Artois furnish 373. Provence gives us a register of 295 names; Lorraine, 240; Touraine, Anjou, and Maine, 207. All others fall below two hundred. Except in a general way it can not be known what relation these figures bear to the total population, as no census of France was taken until comparatively recent times. If we make an estimate on the present basis of inhabitants the relations of the districts will be somewhat

changed. Ile-de-France will stand at the head; but the second place will be taken by French Switzerland, the third by Provence, and the fourth by Orleannais. Another interesting fact made plain by Professor Odin's figures is that, if French territory as a whole had shown the same fecundity as Paris, there would have been nearly 54,000 great writers instead of less than 6,000; or if the same region had been as fertile as the other large cities there would have been 22,000. Or, again, if French productivity had been regulated by the smaller places, there would have been but 1,522; that is, a trifle more than one-fourth of the actual number. That literature in France is not only essentially an artificial product is thus made perfectly plain, but the same general fact is true, in perhaps even a larger degree, of Spain and Italy.

Yet this is not all. Not every great city has given birth to an equal number of writers of merit in proportion to its population. Lyons, for example, is the birthplace of a comparatively small number of distinguished authors; Geneva, on the other hand, of an unusually large number. The same statement appears to be true of Liverpool as compared with several much smaller cities in England. This difference in productivity is in all probability due to the fact that the interests of commerce and trade have largely absorbed the energies of the citizens; an inference that is supported by a similar condition of affairs in other parts of the world. The religious environment has, therefore, not always a preponderating influence. On the other hand, when all other conditions are virtually alike, and the creeds professed by the people unlike, we are safe in attributing difference in production largely to this cause. It is well known that among French writers in all departments, Geneva has produced a much larger proportion than

would be expected from the number of its inhabitants. For more than four centuries it has been a Protestant city, while the rest of French territory has for the most part been Roman Catholic. It is worthy of remark, too, that in Germany, including by this designation its territory linguistically and not politically, the Catholic portions of Bavaria and Austria have given birth to a relatively small number of persons who are entitled to the highest rank in letters. We have already seen that in the production of men of science the religion of a country seems to play an important part. We are justified in drawing the same inference in regard to literature. That French Catholicism has had a weaker conservative influence than any other in Europe will be plain to those who examine its character.

From the data already cited and from other data that might be given it is evident that European literature is in but a limited sense a national product. It is almost entirely an artificial creation, in which the bulk of the population has taken no part and had no interest. It was born and brought to maturity in the salons of the nobles and in the houses of the rich or well-to-do. It is essentially the outgrowth of civilization, and of a civilization that bears the impress of the ruling class. When now and then a person of exceptional psychical powers has been born in the lower stratum of society, it has early become the chief object of his ambition to identify himself socially with those who stand at the top. He did not therefore modify materially the environment in which his first years were passed.

May we not infer from these studies that social progress is to a large extent dependent upon human volition? While it can rarely be said of an individual that he has his destiny in his own hands, it may be said of the larger ag-

gregates of men, as they are bound together in states, that they themselves are chiefly responsible for their own welfare. For every country in which there is an enlightened public opinion we may safely predict continual social amelioration. This movement is in small danger of serious interruption except from extraterritorial interference. Even the literature of a country is largely called into existence by a public opinion which its promoters do the most to create and shape.

NOTE.—In this connection I take pleasure in calling attention to a little volume by Dr. A. E. Winship, entitled Jukes-Edward: A Study in Education and Heredity. The publishers are Robert L. Myers & Co.

NATIONAL EDUCATION.

Readers of the current literature dealing more or less with educational topics are familiar with the phrases "institutional education," "state education," "national education," "popular education," and others of like import. It seems to be generally assumed that these terms are self-explanatory and that they afford little scope for diversity of opinion. Is this assumption well founded? and is there not a wide diversity of views, not only between different countries but among equally competent persons in the same community? Education in some form represents a universal human interest; everybody who thinks at all has given it some attention. It is one of the most vitally important, if not the most important, interest with which all civilized peoples are concerned. This being admittedly the case, it ought not to be specially difficult for those who have studied the subject to come to some substantial agreement as to what it should include in its widest scope. Yet it can hardly be doubted that comparatively few persons have formulated in their own minds what a system of public education based on philosophical principles ought to embrace, and there is hardly more than a formal agreement, speaking by and large, as to what should be aimed at in a system fostered by government. It is safe to assert

that there would be no dissenting voice to the acceptance of the doctrine advocated by Godwin in his Political Justice that education should mean "the adoption of every principle of morality and truth into the practice of the community." It is only when the *how* of this adoption is discussed that we find the wide diversity of views now prevalent.

It is easy to frame an ideal system of training for the young and it has often been done. The difficulty lies in bringing about the acceptance of a workable system. Anent many things to be taught in school there is not and can not be much divergence of opinion. There are not several kinds of mathematics, or of physics, or of biology. If these subjects are taught at all and so far as they are taught they are substantially alike.

The controversy, or at least the discussion, is about those subjects that are in their nature intangible, but which are, nevertheless, tangible and practical in their results. All education is based on the assumption that many if not most of the ills that afflict the human race are preventable by human means.

Few persons will dispute the dictum of Matthew Arnold that conduct is three-fourths of life, and those to whom this claim seems too large will admit that conduct is at least an important part of life. Now if the primary object of all education is to influence conduct for the better; if it is to impress upon the young the importance of keeping in check their selfish desires and cultivating their altruistic impulses; if it is to lead them to see that only such knowledge is wisely used that is used for the good of others, how shall these ends be best attained? Is the current education of our day in the United States and abroad contributing materially to these ends? or at best, is it contribut-

ing as much as it should? No man who has eyes that see can fail to have observed that there is a great chasm between our education and the life into which the graduates from every kind of school are ushered. The great majority of our graduates from High School, College and University are idealists. Whether they have been particularly good students or not, the very fact that they have remained as long as they have in an atmosphere that at its worst does a great deal to encourage the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, while many of their companions are engaged in "making money," testifies to this fact. The education imparted in our schools is and can not but be largely derived from books, at least in so far as it is intended to influence conduct. It embodies the best thought of the wisest men that have lived in the past.

Our young people read the speeches of Chatham, of Burke, of Webster; they study the writings of Washington, of Lincoln, and of many others who have deserved well of their country, to say nothing of poetry. Their histories teach them that the French Revolution was a vindication of the rights of man, and that the course of past events furnishes indubitable evidence of the moral order of the world in the case of nations as well as of individuals. Avarice, greed of power, disregard of justice, inhumanity and other vices have always met their fitting reward.

But what is the mental state of nine-tenths of these young people after five years of contact with the great world, with the hurly-burly of practical life? Their ideals have been laid in the grave from which there is no resurrection. They read no solid books; they keep up no systematic study of any branch of knowledge; they have no interest in a scholarly atmosphere, even when such an atmosphere can be found: In short, five years after graduation finds

nine-tenths of our young people on a decidedly lower intellectual and moral plane than any day of their undergraduate course. They still have a sort of vague faith in the moral order of the world, but they fail to see, or at least to apprehend clearly, that in the small concerns of life, in the career of each individual these vices are just as hideous, just as subversive of social order, and if not restrained, just as sure to bring their punishment sooner or later, as in the case of those who manage the affairs of states. In the ethical domain there is not one law for the usurper, one for the elected representative of a free people and one for the private citizen.

We profess to believe firmly in what we call the higher education; that this profession is in the case of most persons genuine is proved by the princely sums that have been given for the endowment of private institutions and the liberal grants made by many of our State legislatures. Has this liberality had any appreciable effect in purifying our political atmosphere? Has it made our legislators of whatever name or grade more disinterestedly patriotic or less venal? Has it made any considerable portion of our citizens willing to serve the commonwealth or the community without a consideration in hand or in prospect? He who will answer these questions in the affirmative is either fatuously optimistic or strangely blind.

Let us hear what a writer in a recent number of the Westminster Review has to say on this matter. That he tells the truth no one who has the opportunity to study the conditions will deny. What the final outcome or even the effect in the not very distant future will be it is impossible to foretell. After speaking of the penchant for the false, the puerile and the decadent, he continues: "If the chimera of the golden-winged dragon is a dangerous

symbol in the Old World, the danger is no less great in the New, where certain wealthy people are possessed by the idea that the word imperial contains a magic power to accomplish the impossible, to compel Europe to a sense of reverence and awe, to change the institutions, ideas and aspirations of a natural and noble democracy into the sordid and fantastic ambitions of a few society leaders whose chief aim in life is how to surpass the *fetes* of sybaritic potentates, and equal the grim and empty pomps of their apparent triumphs." "There is in America an element of snobbery so keenly ambitious, so callously domineering, that nothing wholly escapes its withering influence. Under the guise of national interests it makes its presence felt at the Capitol and in Church councils, as well as in commercial centers whose leading minds are secretly actuated by a spirit of display, social rivalry and a desire to connect themselves with the European aristocracy." "While Europe is imitating and adopting many of the best customs and inventions of the Great Republic, a large class in America are imitating all that is decadent in the life of Europeans. New York is now so intimately connected with London that the social elements in these two cities have become practically one. But there is this difference; while the aristocracy in the old country is being gradually levelled down to a democratic standard, the wealthy classes in the new world are copying the very things which caused degeneracy in the European noble, for there is nothing so blind as snobbery. The all-important question among certain people is how to throw off the aegis of republicanism and democracy."

"Three things have caused this premature old age: rapid and continued increase of wealth, the American's love of travel, and a hasty, superficial culture. Long-continued

prosperity has created a love of luxury unparalleled in the history of the world; rapid and easy traveling, a taste for foreign things; cheap schools, colleges and literature a belief that the highest culture consists in hearing and seeing. Americans have lived so fast that only an insignificant few have had time to read and digest the work of the great thinkers and writers like Emerson, Lowell and Whitman." In confirmation of the last statement it may be added that the book trade shows a steady falling off during the last twenty years in the works of such authors as Emerson, Holmes, Lowell and Hawthorne. One of Emerson's books is sold to-day where ten were sold twenty years ago.

I have called attention to this unfortunate condition of affairs in the United States because, I hold that in spite of our increased facilities for education, we are on the whole more degenerate than other civilized nations. It may well be doubted. However, if, as Mazzini said, a nation has a right to exist only because it helps men to work together for the good of humanity, what is being done at present to fulfill these conditions or carry out this policy?

For centuries Germany has been regarded as the classic land of ideas and ideals. Its pre-eminence in this respect has been frequently affirmed by foreigners and is freely admitted by the Germans themselves. Nowhere else have teachers been so self-sacrificing or have pondered educational problems so deeply or have accomplished such remarkable results of a certain kind as the Germans during a century or more. Five years of the Bismarckian regime changed all this. One aspiration, one dream had become a reality. But at what a sacrifice! Nowhere do we find brute force, the law of the stronger extolled and excused as in Germany. Almost every historian and publicist of prominence has become a grovelling hero-worshiper. What-

ever the strong man does, whether right or wrong intrinsically, is approved, or at least palliated. Some of the leaders of public opinion tell us that public and private morality differ widely and are sometimes irreconcilable. Deceit, falsehood and double-dealing are to be unconditionally condemned between man and man, but not necessarily between the representatives of nations. The law of love should be the ruling motive between individuals, but the law of brute force must sometimes be resorted to by nations for their self-preservation. The assumption, I suppose, is that a nation which can not preserve itself by fair means or foul is not worthy to exist. This state of public opinion is all the more inconsistent because in Germany the rapacity, unscrupulousness and brutality of two or three French monarchs, but especially of the First Napoleon, have long been the theme of universal execration. In this reversal of public opinion, this apotheosis of the man who brings things to pass, we see almost an entire nation converted to the dangerous doctrine that the end justifies the means. If there is a country that has flung idealism to the winds it is the land of Lessing, Schiller and Goethe; of Froebel and Pestalozzi.

I am not putting Bismarck on the same moral plane with Napoleon, yet they are at least alike in this respect: they accomplished their ends, partly by duplicity, partly by the sword. The goal of the idealists was, indeed, reached by the unification of Germany; but are we compelled to admit that an ideal can only be realized when it prepares the way for the unscrupulous man of deeds?

The lengths to which hero-worship has gone in Germany is indicated by two other signs of the times. Under imperial pressure the educational system of Prussia has been greatly modified. Educational experts, whether wisely

or unwisely, were by a large majority opposed to the recent changes; nevertheless the Emperor had his way. Perhaps he discerned the spirit of the age more clearly than the experts. The case is here referred to neither for approval nor condemnation, but merely as striking evidence of the impuissance of the educationist in a country where the one-man power is so pronounced.

The second is what we may call the Nietzsche cult. Friedrich Nietzsche, who died in 1900, after several years spent in a madhouse, proclaimed with burning eloquence the unadulterated gospel of selfishness. In his writings he is never weary of pouring bitter scorn and sneering contempt on all the altruistic sentiments. With equal eloquence he advocates the cause of brute force, the total disregard of the claims of the weak and humble to the slightest consideration: In fact he does not admit that these have any claims whatever on the strong. This gospel of brutality is so utterly at variance with every principle of Christian and humane civilization that one can hardly suppress the emotion of amazement when he sees large numbers of presumably intelligent people taking it as a real contribution to modern thought. A pack of ravenous wolves would be a peace society compared to a body of men trying to put such a creed into practice. Moreover it is interesting to note that according to competent evidence the originator of this tiger-creed was one Caspar Schmidt, who wrote under the pseudonym of Max Stirner, and who died in 1856 without attracting much attention.* When Nietzsche appeared on the scene the times were ripe for the doctrine. The disciple pleaded the master's cause with so much fervor and laborated his system with such care that men

* Hermann Tuerck. *Der Geniale Mensch.* Berlin, 1901.

began to take the author and his creed seriously, either to be combated or commended.

To the educationist no less than to the student of the history of civilization no country presents so much that is of interest as England. Since about the middle of the sixteenth century its internal development and its outward expansion have been almost uninterrupted. The loss of the American colonies was no serious check. During these three and a half centuries it has been almost without a break the foremost power on the globe. This pre-eminence was won and has been maintained, partly by force, partly by that elastic science called diplomacy, but always by methods that were neither worse nor better than those universally in vogue. While England invariably looked out for herself, often selfishly, often unscrupulously, her conduct in this regard was no baser, generally not so base as that of her rivals. Her success as a colonizing power is abundant evidence that in the main she dealt fairly with her subjects abroad, no matter how gained.

England was the only country that came out of the crisis of the Reformation stronger than she entered it. Notwithstanding the diversities of religious belief within her borders all the creeds were overwhelmingly Protestant. Catholicism did not have a sufficient hold upon her people to weaken her politically as was the case with more than one country of Continental Europe. During this period she produced an almost uninterrupted succession of great names in literature. In philosophy, her achievements were eclipsed only in the latter portion of this period by Germany, but the impulse came from England, or, more strictly speaking, from Scotland. In subjugating the forces of nature and employing them in the service of man England has led the world except during the last few

decades. The same statement may be made in regard to her position in science, at least in its practical aspects. Her constitution has been a demonstration of the theories of the political philosophers of the Continent and was often held up by them as the model of what a government ought to be. Comparing the English with their nearest neighbors we may say that they "are far less fertile and ingenious in resources than Frenchmen, but far more likely to do the right thing. They are far less educated than the Germans, and yet they are more reasonable; far less logical, but saner; far less open to ideas, but infinitely more impervious to sophistry." These things being true, England might consistently be expected to have had a superior system of public education. So far from this being the case, she is still at the beginning of the twentieth century behind at least half a score of other countries of Europe. In England expert educational opinion counts for amazingly little. Here then we have the spectacle of a country that has had an almost uninterruptedly progressive development since the days of Magna Charta; that has passed through no crisis that has materially modified its form of government; that changed its religious faith without serious internecine strife; that has at times been ruled by as inefficient monarchs as ever sat upon a throne; yet with all these vicissitudes has suffered no detriment or check. Nevertheless, the general average of the intelligence of its people has been rather low, the proportion of its illiterates always large. While England has contributed much to the political instruction of the race it has added nothing to educational thought or experience. Surely here are conditions that border on the marvelous! We might explain England's political supremacy as we explain that of Rome, as due to an instinct for government developed by special

conditions; but the parallel breaks down before it is well started. I shall make no attempt to explain it: I am only concerned with a lesson of history that seems to give the lie to modern theories of education which make the prosperity of a nation depend upon its general intelligence, or upon its educational system. Contrast with England her great rival of former days and for a long time the leading power of Continental Europe if not of the world. Spain is the most hopelessly unprogressive country of Europe, not even Turkey excepted. Is it her destiny or her fault? All the nations of the world that have at different epochs acted a part in its history have exhibited certain traits and characteristics that were, as it seems, modified neither by time nor experience,—qualities that in some cases ultimately led to their destruction. Was this obstinate resistance due to stupidity, perversity or inexorable fate?

In this connection the transition is easy and natural to Loyola. When discussing the merits and demerits of a national system of education as contrasted with a scheme of instruction designed to be cosmopolitan we have, to some extent, the light of experience to guide us. The system of the Jesuits, which was ushered into the world almost full-fledged by its framer may not have been either rational or philosophical in the strict sense of the term, but that it was admirably contrived for universality and that it skillfully avoided the disturbing forces growing out of differences of nationality no one can deny. Neither will it be disputed that Jesuitism is the most potent educational agency ever devised,—the most consistent and the most minutely elaborate curriculum of instruction both in its conception and execution the world has yet seen. It is admitted that the Jesuits arrested the rising tide of the

Reformation and in several states of Europe restored the Catholic Church to its earlier status. That it finally lost ground was due to its lack of skill to adapt itself to the progress of civilization and to its persistent meddling in affairs that had only the remotest connection with the instruction of the young. An educational system formulated in the main when Europe had hardly emerged from the intellectual inertia of the Middle Ages, so skillfully articulated as to be able to maintain itself almost or quite to our own time, is one of the marvels of intellectual acumen. Its cosmopolitan character had much to do with its decline. It was native nowhere, exotic everywhere. That it will always remain an interesting study both for what it accomplished as well as for what it attempted and failed to attain, no less than because it is the one system of education that is compact, consistent, elaborately conjoined in all its parts, shrewdly avoiding national differences or even the minor divergences in the church to which it professed allegiance, never losing sight of its goal or allowing itself to be diverted from its main purpose, all will admit who know anything of its history.

It is a truism that the rising generation is to be educated for the institutional life of adult years; or to express it differently, the young of both sexes are to learn those things which they will have use for when they are grown up. What are we to understand by institutional life? and since the young can learn only a small part of what they need later, how shall we select what is most important? Of late years there has been a constant pressure on our courses of study for the admission of more subjects, patrons evidently holding the belief that whatever the young are to learn at all they are to be taught at school. Yet every educationist knows that the more varied the informa-

tion imparted to the learner the less he is educated. As to institutions, are we to keep in view those that now exist or those that may be developed in the course of time? If they are to be modified, what is to be the determining factor? Study present conditions and see how opinions differ. In Germany, as has already been shown, public education is shaped toward the maintenance of a rigorous autocracy, in spite of some pretty loud protests; in France, toward the strengthening of republicanism, though not without opposition. England is in a somewhat chaotic condition, as it has always been. In the different sections of our own country, and even in different portions of the same State, public opinion is moving in various directions. In the South the evident trend is toward the nullification or elimination of all influence on the part of the colored people. There, as well as in some portions of the North, the rights of the white man and of the black man are measured by totally different standards. Abstractly judged, such a state of affairs is more unjust than the old-time creed that the laborer's sons are to be brought up as laborers; the peasant's children to remain peasants, while the nobleman shall not be permitted to forfeit his nobility no matter what he does; because the rule always admitted of exceptions. Again, in Germany religious instruction with a strongly dogmatic flavor is obligatory in all primary and secondary schools. To some extent the same statement applies to England. On the other hand, in France all religious instruction is rigorously barred from the schools. In the United States the conditions are mixed. What we call popular education is non-sectarian and non-religious; but a large proportion of the people, both Catholic and Protestant, are dissatisfied with the omission and are endeavoring, in various ways, to supply the lack.

That denominationalism still has a strong hold upon the people of this country cannot be doubted. In fact it seems to be a characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race. Again, a rational system of instruction, rational instruction of every kind must be based on truth, or at least on an honest quest for truth without regard to the consequences. Truth always prevails in the end. The wise man profits by his own mistakes and is careful not to repeat them, or if he has the opportunity, he takes warning from the blunders of others. How is it with nations? Are they, generally speaking, willing to have the disagreeable truths of their past history put before the rising generation? We may answer, Never. For more than three centuries we have had Protestant histories and Catholic histories, neither party being willing to accept the others as the truth or acknowledge that its own side may have now and then been in the wrong. A school history that is acceptable to the Southern people does not meet with favor in the North. The men who sacrificed their lives on the battlefield are called heroes in one section, rebels in the other. We have been taught to believe that the men who brought about the separation of the Colonies from the mother country were all patriots, ready to sacrifice everything on the altar of their country. The facts tell a different story; but these facts are known only to a few special students of our history. We are not a military nation; yet public opinion is wont to characterize as treason or something closely akin thereto any expression that appears to disparage our national prowess by land or sea. Fouillee says, "There is nothing more unmeaning than historical facts, unless we make them mean something more doubtful still when we want to make them mean anything. Orators on each side of the house will draw their arguments from history. His-

tory, especially contemporary history, proves everything and nothing. Even the events of our own age are as yet only documents, the final value of which is uncertain. The history of Napoleon I., for example, is not yet written. Read Lanfrey after Thiers, and Taine after Lanfrey and draw a conclusion if you can."

Almost every year sees the appearance of a fresh Life of the Great Corsican that claims to throw some new light on his career and his character. Taine is one of the most popular of recent French writers; of his method Henry James truthfully says: "A thin soil of historical evidence is made to produce luxuriant flowers of deduction." Some of the most widely read books professing to be histories are not histories in any proper sense of the term. To make history popular it must be more or less polemic, no matter what period is dealt with. Mitford and Grote constantly draw opposite conclusions from the same data, and inject the present into the interpretation of events that occurred more than two thousand years ago.*

Few persons who have studied our war with Mexico will deny that it was a most unjustifiable war of aggression. On this subject, however, most of our school histories have not a little to say about the bravery of our soldiers and

*The unwillingness of a people to be reminded of their national sins is strikingly exemplified by the conduct of the Athenians with reference to the dramatic representation of the Capture of Miletus by the Poet Phrynicus. The whole theatre, Herodotus tells us, burst into tears, and the author was afterward heavily fined by the assembly for recalling to them their own misfortunes. A law was likewise passed that no one should ever again exhibit this piece. The sting of the reminder lay in the crooked policy that it recalled. As if silence could condone a mean or a mistaken act!

the brilliant strategy of our generals, while they are silent upon the merits of the controversy.

A few years ago the so-called Dreyfus affair was a burning question in France. Nine-tenths of our periodicals were on the side of the accused and vilipended the French people, and especially the courts of justice, for their subserviency to the military spirit. They professed to know all about the case, when from its very nature they could know very little. We are constantly meeting with similar disparaging judgments upon army-ridden Germany.

Albeit, few of us seem to notice a similar condition of things at home. Without any reference to the merits of the case, the man who publicly criticises our army or impugns the motives of those who fought in any of the wars in which this country has been engaged is certain to be branded by many as disloyal. If some one ventures the assertion that many lawyers are dishonest, or that some ministers of the Gospel are hypocrites, or that not all who teach are fit for their vocation, nobody takes exception. Such assertions are frequently made and accepted as matters of course. But let some one affirm that many who entered our army did so from mercenary motives or from love of adventure; and that not a few who belonged to it were cowards and skulkers, the affirmation is sure to be branded as a lie or as evidence of a bad heart.

How much we are still dominated, as we have always been, by the military spirit is shown by the fact that nearly all our Presidents had seen service in the field: some of them would never have been thought of in connection with this high office except for their military record. The Germans have erected many statues to great soldiers and in commemoration of important battles: Is the proportion any less in this country, compared to the civilians thus

honored? At present we are spending more money for wars past and to come than any government on the face of the earth.

It is the nature of man to glorify brute force, to extol the exhibition of physical courage even in a prize-fight, and to ignore or make light of the display of moral courage,—that courage which silently opposes wrong from day to day and which is a thousand times more important to the welfare of the community than the sporadic and the spectacular. It constantly happens that more fortitude is required to refrain from doing than to do.

When we reflect upon this universal tendency to laud and magnify violent measures we become painfully aware of the length of the way the world has still to travel before it shall have outgrown the centuries and aeons of inherited tendencies and reached the goal of a truly enlightened civilization. We are still sadly dominated by the instincts of the savage and the brute. If we do not ourselves fight we pray for and commend those who do. We still have the civilization of the boys who when they cannot settle a dispute by argument fall to blows in order to determine which party is in the right and which in the wrong.

How strangely inconsistent are the nations of the earth! They all profess to believe that historical judgments are the applications of morality in the case of other nations: in their own case they do not wish to have the whole truth told to the rising generation lest it impair the vigor of their patriotism. As if patriotism and pugnacity were interchangeable terms!

You may moralize as much as you please, provided you do not approach too near the present in time and place.

In a court of justice, when it is important to ascertain the character and reputation of a man, testimony from

friends or relatives and otherwise interested parties is rigidly excluded. But in national history we reverse the process; we do not want to hear disagreeable truths that wholly disinterested parties might tell. Yet the world talks of adjusting its international disagreements by arbitration through disinterested parties! We repeat trippingly from the tongue,

> "O wad some pow'r the giftie gie us
> To see oursels as ithers see us!
> It wad frae mony a blunder free us,
> And foolish notion."

But we rarely think of acting upon it. Except under compulsion the testimony of a foreigner or a stranger is ruled out in advance: as if truth and honesty, veracity and charity, courage and fidelity were not universal virtues! As if anything could make the nations of the earth genuinely free except the truth! Before we reach the age of forty most of us have become impervious to new ideas; our stock of wisdom is complete. Few persons are sincerely desirous to know the truth; yet our schools are expected to teach the truth and the truth only!

What is it to be educated? I can do no better, when attempting to answer the question, than to quote from an essay of the late E. R. Sill. "An educated man—what is it that we understand by the phrase? If it would not be easy to set down all that it connotes in our various minds, we should probably agree that it includes, among other things, such qualities as these: a certain largeness of view; an acquaintance with the intellectual life of the world; the apprehension of principles; the power and habit of independent thought; the freedom from personal pro-

vincialism and the recognition of the other point of view; an underlying nobleness of intention; the persistence in magnanimous aims." In the last analysis men's duties do not differ widely from each other; it is in the ability to perform them that the educated man has the advantage. But we must always remember that "if it were as easy to do as it is to know, then were all sinners virtuous," and here the educated, or at least those supposed to be educated, often fall short. Huxley has tersely stated the case. "We live in a world which is full of misery and ignorance, and the plain duty of each and all of us is to try to make the little corner we can influence somewhat less miserable and somewhat less ignorant than when we entered it. To do this effectually it is necessary to be fully possessed of only two beliefs: The first, that the order of nature is ascertainable by our faculties to an extent which is practically unlimited; the second, that our volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events."

Every one who has reflected on the true principles of teaching will admit that our age has discovered nothing new. What for a time may look like a novelty will upon larger information prove to have been thought of by somebody. It is always a question of the attitude of the mind toward knowledge. In the very nature of the case he who reflects will constantly find rising in his mind thoughts and suggestions that are the counterpart of what he finds in books, as his reading becomes more extensive. Thinkers in all ages and in every part of the world have pursued the same paths and in many instances reached the same destination. He who desires to know shall know, it matters little what his era or station in life. He who is indifferent, who does not seek to cultivate alertness of mind, who goes through the world with his eyes half closed and his mind

hermetically sealed against new ideas, who has made up his mind in advance upon every question that comes before him, must always remain more or less ignorant. Little as men know, even the wisest of them, how few among them live up to the measure of their knowledge!

It ought not to enter the minds of any considerable proportion of a free people that they are the victims of an inexorable destiny. This phrase may not be out of place in the mouth of a Roman historian who felt constrained to say of his countrymen that they could neither endure their ills nor their cure; but it ought not to be necessary to use it of any people who have sufficient intelligence to comprehend in any appreciable measure the lessons of their own past and those of the nations about them. But it is an almost equally fatal delusion when a people so far forgets the vicissitudes of national growth and decay as to imagine its preponderance assured no matter what it may do. With the rapid intercourse now prevailing between different parts of the world it is easy for those who will to profit by the experiments and mistakes of others. What is the advantage in having the power to think if it does not lead men to reflect upon the consequences of their acts whether done individually or collectively? Even a brute does not repeat its own mistakes indefinitely: How much less does it become a human being to do so!

When we carefully consider the obstacles that have always obstructed the formulation and adoption of a truly rational system of education in every county of the world, we must realize that the most enlightened nations are still a long way from it. Even demonstrable truth can not always obtain a hearing. It will not do any good where there are no schools nor benefit those who are not in school.

Neither is it just to assume that all who teach are competent and in their places because of merit. Everybody who cares to know is aware that such is not the case. It must be said to the credit of the business as well as to that of the professional world that it has little use for drones and incompetents. They are soon weeded out and thrown into a corner to eke out such an existence as they may.

I repeat, there will always be some who learn nothing, but the number ought to be continually growing smaller until it becomes an insignificant minority. It is plain that there are many subjects in our school courses that can not be judiciously presented in such a way as to bring out prominently their full moral import. Often it is not wise to insist too strongly on facts, if they are calculated to give rise to controversy. Many a conscientious teacher has lost his place through lack of tact or disregard of possible consequences. But the progress of truth can not be permanently arrested. The supremacy, like Alexander's ring, will belong to the most worthy. Even so short an experience as that of one generation proves this incontestably. Every country of Europe, with a possible exception or two, almost all North America and much of the rest of the world is far better off than it was two or three score years ago. All this is due to the advance of science, to the enlightenment fostered in a greater or less degree by educational systems, unphilosophical as they still are. Progress has never been uniform; nor has it been without relapses here and there. But we can say with Galilleo in the fullest confidence, *E pur si muove.* What richer reward can we wish for ourselves than the honest conviction that we have contributed something, however little, to the movement, even though our acts have at times brought us unpopularity and unjust treatment? Time will vindicate us.

Readers of this paper as well as of some of those that have preceded it, will doubtless have made up their minds that like Rasselas they have "reached a conclusion in which nothing is concluded." But let them remember that a greater than Dr. Johnston, that prince of philosophers, the son of Sophroniscus, was more concerned to stimulate thought and provoke inquiry than to answer questions. In the complex and changing life of modern states few problems can be solved once for all; most of them are in a continual process of solution. Some of them have been settled a hundred times by a thousand different persons only to come up anew to vex their successors. Nothing is so much to be feared as stagnation; and the most useless member of a community is the person who always knows just what to do and how to do it, but who does not furnish the motive that will constrain men to adopt his advice. So long as we honestly keep seeking to know and patiently keep trying to do, our labor will not be all or altogether in vain.

THE RELATION OF PRIVATE TO PUBLIC MORALITY.

On the sixth of November, 1874, Dr. Gustavus Ruemelin delivered a lecture before the University of Tuebingen on the relation of private to public morality. It was called forth by the desire to justify the somewhat tortuous policy of Bismarck in bringing about the unification of Germany. As this lecture was included in a volume published the following year, it is safe to assume that it embodies his mature views on this difficult question. Moreover, as Dr. Reumelin was the head of ecclesiastical and educational affairs in the kingdom of Wurtemberg and chancellor of the royal university, we are justified in holding that the case was presented as strongly as it could be put from his point of view. It is therefore eminently fitting that his address should be discussed in a book of this kind.*

He tells us that there is often a conflict between our duties as individuals and our duties as members of the body politic; that in the first relation the controlling motive should be the law of love; in the second, the law of self-preservation. But he lays down no rule by which we shall be enabled in all cases or even in most cases to distinguish between the two relations. We need not be surprised at this

*It has recently (1901) been translated into English under the title *Politics and the Moral Law* and is published by MacMillan & Co., New York and London.

apparent omission. We may be sure that it was not an oversight on the part of the distinguished lecturer, nor need we be surprised that he did not solve a problem that has engaged the attention of some of the ablest men that have ever lived, since they too have not been able to solve it. Four hundred years B. C. the wisest of the Greeks, a man who has exercised an abiding influence on the progress of thought, was condemned to death by his fellow-citizens for crimes of which he was not guilty. It was a clear case of injustice committed by the body of the citizens in their sovereign capacity against an individual. Yet the victim calmly submitted to his fate rather than resort to any of the means of escape that were proposed by his friends. His argument was, in substance, that he had all his life acknowledged the authority of the laws under which he was condemned to die and that to thwart them in any way in their operation would be committing a greater wrong than he was about to suffer; that if his fellow countrymen were willing to incur the odium of putting an innocent man to death, it was their matter, not his; and that it is always better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. The unanimous verdict of posterity is that he reasoned rightly. Yet this same man was the first great champion of the rights of the individual. He vigorously denied that men can make that right which is not intrinsically so. The burden of his philosophy is that underneath and behind all convention there are eternally valid principles that vary not with different people nor grow old with the lapse of time. And so for nearly two and a half millenniums the world has regarded Socrates as a martyr to his devotion to truth and consistency.

The history of the Christian church records the names of many who shared the fate of the Greek philosopher, and for the same reason, viz: the conflict of individual opinion with

political institutions. Thousands of good men and women have had brought home to them the question addressed to the rulers by Peter and John, "Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you rather than unto God, judge ye; for we can not but speak the things which we saw and heard,"—in other words we can not but follow the dictates of our own consciences.

A distinguished Greek dramatist has treated the same conflict of duties in the tragedy of Antigone. The heroine finds herself in a position where she is compelled to choose between obedience to an absolute monarch who has her destiny wholly in his hands, and obedience to a higher law that long antedates human institutions. She unflinchingly takes her stand for what she conceives to be the right and expresses her willingness to bear the consequences of her disobedience to the edicts of a temporal sovereign. The poet plainly shows where his sympathies lie, and posterity remembers Antigone as one of the noblest characters handed down to us from ancient times. She suffered a painful but glorious death while the gods took terrible vengeance upon her slayer.

In the last century when the agitation was going on in this country for a separation from Great Britain there was in some of the colonies a strong party that was opposed to such action. They were loyal subjects of the government under which they lived and they justly regarded the movement for separation as treasonable. Nor have we any right to question the motives or the sincerity of these so-called loyalists. But the stars in their courses were against them and the Declaration of Independence made them outlaws. Many of them lost their lives for the cause to which they adhered. I do not think there is any reason to question the motives of most of those who led in the movement for inde-

pendence, but it would be a strange misapprehension of human nature to assume that all who called themselves patriots were men who unselfishly sought the welfare of their country. In this conflict of duties face to face with which many people found themselves, some took one course, some another. Shall we say that because independence was achieved the separatists alone were right and their opponents wrong, or shall we say that no question of right and wrong was involved but only one of expediency? Or shall we say that in this cause it was impossible to determine *a priori* what was right and what was wrong; that the issue of the conflict alone could decide the question? It is true such epithets as traitor, treason, rebel, and others of like import, do not necessarily belong in the vocabulary of morals. They are oftener mere political terms and have no ethical import whatever. The careful thinker is not misled by them, but in the mouth of the multitude they usually have a dire significance.

Dr. Ruemelin distinctly maintains that the state, that is, men organized into a government, may do things that would be clearly wrong for any individual or group of individuals. This position is as old as government, and I fear that in this case too we often speak of right and wrong where we really mean expediency. Let us not be misled by confounding right with rights. The two words are almost identical in form, but widely divergent in signification. There can not well be any question of the right of the government to take from me the rights it has conferred upon me. Protection to life and property, a certain measure of liberty of action is guaranteed by all governments to their subjects. Here we are dealing with prescriptive and statutory, and not with inherent or natural rights. The history of slavery is testimony to the fact that until comparatively recent

times personal servitude was not regarded as being in contravention of any natural right. On this point as on many others there is a manifest expansion of the ethical idea. It has drawn within the sphere of its influence a larger number of social relations. I do not mean to say that there ever was a time in the history of the human race when it was entirely without moral sentiment. I hold that the term *man* postulates a being that for reasons other than personal felt that there were some things to be done and others to be left undone. But the feeling of obligation and solidarity was developed only to a limited extent as long as men had not reached a stage of society higher than the family and the tribe. On this stage many peoples have remained to the present day. The early history of mankind shows that the whole human race passed through this stage. He who did not belong to the tribe was regarded as an enemy, and some of the most bitter wars were intertribal. In the course of time, tribes were fused into larger aggregates and the feeling of nationality was engendered. The sentiment of kinship began to embrace larger social areas.

By a continued extension of the process great nations were formed. In this way every man under the same government and belonging to the same nation came to a realization of the fact that he owed something to his fellow-citizen though he lived far distant and quite beyond the range of personal acquaintance. In time, the more enlightened nations even began to feel that they could not be wholly indifferent to the fate of any member of the human race. To this feeling is due the interest taken in England and America in the suffering Armenians, Cubans, and in the suppression of the slave trade in Africa. The humanitarian sentiment finally overflows geographical boundaries and brings the whole world within the scope of its activity. The

most practical form of this altruism is seen in the labors of the missionary. It goes even beyond men and includes within its sphere the entire sentiment creation. This sentiment has been fostered and greatly promoted by the growth and spread of intelligence by means of national and international commerce. We can feel no interest in a people about whom we know nothing. It is true we may know and yet be indifferent; but the feeling of interest and sympathy must have something to feed on. If we do not know, we are sure to be indifferent.

It is the custom of some people to disparage commerce as founded on mere self-interest; and there is some truth in the charge. But self-interest is not necessarily selfishness. It may be wisely directed, and generally gives as much as it takes, and very often more. With the increase of knowledge and the frequency of intercourse there is developed the clearer recognition of what is due from one man to another. Facility of commercial intercourse is fostered by commercial integrity. Business can not long be carried on except on well established business principles. Otherwise it is robbery.

Without exception the nations of Europe are living on a higher moral plane than that of a hundred years ago, and on a considerably higher plane than that of two hundred years ago. I do not believe there is a nation in Europe today that would tolerate the low private moral standard that was almost universal in court circles of the last century. Speaking only of England, Thackeray says: "No wonder that Whitefield cried out in the wilderness,—that Wesley quitted the insulted temple to pray on the hillside. I look with reverence on these men at that time. Which is the sublimer spectacle,—the good John Wesley surrounded by his congregation at the pit's mouth, or the Queen's chaplain

mumbling through his morning office in the anteroom under the picture of the great Venus, with the door opening into the adjoining chamber where the Queen is dressing, talking scandal to Lord Hervey, or uttering sneers at Lady Suffolk, who is kneeling with a basin at her mistress's feet?"

The history of the world is a gruesome tale. It is little else even for the times of peace than the record of intrigue of court against court; of courtier against courtier; of wickedness in high places and of the oppression of the lowly. Vice, crime, trickery, and immorality seem to have held high carnival from age to age. But let us not forget what our greatest poet says: "The evil that men do lives after them, The good is oft interred with their bones." If the ruling classes in general showed no sympathy for their subjects, these often displayed deeds of heroic self-sacrifice toward each other. God has never been without his witnesses; nobility of soul without its representatives. Countless acts of kindness have passed unnoticed except by the recipient and there has never been a total lack of those who felt that they were their brother's keeper. I freely acknowledge, for I can not disbelieve the evidence, that our politics is still sadly corrupt; in some parts of the country, fearfully so. Yet I am convinced that on the whole it stands on a higher plane than ever before. If as yet not as much has been accomplished in the way of its reform, as good men have wished, the generally acknowledged necessity of reform is in itself a hopeful sign. We are at least alive to the dangers that threaten us. And before we can escape or avoid danger we must know what and where it is.

Dr. Ruemelin distinctly says that the statesman individually owes allegiance to the moral law, but not in his public character. In other words his politics need not be regulated by an ethical standard. This looks to me like a dangerous

doctrine. How shall we separate the man from his acts? Do not a man's habitual acts constitute his character? Can a man in public office distinguish between his actions and say of the one, This I do in my representative capacity and this as a private individual? In the one case I always tell the truth and keep my word; in the other, only when I think it expedient. We sometimes find men who are morally weak exhibiting great strength as statesmen both creative and reformatory. A man's policy may be better than his life; just as a great writer may be a despicable character. But here we find the conditions reversed. Our author, at least by implication, tells us that a statesman may resort to fraud and falsehood, trickery and deception, in order to enchance the greatness of the nation for which he is acting, but he must not do these things in his private capacity. I grant that a temporary advantage may be gained in this way, but I question its expediency in the long run. The citizen of a representative government often finds himself in the unpleasant dilemma of having to choose between a candidate whose public policy he endorses and whose private character he detests. To which shall he give the preference—to the man or to his views on public questions? There is hardly any doubt that in matters of grave import the policy is to be preferred rather than the man; but there are many minor questions in which it is possible to show a preference for the reputable citizen, and in this way parties may be compelled to select worthier candidates. Unfortunately, too, the voter rarely has the privilege of registering his sentiments on all questions in which he is interested. So many issues are usually involved that he is compelled to strike an average, yet if he can not in all cases make choice of what he regards best he can at least enter his protest against the largest number of evils.

What has been the practical effect of the policy that the ruler or the statesman is not subject to the moral law? Always and everywhere pernicious in the extreme. What is, or at least ought to be, the object for which all government exists? To secure justice. On this point there is not likely to be any disagreement. It is hardly correct to say that governments were instituted to dispense justice among the governed; it is nearer the truth to say that governments, or rather government, was developed by a gradual process because men could exist in no other way. Wherever there is collective activity there must be organization, there must be government. Every man must have his assigned place and know the duties devolving upon him. Boys can't so much as play a game of ball without first coming to an agreement as to the rules that shall govern it. These rules are the laws of the game. Just so in the state. Its laws are the rules according to which men are required to regulate their conduct in a political sense; they define within certain limits the relations that men sustain to their fellow men. There is no scientific frontier beyond which statute law can not pass. Hence in some countries many acts are illegal of which the law-making power in others takes no account. With every enlightened legislator the supreme problem is how to make such changes in the laws from time to time as will best secure the end for which all laws exist: the largest liberty of the individual with the highest good of the community and the state as a whole.

Under a republican form of government laws are as a general thing an expression of public opinion. A certain line of policy is often followed by a community or a state before it has been formulated into a statute. Generally, however, leaders are necessary not only to formulate the wants of a clientele, but to see that these wants when put

into the form of laws are observed by all who come under their operation. Murder and theft are everywhere punished whether there be a statute to that effect or not. And so on through a long list of acts.

It is true that an absolute ruler may enact laws and see that they are enforced that are in advance of public opinion, but this sort of rulers has been rare in the history of the world. If such rulers were always guided by the moral law which commands all men to do justly and to love mercy they would seek only the good of their subjects. Generally, however, they have sought mere personal aggrandizement at the expense of the governed. It was by following such a policy that Louis XIV inflicted untold injury on France. It is the same policy persistently carried out for centuries that has brought Spain to its present unhappy condition. Turkey is wretchedly poor, Italy is little better off, and Spain is on the verge of ruin because those in authority, those best able to bear the burdens of government have persistently refused to do their duty and have compelled the poorer members of the body politic to support a policy with the formulating of which they had nothing to do. Autocratic rulers are more likely, as experience teaches, to be in the rear of public opinion than in advance of it. They usually find themselves more comfortable and more secure in maintaining the *status quo* than in yielding to proposed changes. For this reason republican governments are more progressive, except in rare cases, than monarchical. Even under the best monarchs, those who are ever ready to initiate progressive measures, there is always danger of a stagnation. The people become accustomed to look to their ruler for the initiative, and when this is not forthcoming, there is no force to take its place.

No one will deny that the fundamental law of the state is

self-preservation. But is it more imperative for the state than for the individual? We have reached a stage of moral progress at least high enough to deem more praiseworthy the individual who perishes in the attempt to rescue a fellow man than him who saves himself at the sacrifice of everybody else. In fact no comparison can be made as to the moral quality of the two acts. To one is accorded only commendation, to the other only blame, if not execration. We are constantly reminded that the man who seeks to build up his private business at the expense of everybody else, soon finds that he has adopted an unwise policy. Nations too have tried the same thing again and again, always with disastrous results. It seems to me that if there be any difference the observance of the moral law is even more important in the government of states than in the conduct of the individual. A man may gain riches and power by dishonesty and oppression, but he cannot long retain or use it because of the brevity of human life. But the state is or is supposed to be perpetual and it is a serious matter for one generation to entail a curse upon another, by giving its energies a wrong trend or starting it on a career in which the rights of man are trampled under foot. I do not believe that anybody denies that there are such things as national sins, and when the time comes for the Lord of the Ages to say that they shall be expiated, those who are only negatively guilty by acquiescence, guilty through blindness, have to suffer as well as those who are directly concerned. This was the thought in the mind of Lincoln when he uttered the memorable words: "Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that it continues until all the wealth piled up by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrecognized toil shall be sunk, and until

every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.' "

With what singleness of purpose, in what bitterness of soul, with what superhuman prescience the prophets of old, the national conscience of the Hebrew people warned their countrymen against national sins. But the people refused to hear. And how fearfully have they expiated their spiritual blindness! Well may we stand in reverent awe before that God who holds the nations of the earth in the hollow of His hand; before that mysterious and yet not always inscrutable power not ourselves, that makes for righteousness. It was under the inspiration of this sublime thought, under the shadow of this awful national responsibility that Kipling wrote his soul-inspiring Recessional. And he is the poet who more than any other of our day holds with a strong and courageous grasp the contemporaneous motives that we are wont to call practical, even vulgar; yet amid all the stir and strife of our busy age he warns us that we are in danger of forgetting what is most important of all,—our duty to one another and to the coming age.

It is often a serious matter, sometimes an impossible one, to decide when the law of self-preservation is wisely appealed to. I have elsewhere called attention to the miseries the Greek states entailed upon themselves by their circumscribed patriotism. What were the citizens of the smaller German states to do who foresaw the unwisdom of their rulers in throwing themselves into the arms of Napoleon? Were they to incur the risk of being punished as traitors for daring to point out the inevitable consequences of such a course? Were the genuine patriots among the Wurtemburgers and Bavarians, those who took sides for or

against Napoleon? How was the law of self-preservation to be applied? We have had similar difficulties to solve. A typical case is furnished by Gen. Robert E. Lee. His private character was above reproach, yet he embraced a cause that time shows more and more plainly to have been counter to the moral order of the world. He believed that it was the duty of the patriot to go with his state, deeming his allegiance to her stronger than to the Union. He made a mistaken application of the law of self-preservation, within the narrow limits of a state, and he left behind him the melancholy example of a noble man who wasted his energies and misused his talents in a cause that was abhorrent to the moral sense of the world.

The view held by almost all writers on government, until comparatively recent times, was that the powers that be have authority not only to determine the rights of the subject but also what is right for the subject. Of course there have always been conflicts, especially when the individual conscience was infringed upon. In all cases of religious persecution this doctrine was shifted from the domain of theory into the sphere of practice. But the theory was never given up and almost invariably the persecuted became persecutors in turn as soon as they had the power. The doctrine that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, as a practical principle, is not older than our Declaration of Independence. Since its promulgation there has been a constantly growing tendency to reconcile the rights of the individual conscience with the functions of the state. It is now generally held that it is the duty of those in authority to make the government so good, the laws so just that the subject will himself recognize the fact and yield willing obedience. The problem is by no means yet fully solved but the enlightened nations of the earth

are devoting much thought to its solution, and I believe we are getting nearer the goal all the time. It is customary to stigmatize as reprehensible at all times and under all circumstances the jesuitical doctrine that the end justifies the means, and that it is permissible to do evil that good may come. The mistake it seems to me lies, so far as the first proposition is concerned in mistaking that for an end which is not. There is no *end* in organized society. There is always something beyond that which we may mistake for an end. In reality there is no end, and what we are apt to consider such is but the means to something more remote. As to the second proposition, I do not believe that it is ever right to do wrong. But there is a constant growth and enlargement of the public as of the individual conscience. The child and the youth may perform acts with a clear conscience that maturer years will condemn. And so we find governments legalizing acts or conniving at them which in a more enlightened age it repudiates and condemns. Nor do I see any reason for believing that might ever makes right, but we often use the term *right* where it has no place and where *rights* is the proper word. It often happens, however, that there is might in right and those who are crushed by force imagine that they have been wronged.

There is no doubt that public opinion has a good deal of influence on the development of the moral sentiments; not a public opinion based on ignorance or sentiment or a passing fancy, but on knowledge and enlightenment. He who is too high or too low to be influenced by it is commonly a dangerous or a despicable character. The one extreme is represented by the autocrat, the other by the tramp. The chief reason why the so-called "bloated bondholder" is hated or despised is because as the representative of a class, he

cares little for public opinion. Owing to his secure financial position he is indifferent to public opinion. Unfortunate is the state of that individual whose mind can conceive or whose lips can utter the thought, "I don't care what other people think of me."

The world will never cease to admire the man who fearlessly does his duty as he understands it. No matter how lowly his condition, no matter how circumscribed the sphere of his activity, if he enters upon a difficult task or faces a great danger because he feels that he ought to do so, the world will not withhold from him its admiration.

> "I slept and dreamed that life was Beauty;
> I woke and found that life was Duty;—
> Was that dream a shadowy lie?"

Assuredly neither one or the other; but the thought that came to the poet in his waking hour was the sublimer of the two. When we consider how much the welfare of the individual is bound up with the welfare of the state we can easily see how the larger duty often included the less and is in harmony with it. To make the harmony as nearly perfect as possible is the first obligation of every enlightened government.

Every community, and in a large measure every commonwealth contains a certain number of members who have no ideals. Their conception of duty is exceedingly circumscribed and they can be kept from preying on society only by the fear or the force of the strong arm of the law. Neither is it wise under all circumstances to press too closely the theory that a good government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. A good government can never receive the consent of all the governed,

often not of a majority. The subject whose pernicious activity is circumscribed by such a rule will stigmatize it as tyranny, yet if it is just in principle and justly administered it will in the course of events be its own best justification. But the rational man, the good citizen, does not need the restraint of the law. He is a law to himself both as to what he ought to do and as to what he ought not to do. Under a wise government there will not be and there certainly ought not to be a clash between our duty as citizens and our duty as individuals. This is the goal toward which all governments tend,—at least all enlightened governments. I believe it is a mistake to lay too much stress on those examples of personal bravery that are now and then brought out conspicuously by the exigencies of war. The man who has the courage to do his duty at the risk of his life would, often do it under any circumstances. The innate nobility of such a nature has merely found a larger place in which to display itself. Sometimes the thought that he is in the public eye and that an act of heroism will win universal applause may spur a man to a brave deed who would prove to be a coward in a less conspicuous position. It may require less bravery to die for a cause than to live for it. Experience proves that the spectacular hero is often morally a weaker character than the man who in an obscure place takes up his duty daily and discharges it to the best of his ability. "'Tis not dying for one's country that is hard; 'tis living for it, Harry." If there is no patriotism except in facing shot and shell the lot of most young men now living is an unfortunate one. They might have had the best intention to do so, but there has been no opportunity for them to exhibit their physical courage on the field of battle. As wars become fewer there will be a constantly diminishing need of men whose chief recommendation is their fight-

ing qualities. Nevertheless, those who would deserve well of their country have none the fewer opportunities for serving her efficiently, though it may not be in so conspicuous a way. And it is this sort of men which the world most needs. I repeat, there should be no conflict between public and private duties. In many cases they have nothing to do with each other; in others they mutually support and strengthen one another.

But what shall we say of a condition of things where a ruler conscientiously inflicts great damage upon his subjects and where the conscience of the subject is outraged by obedience to law? Shall the latter acquiesce in what he believes to be wrong? Is there a reconciliation between two diametrically opposite principles? There is not. The sovereign and the subject take their own risk in deciding what course they shall adopt. Philip II of Spain, thought he was doing God a service when he undertook to stamp out heresy in his domains; but time has shown that his policy was a fearful mistake. The same mistake has often been repeated before and since. It is as plain as day that if men were wise there would at once be a universal disarmament.

If you were to ask me what I think of the morality of party contests I should say that in many cases they do not come within the domain of morals at all. Of course faith should be kept in such matters as in any other, but as to the questions at issue they usually mean little more than a struggle for office. If men are willing to risk their money in such a game, they take the consequences. I do not know whether the venality of voters is greater now than ever before, or corruption more common, though I am strongly inclined to doubt it. If we are moving on a downward plane, it may be that nothing short of bitter experience will stop us. I do not believe that there is now or ever has been a

government without some corruption. There have always been men, and there will always be, with whom the only motive that has any weight is a personal one. And of this class of men there is always a larger or smaller number in every legislative body. All governments are more or less of an experiment. In the history of the world but one has lasted as long as eight or nine centuries without undergoing violent and radical changes. We have done fairly well for a little more than one century; what our future shall be depends somewhat upon the form of our government, but far more depends upon the intelligence and genuine patriotism of our citizens.

That the law of self-preservation should determine the conduct of the citizen as such is a doctrine that runs counter to the lesson of history. If it had prevailed it would have rendered impossible the unification of all the larger empires of modern times. It would cut up the map of the world into an almost countless number of little more or less independent sovereignties. Whether the law of self-preservation is wise must be determined by other considerations,—not so much by what is right as by what is expedient and wise. Neither will the good citizen be ruled by such a shibboleth as, "my country, whether right or wrong." He will scrutinize carefully what is meant by "country" in this sense. He will not be misled by a mere party cry to endorse a policy which his judgment disapproves. If there is such a thing as a national conscience it exists solely because the majority hold like views as to what is right and what is wrong. If the national conscience is perverted it is the duty of those who are most foresighted to set it right. If enlightenment does not clarify the motives of a people the less we have of it the better. No intelligent man will offer the lame excuse for doing what he holds to be wrong, that the

majority wishes it. Individual judgment must always be the final arbiter in matters of conduct. Almost all moral reforms have in their inception been advanced by a minority. How many men posterity honors who identified themselves with a cause that was lost for the time being! The doctrine that a man may do in his official capacity what his judgment condemns is a dangerous doctrine. It is especially dangerous in a republic where so large a proportion of the citizens are called upon from time to time to hold public office. We shall probably always have among us a large number of persons who mistake the success of party for the welfare of the country. It is these who are perennially in favor of the flag and an appropriation. It is this class of men that Dr. Johnson had in mind when he defined patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel. When their private interests were menaced they cried out that the country was in danger. Treason and criticism of the party in power are two widely different things, though they have often been confounded, sometimes ignorantly, sometimes purposely.

Not only has it been the doctrine of those who directed the governments of the world that the great majority of the subjects never outgrow their tutelage, that they rarely discern with any degree of clearness what is for their true interest, and that, therefore, certain more highly endowed or divinely commissioned persons must decide this question and guide them as to how it shall be attained, but nearly all writers upon government have maintained it in theory. Yet it is everywhere dead or dying. The Declaration of Independence was the first clear disavowal of the doctrine and it is probable that the Colonies did not themselves fully apprehend the weighty significance of the step they then took. The political development of most of the European states

during the present century has been along lines then marked out. In other words, it has come to be a recognized principle of statecraft that in the main governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. In practice the theory can not be consistently carried out for it is impossible to secure unanimity on many of the problems that must be decided in order to make a viable government. Institutional life will always necessitate many compromises. But most governments no longer undertake to decide political questions without consulting the body of the citizens. They are putting more and more faith in the potency of reason and less in coercion. It is the essence of democracy that the minority, no matter how large, shall learn to submit to the majority for the time being, no matter how distasteful. It is because some of the Spanish-American states have not learned this lesson that they are in the chronic throes of revolution.

If intelligent patriotism can be taught,—and who doubts it?—it must be done by enabling every citizen to express with the ballot, an intelligent opinion, on every question of public interest. The greatest good of the commonwealth is best secured by promoting the interest of the largest number of individuals. While the duty of the citizen and that of the private man are not always identical they ought not to conflict. It is hard to see wherein the good citizen differs from the good man and *vice versa.*

I give here the closing paragraph of the translation referred to on p. 260, for while some of the passages are intended to have a special application, they also embody general truths. "On the other hand, we can hardly fail to notice in the management of public affairs an increasing tendency toward nobler ends. In the eighteenth century politics consisted mainly of cabinet intrigues, mutual espionage and plot-

ting, the corruption of valets and court ladies; all these were important functions of a diplomat. To grab and traffic in territory, to quarrel about rank and power, seemed to be the content of diplomatic science; the only regard paid to the welfare of the people was in the choice of language and in the multiplication of meaningless phrases. It is one of the blessings of modern free institutions that the fate of nations is no longer discussed and decided exclusively in the cabinets and antechambers of princes, but in the public deliberations of the representatives of the people. Plans that shun the light of publicity have become, not indeed impossible, but decidedly more difficult of execution. Since two of the great civilized nations of Europe have passed from a condition of wretched dismemberment to that of national unity, the true and natural boundaries of the European family of nations have been found and established in their essential outlines. Universal military service renders wars impossible which are not recognized by the people themselves as just and inevitable. Wars themselves are of shorter duration and more humane in conduct. The most recent progress in humane methods of warfare has emanated from the very state which not more than one hundred years ago caused its own soldiers to be thrown alive into a moat in order that the storming party might pass over their bodies as over a bridge. History has given to the German people, now powerful enough not to covet the property of its neighbors, and yet able to maintain its own possessions against all the world, the mission of founding an empire of peace in the center of the European continent— a state whose politics should seek simply to promote prosperity, liberty and civilization. We have been fortunate enough to behold and enjoy the fruition of a policy which need not shrink from comparison with the highest standards of his-

tory. For the second time in the course of the century, out of the distress and confusion of the moment, there has arisen to us a man,—the embodiment of justice and power. But the fundamental basis of international ethics is the moral sense of the people themselves. If the German people shall maintain the preponderance of its love of ideals over the mere lust for gain and enjoyment, over indifference to the common welfare, and over narrow prejudice,—only in that case can the politics of the empire, henceforth based on universal suffrage, be administered in a similar spirit. The morality of a people and that of its statesmen go hand in hand. Only by accident will the standard of morality in the government of a free people be higher than that of the governed. And only in the ever continuous process of action and reaction between both may be found the ultimate solution of the problem discussed in this address." Most of this quotation has not only the true ring but likewise a remarkably home-like look. Evidently the upright citizen of an autocratic state regards his political relations very much in the same way that the citizen of a representative republic regards his. He may talk less and work in a more circumscribed sphere of political activity, but he does not therefore necessarily think less. It may be too that when he opens his mouth or takes up his pen, he gives expression to ideas that are more to the purpose than most people do where words are so cheap. The cure for political corruption as well as for a mistaken public policy is to be effected by enlightenment, not by intelligence alone. The progress of enlightenment is rapidly bringing about a condition of affairs when there will no longer be a wide chasm between the morality of the individual and what, for want of a better designation, we call the morality of the state. When Charles the First, was debating with himself the question

whether he should keep or break the promise he had made to Wentworth (Strafford) to save him from his enemies, the bishops succeeded in making him believe that he had a public and a private conscience, as he was both a king and a man. They assured him that his pledge to his unfortunate minister was given in his private capacity, but that in signing his death-warrant he was doing so as king. We hardly know whether to denounce most vigorously the abominable casuistry of bishop or politician, for both were united in the same persons; but we may be quite sure that no man or group of men would in our day resort to such a contemptible subterfuge. Unfortunately, it can not be denied that we see a good deal of similar conduct in a small way.

To the progress of enlightenment the teaching profession has it in its power to make the largest contribution. Every teacher worthy of the name is more or less of a reformer. It is not only his prerogative, but his duty to be so. If his influence is not uplifting, if he does not contribute something toward making all forms of meanness a little more unpopular, if he is content to drift with the current of popular favor, or if he makes it a part of his business to find the lines of least resistance, he has sadly missed his calling. On the other hand he needs to be on his guard against taking a mere idiosyncrasy, a mere personal whim or opinion for a principle. Those who differ with him may be just as upright and just as patriotic as he. "My way" is not necessarily the best way or the only way that leads to the goal. I do not believe that the wise man seeks martyrdom, but if martyrdom finds him in the performance of his duty he must not shrink from it. There are times and occasions when he must take a stand, cost what it may. Temporary detriment to mind or body or estate is not too

high a price to pay for the truth and the right. In the end he will not only lose nothing but assuredly gain much. It would be a grand consummation if such an *esprit de corps* could be engendered among teachers as to make the public fully aware that none of them could be induced to take the place of one who had been dismissed for any cause except proved inefficiency or immorality. It is safe to assume that such a condition of things is nearer than the time when employers shall have ceased to seek places for the incompetent, except in their own business. The poor and the inefficient we shall always have with us and so we shall always have the problem of providing for those who are unable to provide for themselves.

THE END.

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
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